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Abstract
Sparse graph codes were first introduced by Gallager over 40 years ago. Over the
last two decades, such codes have been the subject of intense research, and capacity-
approaching sparse graph codes with low complexity encoding and decoding algo-
rithms have been designed for many channels. Motivated by the success of sparse
graph codes for channel coding, we explore the use of sparse graph codes for four
other problems related to compression, sensing, and security.
First, we construct locally encodable and decodable source codes for a simple class
of sources. Local encodability refers to the property that when the original source
data changes slightly, the compression produced by the source code can be updated
easily. Local decodability refers to the property that a single source symbol can be
recovered without having to decode the entire source block.
Second, we analyze a simple message-passing algorithm for compressed sensing
recovery, and show that our algorithm provides a nontrivial f1/f1 guarantee. We also
show that very sparse matrices and matrices whose entries must be either 0 or 1 have
poor performance with respect to the restricted isometry property for the f2 norm.
Third, we analyze the performance of a special class of sparse graph codes, LDPC
codes, for the problem of quantizing a uniformly random bit string under Hamming
distortion. We show that LDPC codes can come arbitrarily close to the rate-distortion
bound using an optimal quantizer. This is a special case of a general result showing a
duality between lossy source coding and channel coding-if we ignore computational
complexity, then good channel codes are automatically good lossy source codes. We
also prove a lower bound on the average degree of vertices in an LDPC code as a
function of the gap to the rate-distortion bound.
Finally, we construct efficient, capacity-achieving codes for the wiretap channel, a
model of communication that allows one to provide information-theoretic, rather than
computational, security guarantees. Our main results include the introduction of a
new security critertion which is an information-theoretic analog of semantic security,
the construction of capacity-achieving codes possessing strong security with nearly
linear time encoding and decoding algorithms for any degraded wiretap channel, and
the construction of capacity-achieving codes possessing semantic security with linear
time encoding and decoding algorithms for erasure wiretap channels.
Our analysis relies on a relatively small set of tools. One tool is density evolu-
tion, a powerful method for analyzing the behavior of message-passing algorithms
on long, random sparse graph codes. Another concept we use extensively is the no-
tion of an expander graph. Expander graphs have powerful properties that allow us
to prove adversarial, rather than probabilistic, guarantees for message-passing algo-
rithms. Expander graphs are also useful in the context of the wiretap channel because
they provide a method for constructing randomness extractors. Finally, we use sev-
eral well-known isoperimetric inequalities (Harper's inequality, Azuma's inequality,
and the Gaussian Isoperimetric inequality) in our analysis of the duality between
lossy source coding and channel coding.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis explores the application of sparse graph codes to several problems broadly
related to compression, sensing, and security. In Section 1.1, we briefly review the
basic mathematical model for communication over a noisy channel, as proposed by
Shannon in his classic work [107]. Next, in Section 1.2 we discuss sparse graph
codes informally, postponing a formal description of sparse graph codes to Chapter
2. Finally, in Section 1.3 we give a high-level overview of the problems considered in
this thesis and our main results.
1.1 Channel Coding Review
In [107], Shannon proposed a mathematical model for communication over a noisy
channel. Figure 1-1 shows the basic communication model. The message is a string
Message Encoder Codeword Decoder Codeword Inverse Message
(k bits) (n symbols) Noisy Channel Q Estimate ' Estimate
Figure 1-1: Mathematical model for communication. First, a message of k bits (i.e.,
a string of k O's and l's) is encoded into a string of n symbols from the channel input
alphabet X. The resulting codeword is sent over the channel Q, producing a string
of n symbols from the channel output alphabet '. The decoder first estimates the
codeword, and then applies the inverse of the encoding map to obtain an estimate of
the original message of k bits.
of bits, and the first step in communication is to encode the message by mapping it
into a codeword composed of symbols from X, the channel input alphabet. Next, the
codeword is transmitted over the channel, and the receiver receives a noisy version of
the codeword. Formally, the channel is assumed to be a discrete memoryless channel
(DMC). Recall that a memoryless channel can be specified by its input alphabet X,
output alphabet , and transition matrix Q(ylx). Specifically, if a string x" is fed into
the channel, then the channel output is a random variable Y' distributed according
to
n
Q(Y"n = y"| Ix") = Q(yIlX).
One of the basic results of information theory, the Channel Coding Theorem [28,30,
107], shows that each memoryless channel has a capacity, that is, a maximum number
of bits per channel use that can be transmitted reliably in the limit of long channel
inputs.
The receiver must recover the message from y". Conceptually, we split this pro-
cedure into two steps. First, the receiver estimates which codeword c E I" was sent
over the channel. Then, the receiver inverts the encoding mapping to determine the
original message corresponding to codeword c. Most of coding theory focuses on
the design of good codes, i.e., designing large sets of codewords that can be reliably
distinguished when sent over the channel. The encoding mapping and inverting the
encoding mapping are typically an afterthought. One possible justification for this
is that from a theoretical standpoint, most codes proposed to date are linear codes,
and the encoding and inverse maps can be implemented in polynomial (in the code
length) complexity for any code. Designing a code and a decoding algorithm, on the
other hand, is much harder. For example, the maximum likelihood (ML) decoding
problem for linear codes is NP-hard in general [12], so a lot of research has focused on
the design of linear codes possessing additional structure that allows ML or near-ML
decoding in linear time at rates close to capacity. As we will see in Section 1.2, sparse
graph codes have gone a long way towards solving the code design problem. Of course,
if we can construct codes that are decodable in linear time, then the complexity of
the encoding and inverse maps, which is always polynomial, can suddenly become
overwhelming compared to the decoding complexity. Fortunately, certain classes of
sparse graph codes support not only linear time decoding, but also possess linear time
encoding and inverse algorithms.
1.2 Informal Overview of Sparse Graph Codes
Sparse graph codes were first proposed in [45], and have emerged as an attractive
solution to the channel coding problem. In this section we informally review some of
the major results in the area. A more formal description of the sparse graph codes
used in this thesis is given in Chapter 2.
As the name implies, sparse graph codes are error-correcting codes defined in terms
of a sparse graph, i.e., a graph with very few edges. Typically, by very few edges we
mean that as the graph size grows, i.e., as the codeword length increases, the number
of edges grows linearly with the number of vertices in the graph. Sparse graph codes
form a subclass of a general class of probabilistic models known as graphical models,
which are often represented by structures known as factor graphs. Graphical models
have found use not just in the design of error-correcting codes, but also in machine
learning, statistical inference, and many other fields. Several good introductions to
factor graphs can be found in the papers [1, 69]. However, since we focus on sparse
graph codes in this thesis, we will not elaborate on the general theory of factor graphs.
Instead, we review results that apply specifically to sparse graph codes in the context
of channel coding.
There are many different types of sparse graph codes, corresponding to different
ways of interpreting a sparse graph as defining a code. For example, low density
generator matrix (LDGM) codes are one class of sparse graph codes. It is well-
known that LDGM codes are terrible channel codes (see, for example, Section 2.2.1
for a simple explanation of this fact) in the sense that the block error rate, i.e., the
probability that an optimal decoder is able to correctly estimate the codeword sent
by the transmitter, does not approach 0 in the limit of long code lengths-in fact,
the probability of error approaches 1. Nevertheless, LDGM codes have some nice
properties. For example, the encoding map can be computed in linear time. Also,
although the block error rate, even under optimal decoding, approaches 1, LDGM
codes can be used to reduce the noise level of a channel. For example, instead of
considering decoders that produce an estimate of the transmitted codeword, we can
consider decoders that produce an estimate for each bit sent by the transmitter. The
corresponding notion of error, known as the bit error rate, is the average fraction
of bits that such a decoder estimates incorrectly. It turns out that although LDGM
codes have a high error rate in the sense that most of the time the sent message
cannot be recovered correctly even by an optimal decoder, carefully designed LDGM
codes can achieve low bit error rates. For example, although LDGM codes do not
allow the reliable transmission of long blocks of messages, a good LDGM code might
be designed so that if a message of 1000 bits is encoded by the LDGM code, then
decoded by a practical, but potentially suboptimal, decoder, on average at least 990
of the bits are decoded correctly, i.e., the bit error rate is only .01. Intuitively, it
should come as no surprise that the ability of LDGM codes to achieve low bit error
rates is quite useful, and several papers have used LDGM codes in clever ways to
construct codes for the binary erasure channel (BEC) that can be decoded in linear
or nearly linear time, and achieve not only low bit error rates, but also low block error
rates [75, 76,110,113]. 1 Because of the special structure of LDGM codes, these codes
typically allow the encoding and inverse maps to be computed in (nearly) linear time
as well.
Although with some effort LDGM codes can be used to design codes achieving low
block error rates, in practice it is difficult to achieve very low block error rates when
operating near channel capacity by just relying on clever combinations of LDGM
codes. It turns out that another class of codes, low density parity check (LDPC)
codes, can provide much better performance.
LDPC codes were first proposed by Gallager [45]. In [45], Gallager showed that
a special class of LDPC codes called regular LDPC codes can achieve the capacity
'See Section 2.1 for a formal definition of the BEC.
of the binary symmetric channel (BSC). 2 Specifically, he showed that if an optimal,
i.e., maximum likelihood (ML) , decoder is used, then the performance of a regular
LDPC code drawn from a suitable random ensemble is likely to be quite good. In
fact, [45] provides a detailed analysis computing the rate at which the block error rate
decays as a function of the code length n. In contrast to LDGM codes, the block error
rate for LDPC codes under ML decoding approaches 0 exponentially quickly in n,
and [45] characterizes the error exponent associated with the block error rate. More
recently, [72] analyzes the distribution of codewords for several different ensembles of
LDPC codes, including the ensembles proposed by Gallager.
There has also been work attempting to characterize how the number of edges in
the graph representing an LDPC code (often called the Tanner graph of the code)
scales as we try to approach capacity. For example, a famous result of Gallager [45]
says that for any LDPC code, the ratio of the number of edges in the Tanner graph
to the number of vertices in the graph must grow in order to approach rates closer to
the capacity. However, the growth rate is not very fast, so that at least in principle
LDPC codes with relatively low average degree can approach rates very close to the
capacity.
Although LDPC codes achieve good performance under ML decoding, it can be
shown that in the worst-case, ML decoding of an LDPC code is NP-hard, so ML
decoding of LDPC codes is likely to be quite complex. As an attempt to address
the decoding problem, Gallager [45] proposed a low complexity message-passing al-
gorithm for decoding LDPC codes. Although analyzing the algorithm proved to be
challenging, Gallager [45] was able to rigorously show that his message-passing al-
gorithm could correct a (small) constant fraction of errors, and simulation results
suggested that Gallager's message-passing algorithm could correct a sizable fraction
of errors.
Despite the results in [45], LDPC codes were all but forgotten for roughly thirty
years, until Berrou, Glavieux, and Thitimajshima discovered turbo codes [13]. After
the discovery of turbo codes, several groups of researchers rediscovered LDPC codes
2See Section 2.1 for a formal definition of the BSC.
[76,77]. Subsequent work on LDPC codes showed that although regular LDPC codes
can correct a sizable fraction of errors under message-passing decoding, the more
general class of irregular LDPC codes contains codes that can correct far more errors
under message-passing decoding. In fact, it has been verified by simulation that for
many channels, carefully optimized irregular LDPC codes can achieve low block error
rates under message-passing decoding at rates very close to capacity [23,99,100]. In
the special case of the BEC, it is possible to rigorously prove that LDPC codes achieve
the capacity [76,91] under message-passing decoding.
We now give a high level description of message-passing algorithms, and a rough
sketch of how one might go about analyzing the performance of message-passing de-
coding. One way to understand message-passing decoding is to consider ML decoding
of an LDPC code whose Tanner graph is cycle-free. Although ML decoding is NP-
hard in general, when the Tanner graph is cycle-free, a simple dynamic programming
algorithm can be used for ML decoding. One can interpret this dynamic program-
ming algorithm as a message-passing algorithm, i.e., an algorithm where vertices in
the Tanner graph pass messages to their neighbors. These messages are updated iter-
atively using local update rules (by local, we mean that the updated message leaving
a vertex depends only on the messages coming into that vertex at the previous itera-
tion). The reader is referred to [118] for a more detailed exposition of message-passing
algorithms and their application in the general context of graphical models.
For cycle-free graphs, by choosing the update rules properly, one can construct
message-passing algorithms that perform ML decoding. Unfortunately, it is known
that LDPC codes whose Tanner graph is cycle-free are very bad [39], so good codes
must have cycles. However, because the update rules are local, a message-passing
algorithm can in principle be applied to an arbitrary graph, i.e., even a graph with
cycles. If we choose to run a message-passing algorithm on a graph with cycles,
there is no guarantee that the algorithm performs ML decoding-in fact, we cannot
even guarantee that the messages converge! Even though the behavior of message-
passing algorithms is not well-understood for arbitrary graphs, simulations suggest
that when the Tanner graph has cycles, message-passing decoding can be very effective
for carefully designed codes. The key insight needed to explain this phenomenon,
which already appears in [45], but which was subsequently refined in [76,100], is that
the asymptotic behavior of message-passing algorithms can be analyzed when the
Tanner graph has no short cycles, i.e., the Tanner graph has large girth. By definition,
message-passing algorithms only depend on local data, so if the Tanner graph has no
short cycles, then for the first few iterations, the decoding algorithm does not "know"
that it is operating on a graph with cycles. Therefore, an analysis based on trees is
sufficient to capture the behavior. Since message-passing is much easier to analyze
on trees, this provides a powerful approach to analyzing the performance of message-
passing decoding of LDPC code ensembles that have large girth. This approach is
discussed in detail in [100], and is called density evolution. Density evolution plays a
key role in many of the code constructions in this thesis. For example, the analysis
in Appendix A includes a fairly detailed example of the density evolution technique.
Density evolution has been used to design LDPC codes that approach the capacity
for several channels [23,99] when message-passing decoding, rather than ML decoding,
is used. However, the BEC is the only channel for which it has been proved that LDPC
codes with message-passing decoding can achieve capacity. There are many proofs of
this result [76, 91], and density evolution is the key ingredient in all of these proofs.
We now discuss the encoding problem for LDPC codes. As noted earlier, a lot of
research in coding theory has focused on constructing codes and practical decoding
algorithms, and often the complexity of the encoding and inverse maps is neglected.
In contrast to LDGM codes, there is no known linear time algorithm for encoding a
general LDPC code (LDPC codes are linear codes, so these codes must be encodable in
polynomial time). In general, the naive encoding algorithm that applies to any linear
code takes 0(n 2) time, so this naive algorithm is significantly more complex than the
linear time message-passing algorithm for decoding an LDPC code. One approach
to designing LDPC codes with low encoding complexity [101] uses message-passing
decoding in a clever way to encode LDPC codes. For certain classes of LDPC codes,
the encoding method proposed in [101] can reduce the encoding complexity to 0(n),
and even when it does not, the encoding complexity is usually much smaller than the
complexity of the naive encoding algorithm for arbitrary linear codes. However, from
a theoretical standpoint, it is difficult to design LDPC codes that can provably be
encoded in linear time using the algorithm from [101] and simultaneously approach
capacity under message-passing decoding.
It turns out that one can construct sparse graph codes that share many properties
with LDPC codes, but which also have additional structure that makes encoding
trivial. Nonsystematic irregular repeat-accumulate (NSIRA) codes [97] are one such
class of codes. NSIRA codes are a variation of LDPC codes designed to have very
efficient encoding and decoding algorithms for the BEC. NSIRA codes build upon a
line of work that started with [32], which proposed the class of repeat-accumulate
codes. One motivation for repeat-accumulate codes is that this class of codes has a
graphical structure which makes the encoding and inverse maps trivial to compute
in linear time. At the same time, the graphical structure looks similar to that of
LDPC codes, so potentially density evolution and related tools developed for LDPC
codes can be used to find repeat-accumulate codes with practical decoding algorithms.
In particular, generalizing repeat-accumulate codes to irregular repeat-accumulate
codes in much the same way that regular LDPC codes were generalized to irregular
LDPC codes, it was shown in [64] that one can construct irregular repeat-accumulate
codes that achieve the capacity of the binary erasure channel under message-passing
decoding. NSIRA codes take this work one step further, producing codes for which
the encoding and inverse maps are trivial, but which also have the property that they
achieve the capacity of the BEC under message-passing decoding with uniformly
bounded complexity regardless of the gap to capacity-in particular, the average
degree of the vertices in the graphical representation of suitable NSIRA codes remains
constant as the code length gets large. 3 Contrast this with LDPC codes, where we
mentioned previously that even under ML decoding, the average degree of the vertices
in the Tanner graph, and hence the complexity of message-passing decoding, must
become unbounded as the rate approach the capacity. (Gallager [45] only proved
3By uniformly bounded complexity, we mean that the number of operations per bit required for
the encoding, decoding, and inverse operations is bounded by some fixed constant independent of
the gap to capacity.
a lower bound for the BSC, but a similar result holds for the BEC as well [106].)
Thus, in addition to having nice encoding and decoding properties, NSIRA codes are
defined by a graph that can in a fundamental sense be significantly sparser than the
Tanner graph of a good LDPC code. In Chapter 5 we will see another example of this
phenomenon, i.e., a case where codes defined by one class of graph structures may be
fundamentally limited so that the average degree must become unbounded to achieve
the appropriate information-theoretic limit, while other graph structures can be used
to define codes achieving the same limit with a uniformly bounded average degree.
We close our brief overview of sparse graph codes by quickly reviewing the use of
expander graphs in coding theory. The message-passing algorithms described above
take advantage of the probabilistic nature of the channel, and density evolution can
be used to produce bounds on the bit error rate under message-passing decoding.
As mentioned above, density evolution is myopic in the sense that it only relies
on the local graph structure. Roughly speaking, density evolution can be used to
analyze the behavior of a message-passing algorithm on a graph with n vertices by
examining a neighborhood of o(n) vertices around any given vertex-density evolution
typically breaks down once the neighborhood contains more than about VFl vertices.
Therefore, a different analysis tool is required if, for example, we want to prove that
the block error rate under message-passing decoding decays exponentially with n,
because exponential decay cannot be proved without looking at the global structure
of the graph.
Although the performance of message-passing algorithms on arbitrary graphs is
difficult to analyze, it turns out that expander graphs are a class of graphs possessing
properties that make a global analysis of message-passing algorithms more tractable.
For example, in [113] it is proved that LDPC codes defined by Tanner graphs with
good expansion properties can provide adversarial error-correction guarantees. In
other words, instead of assuming that errors are introduced by a memoryless channel,
one can show even if the errors are carefully chosen by an adversary, as long as the
number of errors is sufficiently small, no matter how the adversary chooses the errors,
a message-passing algorithm can be used to recover the original codeword.
Although the number of (adversarial) errors that such codes can correct is quite
low, for theoretical purposes these codes are useful as they allow us to provide bounds
on the block error rate. Intuitively, the idea is that we use density evolution to analyze
the bit error rate, and if the bit error rate is small, then combining our code with a code
constructed using expander graphs provides a deterministic guarantee that the few
remaining bit errors are corrected. Thus, we can use a code derived from an expander
graph to turn bounds on the bit error rate into bounds on the block error rate. For
example, we use this approach in Chapter 6 to construct codes for the wiretap channel.
Another example where we use expander graphs is in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 focuses
on compressed sensing, which roughly speaking corresponds to constructing very high
rate codes. It turns out that at high rates, the number of adversarial errors corrected
by codes defined using expander graphs is within a constant factor of the channel
capacity. Thus, in the high-rate case, codes defined using expander graphs can be
quite useful by themselves, and in Chapter 4 we analyze a message-passing algorithm
run only on an expander graph with no additional modifications.
The above overview has barely scratched the surface of known results on sparse
graph codes. We refer the reader to the many excellent surveys on LDPC codes, for
example [102,111], and the recent book [103] for a more thorough introduction to the
major topics in LDPC codes.
1.3 Thesis Outline
In Sections 1.1 and 1.2 we summarized the emergence of sparse graph codes as a
practical alternative to random codes for the channel coding problem. The reader
familiar with information theory knows that the random coding technique appears in
many other contexts, to name a few, source coding, lossy source coding, broadcast
channels, and multiple-access channels. Given that sparse graph codes appear to have
low complexity and yet still approach the capacity for a broad class of channels, it
is natural to wonder if sparse graph codes can be adapted to replace random codes
more generally. In this thesis, we present four examples suggesting that sparse graph
codes do have potential as a low complexity alternative to random codes in contexts
beyond their original domain of channel coding.
First, in Chapter 3 we consider using sparse graphs for (lossless) compression.
Compression, also known as source coding, is a well-studied problem. Traditionally,
the most important performance metrics for source coding are the compression rate
and the computational complexity of encoding and decoding the source code. In
Chapter 3 we are interested in constructing source codes that possess two additional
properties-local encodability and local decodability. To define these properties, con-
sider compression of a block, or equivalently, a vector of data. Local encodability is
the property that when a single component of the vector is changed, it is easy to up-
date the compressed output. Local decodability is the property that any component
of the vector can be recovered efficiently from the compressed output. For example,
it should be possible to recover a single component much more efficiently than by
running the decompression algorithm to recover the whole vector. It is easy to think
of scenarios where source codes possessing these properties could be useful. For ex-
ample, imagine that you are writing your thesis, and you want to store the thesis in a
compressed format. As your advisor gives you feedback, you might make some edits
to the thesis-for example, maybe you revise one page. Since you will make many
small edits, you don't want to decompress and recompress your thesis every time you
make a change. If you use a locally encodable source code, then your compressed
thesis can easily be updated as you edit, eliminating the need for decompression and
recompression! As another scenario, imagine that one wants to store a large database
in a compressed format. In order for the database to be useful, a user needs to be
able to quickly access a single record in the database-thus, a source code used to
compress the database must be locally decodable.
For a simple class of sources, we propose a solution based on sparse graph codes
that possesses nontrivial local encoding and local decoding properties. In more detail,
we construct source codes for sources specified by average and maximum constraints,
so the source consists of all vectors of nonnegative integers whose average is at most
A, and whose maximum is at most M, where A and M are parameters that can be
set arbitrarily. Our source codes achieve rates close to the information-theoretic limit
for these sources in the limit of large A. Our codes are also locally encodable and
decodable-the expected running time of our local encoding and decoding algorithms
is at most polylogarithmic in N, and for many choices of A, M, and N, the expected
running time is constant. We provide some motivation for this source model in
Chapter 3, but the construction of locally encodable and decodable source codes for
more general classes of sources is an interesting direction for future work.
In Chapter 4, we apply sparse graph codes to the problem of compressed sens-
ing. We define the compressed sensing problem formally in Chapter 4, but roughly
speaking, compressed sensing is the problem of recovering an N-dimensional signal x
from M linear measurements y. When M < N, there is not enough information to
determine x from y, i.e., the linear system is underdetermined. The key idea in com-
pressed sensing is that if the signal x is very sparse, i.e., most of the components of x
are 0, then even in the case that M < N, it is possible to reconstruct x exactly from
y. For example, if 99% of the components of x are 0, a typical result in compressed
sensing might allow one to conclude that x can be recovered exactly from roughly
.05N linear measurements via linear programming (LP), provided that these linear
measurements satisfy certain technical conditions.
Of course, many signals encountered in the real-world are not perfectly sparse, but
rather are approximately sparse in the sense that a few signal coefficients carry most
of the information. There are several methods for measuring approximate sparsity
and for providing recovery guarantees for approximately sparse signals. One widely
used notion is an p/f guarantee. Mathematically, an Ep/Eq guarantee is a recovery
guarantee of the form
||x - |p, < C|x -x kj Iq
where x is the original signal, xk denotes the best k-term approximation of x, i.e., the
set of k largest magnitude components of x, and J denotes the estimate of x produced
by a recovery algorithm. C denotes the factor by which the error is multiplied;
obviously, all things being equal, smaller values of C are preferable to larger values.
In Chapter 4, we consider f1/E1 and f2/f 1 guarantees.
In the first half of Chapter 4, we show that linear measurements derived from
sparse graph codes can perform well for compressed sensing, and further, that message-
passing algorithms can be used as an efficient alternative to LP for recovering the
original signal x from the measurements y. More precisely, we show that if the linear
measurements correspond to a suitably good expander graph (see Section 2.3 for a
definition of expander graphs), then a simple message-passing algorithm can be used
to recover sparse signals, and the same algorithm also provides an f//f guarantee.
In the second half of Chapter 4, we probe the limitations of sparse graph codes
with respect to f2/f1 guarantees. Specifically, we show that linear measurements
based on binary matrices do not possess good restricted isometry constants with
respect to the £2 norm (see Chapter 4 for a definition of restricted isometry constants).
We also show that linear measurements based on very sparse matrices do not have
good isometry constants, even if the entries do not have to be binary. To date, the
restricted isometry property is the only method known for providing f2/f1 guarantees,
so our results suggest that either a new proof technique or a different class of linear
measurements is needed to develop fast (i.e., linear or near linear time) reconstruction
algorithms providing f2/fi recovery guarantees.
In Chapter 5, we consider using sparse graphs codes for lossy source coding, also
known as rate-distortion coding. Roughly speaking, lossy source coding is similar
to traditional, lossless source coding, i.e., the goal is to represent a source using as
few bits as possible. However, unlike the lossless case, in lossy source coding we do
not have to reconstruct the source exactly from the compressed version. Rather, we
just need to reconstruct the source approximately, where the notion of approximate
recovery is formalized through a distortion measure quantifying the difference between
the original source and our reconstruction.
While we are unable to provide efficient algorithms for lossy source coding using
sparse graph codes, we are able to prove nontrivial guarantees on the performance of
sparse graph codes when optimal (and computationally very expensive) algorithms
are used. Specifically, we show that if one ignores computational complexity, there
is a strong duality between the lossy source coding problem and the channel coding
problem. Our results imply that for a broad class of rate-distortion problems, a good
channel code (i.e., a code achieving low probability of error under ML decoding) for
an appropriate dual channel automatically achieves low distortion for the original
rate-distortion problem. This duality result relies on an interesting connection be-
tween isoperimetric inequalities and the rate-distortion problem. Note that this result
applies to any code, not just sparse graph codes. Intuitively, one can think of channel
coding as a sphere-packing problem, while lossy source coding is a covering problem.
Our duality result essentially says that in high dimensions, i.e., for long code lengths,
these problems are equivalent in the sense that good sphere-packings must also be
good covers.
As a simple corollary of this general result, we show that LDPC codes are optimal
for the problem of quantizing a binary symmetric source under Hamming distortion
(BSS-HD), i.e., quantizing a uniformly random bit string so that the reconstruction is
within Hamming distance D of the original string.4 Intuitively, this result is obtained
by observing that the dual channel for the BSS-HD problem is the BSC, and as we
noted in Section 1.2, LDPC codes achieve capacity for the BSC. Therefore, they must
also be optimal for the BSS-HD problem.
For the BSS-HD problem, we also prove lower bounds on the sparsity of LDGM
codes and LDPC codes. This is the analog for lossy source coding of the fact that
the LDGM and LDPC graph structures suffer inherent limitations compared to other
classes of codes. We already mentioned this in Section 1.2 in the context of chan-
nel coding, and our lower bounds show that the average degree of the vertices in
the graphs representing LDGM codes and LDPC codes must become unbounded to
approach optimal performance for the BSS-HD problem. In a little more detail, we
show that for LDGM codes and LDPC codes, the average degree of the vertices in
the associated graphs must grow as Q(log(l)), where e is the gap between the code
rate and the optimal code rate for a given distortion level. This dependence on e is
4 By optimal, we mean that LDPC codes can achieve performance arbitrarily close to the rate-
distortion function. See Chapter 5 for a formal definition of the rate-distortion function and the
BSS-HD problem.
tight to within constant factors, and just as the NSIRA codes have graphical repre-
sentations that have uniformly bounded average degree no matter how close we want
to approach the capacity of the BEC, it turns out that a concatenation of LDGM
codes and LDPC codes can have uniformly bounded average degree for the BSS-HD
problem.
In Chapter 6, we apply sparse graph codes to the wiretap channel [120]. The
wiretap channel is a probabilistic model for one of the most fundamental problems in
cryptography, namely, how two parties can communicate information secretly in the
presence of an eavesdropper. The wiretap channel is interesting because it provides
a way around the classic result of Shannon [108] stating that every information-
theoretically secure communication scheme essentially has requirements equivalent to
a one-time pad, i.e., communicating k bits secretly requires two parties to already
share a secret key of length k. As we explain in more detail in Chapter 6, the
wiretap channel model allows one to provide security guarantees almost as strong as
the guarantees required under Shannon's definition of security [108], but the inherent
limitations the model places on the eavesdropper allow us to construct secure coding
schemes that are the analogs of public-key encryption, i.e., secure codes for the wiretap
channel do not suffer the drawback of the one-time pad in that the two parties do
not need to share a secret key.
Our main results for the wiretap channel include the following. First, we define
the information-theoretic analog of semantic security [49], a widely used notion of se-
curity in computational cryptography, and show that our analog of semantic security
is closely related to, but slightly stronger, than the notion of strong security consid-
ered in the wiretap channel literature. Next, we propose a general architecture for
constructing codes for wiretap channels. Our architecture separates the code design
process into the design of a precode to provide security, and a standard channel code
to correct errors introduced by the noisy channel between the two parties trying to
communicate. This is attractive because the precode can be designed independently
of the channel code, so we have effectively decoupled security and error-correction
in the code design process. We give a few example precodes based on randomness
extractors (see Section 2.3 for a definition of randomness extractors) to illustrate the
code design process, resulting in a proof that for any degraded wiretap channel, there
exist precodes possessing strong security whose encoding and decoding complexities
are 0(n log n log log n). Finally, for the special case of wiretap channels where the
component channels are BECs, we design sparse graph codes possessing semantic
security whose encoding and decoding complexities are only O(n).
Chapter 7 summarizes the results in this thesis and suggests avenues for future
research.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we summarize some basic results used later in the thesis. In Section
2.1, we quickly review some basic notions from coding theory and information theory,
such as linear codes and the method of types. Next, in Section 2.2, we define sparse
graph codes and describe in detail four classes of sparse graph codes that are used in
this thesis. Finally, Section 2.3 defines expander graphs and randomness extractors,
and describes several constructions of these objects.
2.1 Brief Review of Information Theory and Cod-
ing Theory
We start by reviewing a little bit of information theory. First, we recall the def-
initions of three standard channel models-the binary erasure channel (BEC), the
binary symmetric channel (BSC), and the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel. These three channel models are examples of memoryless channels, as de-
fined in Chapter 1.
9 BEC(e): The binary erasure channel with erasure probability e has input al-
phabet {0, 1} and output alphabet {0, 1, *}. The transition matrix is
1-e for y=x
e for y = *
The capacity of the BEC is 1 - e.
" BSC(p): The input and output alphabet for the binary symmetric channel with
flip probability p is {0, 1}. The transition matrix is given by
I -p for y = x
p for y = 1 - x
The capacity of the BSC is 1 - hb(p), where hb(p) denotes the binary entropy
function, i.e., hb(p) -p log(p) - (1 - p) log(1 - p).
" AWGN: The additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with power con-
straint P and noise variance o' has input alphabet and output alphabet R. The
channel is defined by Y = X + N, where X denotes the channel input and N
represents ambient noise distributed so that N ~ N(O, oa2). That is, the channel
output Y is the sum of the input and noise, hence the name additive white
Gaussian noise channel. The input power constraint is that the average power
of the symbols in a codeword must be at most P, i.e., for all codewords X" in
the codebook, IE X < P. The capacity of the AWGN channel is j log(1+ -).
One of the main goals of coding theory is to design practical codes achieving the
capacity of the above channels, and sparse graph codes have gone a long way towards
achieving this goal.
The method of types is a commonly used and powerful analysis tool for discrete
memoryless channels. We introduce some basic notation for dealing with types, and
summarize a few well-known results on types that we use in Chapters 5 and 6. The
type of a sequence Xn E ?" is the probability distribution P over X such that
number of occurrences of x in x.
n
Similarly, given two strings x" and y", we define the conditional distribution induced
by these sequences as
number of occurrences of (y, x) in (y", Xn)
~Y1XI\YIX) - number of occurrences of y in yfl
(Note that if a symbol y E does not occur at least once in yf, then the above
expression is undefined.) We define Qxiy in a similar fashion. We use several standard
results regarding types from the theory of large deviations. These results can be found,
for example, in [281.
1. The total number of types associated with strings x" C X" is at most (n+ 1) IX1.
2. Sanov's theorem when X" is generated i.i.d. according to Px, the probability
that X" has type P is at least I e-nD(f1Px), where D(.1-|) denotes the
Kullback-Liebler divergence.
3. Given yn with type Py and a conditional distribution Qxiy, the number of
strings z" such that the conditional distribution induced by x" and yn equals
Qxiy is at least
enH(XIY)
(n + i)MI'
where X and Y are random variables distributed according to (X, Y) ~ QyixPY.
4. When a string y" with type Py is the input to a channel with distribution Qxiy,
the probability that the conditional distribution Qxiy induced by the channel
output and channel input satisfies the property Oxiyy - QxiyPyII < 1
is at least 1 - o(1), where the o(1) is with respect to n.
Now, we review some basic terminology from coding theory. A binary code C
with blocklength n, rate R, and relative distance J is simply a subset of {0, 1}" of
size 2Rn, such that the Hamming distance between any two elements of C is at least
on. (Recall that the Hamming distance is the number of coordinates in which two
strings differ). We say that a sequence of codes {Cn}, indexed by the blocklength
n, is asymptotically good if limna, on > 0, where on denotes the relative distance of
C,. Construction of asymptotically good codes with positive rate is one of the main
problems in classical coding theory.
The set {0, 1} can naturally be identified with the two element field GF(2), and
{0, 1}" can naturally be viewed as an n-dimensional vector space over GF(2). We
say that C is a linear code if C is a linear subspace of {0, 1}'. In the case of binary
codes, this simply means that if ci and c2 are two codewords in C, then c1 + c2 is also
in C. Note that addition refers to addition in the vector space {0, 1}", i.e., the sum
of two binary strings is the bitwise exclusive-or of the two strings.
Since binary linear codes C correspond to linear subspaces of {0, 1}", a natural
method to represent a linear code C is to specify a basis for the subspace correspond-
ing to C. Specifically, we can form a generator matrix G for C, i.e., a matrix whose
row space is equal to the set of strings in C. Note that the generator matrix repre-
sentation is far from being unique-any two generator matrices with the same row
space represent the same code.
Another way to represent the code C is via the dual subspace. In more detail,
given two vectors u, v E {0, }", let u v denote the dot product of the two vectors,
i.e.,
n
U v - = uivi,
i=1
where addition and multiplication are carried out over the field GF(2). Then, the
set C' = {v {0, 1}" : v - = 0 Vu E C} is a linear subspace of {0, 1}n, which
we call the dual code to C. It can easily be verified that C' uniquely specifies C,
for example, by observing that (C')' = C for any linear subspace C. Therefore, we
can specify C by giving a generator matrix H for the dual code C'. Note that an
equivalent definition of C' is that C' is the nullspace of a generator matrix G of C.
Thus, C is the nullspace of H, and H is called a parity check matrix for C.
2.2 Sparse Graph Codes-Definition and Exam-
ples
We can naturally associate a bipartite graph with a matrix with entries in {0, 1}. For
example, let G be an m-by-n generator matrix. Then, we can form a bipartite graph
with m vertices called variable nodes, and n vertices called check nodes, as shown in
Figure 2-1. We connect the ith variable node to the jth check node if Gj3 = 1, where
Check Nodes
Variable Nodes
Figure 2-1: Normal graph representation of a generator matrix.
Gij denotes the entry in the ith row and jth column of G. For example, the graph in
Figure 2-1 corresponds to the matrix
1 1 0
G =.
0 1 1
We can perform a similar procedure for parity check matrices, except that the
role of the variable and check nodes is reversed. In more detail, let H be an m-by-n
parity check matrix. Then, we form a bipartite graph with n variable nodes and m
check nodes, where the ith check node is connected to the jth variable node if Hij = 1.
Figure 2-2 shows the graph associated with the parity check matrix
H =
L0
Note that this is the same matrix that we used in our generator matrix example, and
the only difference between Figures 2-1 and 2-2 is that the variable nodes and the
check nodes have been interchanged. This is a special case of an important general
principle-if one is given the graph of a code, interchanging the variable nodes with
the check nodes gives the graph associated with the dual code.
Variable Nodes
T T T
Check Nodes
Figure 2-2: Tanner graph representation of a parity check matrix.
In the case of parity check matrices, the graph constructed above is often called
the Tanner graph of the code. The use of = to denote variable nodes and + to denote
check nodes is meant to be suggestive. For example, consider the Tanner graph shown
in Figure 2-2. Imagine that we assign the values 0 and 1 to the edges of the Tanner
graph. We say that a variable node is satisfied if the constraint that all values assigned
the edges incident to that variable node have the same value, hence the = notation.
Similarly, a check node is satisfied if the sum of all the values assigned to the edges
incident to the check node is 0, hence the + notation. We say that the value assigned
to a variable node is the value assigned to the half-edge leaving the variable node.
Then, it is easy to see that the whole Tanner graph is satisfied if and only if the values
assigned to the variable nodes form a string in the code C. A similar interpretation
is possible for generator matrix codes. This type of graph representation is called a
normal graph [42].
Now that we have constructed graphs associated with the generator matrix and
parity check matrix of a code, the name sparse graph code should be self-explanatory.
A sparse graph code is simply a linear code that is represented by a graph with a small
number of edges. To be explicit, note that a general Tanner graph with n variable
nodes and m check nodes could have as many as mn edges. In the context of coding
theory, the interesting regime is when m is proportional to n, so this means that the
number of edges could grow like n2. In this thesis, when we refer to a sparse graph
code, we usually mean a graph for which the number of edges is proportional to n,
i.e., the average degree of the variable nodes is bounded rather than growing with
n. Occasionally, however, we may refer to graphs with O(n log n) edges or even nii
edges for some small E as sparse graphs since these graphs still have far fewer than
n2 edges.
There are many variations of sparse graph codes, so we briefly discuss a few of
the sparse graph codes used in this thesis.
2.2.1 Low Density Generator Matrix (LDGM) Codes
If a code has a generator matrix with a sparse graph representation, i.e., a generator
matrix with 0(n) 1's, then we call the code a low density generator matrix (LDGM)
code. In the context of channel coding, it is easy to convince oneself that LDGM
codes are terrible channel codes. To see this, note that even for a BEC, if the channel
erases all the check nodes connected to some variable node, then the value of this
variable node cannot be determined correctly with probability better than random
guessing. By definition, the average degree of the variable nodes in an LDGM code is
bounded by a constant d independent of n, so intuitively it is clear that at least one
variable node will have all of its neighbors erased, and one can easily turn this into a
rigorous proof that the (block) probability of error approaches 1 for LDGM codes.
2.2.2 Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) Codes
If a code has a sparse Tanner graph, then the code is called a low density parity check
(LDPC) code. Generally speaking, random ensembles of LDPC codes are considered
rather than individual codes. We now describe one of the most common LDPC
ensembles, an irregular (A, p)-LDPC ensemble.
A (A, p)-LDPC ensemble is a random code whose Tanner graph is generated as
follows. Let A and p be probability distributions over the positive integers, and let
Ai and pi denote the probability assigned to i by A and p, respectively. We construct
a random Tanner graph such that A corresponds to the degree distribution of the
variables nodes in the Tanner graph, i.e., for each i, the fraction of variable nodes
in the Tanner graph with degree i is Ai. Similarly, p corresponds to the degree
distribution of the check nodes in the Tanner graph, i.e., for each i, the fraction
of check nodes in the Tanner graph with degree i is pi. Let EX = Asi and
E, =El pii be the expectations of A and p, respectively. For simplicity, in the
following we assume that n is an integer such that Ain and PEn are integers for all
i. We construct a Tanner graph with n variable nodes, m = Ln check nodes, and
E = EAn edges using the method proposed in [76,100]. The edges are assigned using
the following procedure. We think of each variable node as having a set of sockets.
Specifically, we partition the n variable nodes into disjoint sets so that Ain nodes have
1 socket, A2n nodes have 2 sockets, and so on. Note that because A is a probability
distribution, En Ai = 1, so this procedure assigns every variable node to some set.
Also, note that the total number of sockets is Ei A=in FEn. We create sockets
for the check nodes similarly. That is, we partition the m check nodes into disjoint
sets so that p1m nodes have 1 socket, p2m nodes have 2 sockets, and so on. As before,
this procedure assigns every check node to some set, and the total number of sockets
is again EAn. Thus, we have an equal number of sockets for the variable nodes and
the check nodes. Let v1,. .. , VE denote the sockets assigned to variables nodes, let
C,... , CE denote the sockets assigned to check nodes, and let -r denote a uniformly
random permutation of the set {1, ... , E}. Then, the edges of the Tanner graph are
formed by adding an edge to the Tanner graph between each pair (vi, Cr(i)). Figure
2-3 illustrates this procedure for a small example.
Recall from Chapter 1 that unlike LDGM codes, LDPC codes can achieve low
block error rates. In Chapter 1 we mentioned two different classes of LDPC codes-
regular LDPC codes and irregular LDPC codes. Regular LDPC codes are codes for
which Ai and pi each place all of their probability mass on a single positive integer.
Variable Nodes
2 sockets for each variable node
Connect sockets
using a random permutation
3 sockets for each check node
Check Nodes
Figure 2-3: Example of a randomly constructed Tannergraph with 6 edges. Each
variable node has degree 2, and each check node has degree 3.
Irregular LDPC codes are LDPC codes with general distributions A and p, i.e., the
distribution is not constrained to place all the mass on a single integer.
2.2.3 Nonsystematic Irregular Repeat-Accumulate (NSIRA)
Codes
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, nonsystematic irregular repeat-accumulate (NSIRA)
codes [97 are a variation on LDPC codes designed so that the encoding and inverse
maps are trivial to compute. There exist NSIRA codes that achieve capacity for the
BEC under message-passing decoding. Furthermore, these codes achieve capacity for
the BEC with uniformly bounded complexity regardless of the gap to capacity.
Formally, NSIRA codes are encoded as follows. Let m= . . . man E {O, 1}Rn
be the message. Then, we repeat each bit mi ci times, where ci is a repetition factor
that may be different for each bit (this is the irregularity, i.e., the I in NSIRA).
Let x 1 ... Xan denote the an bits obtained after this repetition, where a = 1E1 ci.
Then, we randomly permute the bits, and accumulate the result a bits at a time.
Formally, let 7r denote a uniformly distributed permutation over the set {1, . . . , n}.
Then, the final encoding is
ai
ZiEX 7 j)
j=1
I1< i< n.
The reason these codes are called nonsystematic is that the original message bits mi
are not part of the output.
Figure 2-4 shows the graph corresponding to NSIRA codes. After looking at
Encoded Output
This graph represents
an accumulator
Apply random
permutation
(Punctured) Input Message Bits
Figure 2-4: Graphical representation of a nonsystematic irregular repeat-accumulate
code.
Figure 2-4, one might wonder why NSIRA codes are not just a special class of LDPC
codes. NSIRA codes can be interpreted as LDPC codes where some of the variable
nodes have been punctured, i.e., the variable nodes corresponding to the original
message are not sent over the channel. It is this puncturing that allows NSIRA codes
to get around the limitations of LDPC codes and achieve capacity for the BEC with
uniformly bounded complexity.
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Figure 2-5: Graphical representation of a repeat-accumulate-accumulate code.
2.2.4 Repeat-Accumulate-Accumulate (RAA) Codes
Repeat-accumulate-accumulate (RAA) codes [7] are defined in terms of a repetition
factor c and two independent, uniformly random permutations i, and 7r2. Let m =
Mi . . man C {o, 1 }R be the message. Then, to encode m, we start by repeating each
bit of m c times. Next, we permute these cRn bits according to ri. Then, pass the
permuted bits through an accumulator, i.e., if Xi,..., XcR denote the permuted bits,
the output of the accumulator is given by y2 = Z= x. To complete the encoding,
we repeat this process using r2, i.e., permute the bits according to 7r 2 and accumulate
the result again. Figure 2-5 shows the graph associated with this encoding process.
Note that although RAA codes as originally defined in [7] only include the output
of the final accumulator in the encoding, we will find it convenient to include the
original message and the output of the intermediate encoding in the encoding as well.
RAA codes were not designed with low-complexity decoding algorithms in mind,
but their simple code structure makes them useful in our constructions for the wiretap
channel. The key property of these codes is that by setting c appropriately, one
can construct asymptotically good RAA codes with positive rate. As we will see
in Chapter 6, the fact that RAA codes are asymptotically good but also possess
additional structure makes them quite useful in the context of coding for secrecy.
2.3 Expanders and Extractors
There is a huge body of work on constructing expander graphs and the closely related
concept of randomness extractors. In this section, we describe just the concepts used
in this thesis. For the reader familiar with expander and extractors, this thesis relies
on the Lubotzky-Phillips-Sarnak (LPS) construction of Ramanujan graphs [74], as
well as Margulis' construction of spectral expanders [78]. Also, we use the zigzag
construction of [19], and the Leftover Hash Lemma [59], a well-known method for
constructing randomness extractors. A good reference for the reader interested in
learning more about expander graphs and their applications is [57].
There are several definitions of expander graphs. The two notions that are relevant
to the constructions in this thesis are spectral expansion and vertex expansion. First,
we define spectral expansion. Let {G,} be a sequence of d-regular graphs, indexed by
the number of vertices (d-regular means that every vertex is incident to d edges). Let
A, d A2 ... > A,, denote the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of G", sorted
in descending order. We say that the sequence of graphs {G,} is a family of spectral
expanders if
lim sup A2 < d,
n-oo
i.e., there is a constant separation between the largest eigenvalue and the second
largest eigenvalue. Intuitively, such graphs are well-connected. For example, a ran-
dom walk on such a graph converges to its stationary distribution quickly. We use
spectral expanders indirectly, in the sense that spectral expanders form the basis for
constructions of randomness extractors and vertex expanders.
Now, we discuss vertex expansion. Vertex expansion can be defined for general
graphs, but in this thesis we are only interested in the bipartite case. Let G =
(X, Y, E) be a bipartite graph with left vertex set X, right vertex set Y, and edge
set E C X x Y. For an arbitrary set of vertices S C X U Y, let F(S) be the set of
neighbors of S, i.e., F(S) = {u C X U Y: 3v E S such that (u, v) C E}.
Definition 2.3.1 (Vertex Expander). The bipartite graph G = (X, Y, E) is a (c, d)-
regular (K, a)-expander if every vertex in X has degree c, every vertex in Y has degree
d, and for every set S C X of size at most K, |F(S)I > ac|S|.
Intuitively, |F(S) is always at most CIS1, so if a is close to 1, then this says that small
sets of vertices on the left have nearly disjoint sets of neighbors on the right.
As alluded to in Chapter 1, expander graphs can be used to construct codes with
adversarial error-correction guarantees. For example, vertex expanders with a > .5
can be used to construct asymptotically good error correcting codes. Specifically,
in [113] it is proved that if G is a (K, a)-expander with a > .5, and if we view G as
the Tanner graph of an LDPC code, the resulting code has minimum distance at least
K. Using the probabilistic method, one can prove the existence of (K, 1- E)-expander
graphs with N left vertices and M = O(K log(N)) right vertices. Thus, in the regime
where K, N -* oc such that the ratio 1 is kept fixed, we obtain asymptotically good
codes. In fact, when a > .75, we can say even more. As shown in [1131, if G is a
(K, a)-expander with a > .75, a simple message-passing algorithm can be used to
correct any pattern of L errors. Recall from Chapter 1 that we can use this kind of
result to provide bounds on the block error rate.
Closely related to the notion of expander graphs is the concept of a randomness
extractor. Roughly speaking, randomness extractors are functions designed to purify
randomness. Formally, we define the min-entropy of a random variable X distributed
over some finite alphabet, say {1, 2, ... , N}, as
Ho(X) = max - log(Pr[X = i]).
iE{1,.N}
We say that a random variable X is a (k, e)-source if there exists some distribution
with min-entropy k whose statistical (f1) distance from X is at most E. Finally, a
(k, E)-randomness extractor Ext is a function mapping two arguments, a source X
and a random seed S uniformly distributed over some set {1,... , 2k '}, into the set
{1, ... , 2 k}, satisfying the following property. For all sources X with min-entropy at
least k, the random variable (S, Ext(X, S)) is a (k + k', E)-source, i.e., (S, Ext(X, S))
has statistical distance at most E from the uniform distribution over { 1..., 2k+k'}
Note that the above definition is usually referred to in the literature as the definition
of a strong randomness extractor. The reason functions satisfying the above definition
are called strong extractors is because the output of the function looks close to uniform
even when the seed is part of the output. We use randomness extractors in our code
constructions for the wiretap channel in Chapter 6.
We now describe in more detail the constructions of expanders and extractors
used in Chapters 3, 4, and 6.
2.3.1 The Lubotzky-Phillips-Sarnak (LPS) Construction
In this section, we describe the LPS construction of Ramanujan graphs. The LPS
construction takes two parameters, p and q, such that (a) p and q are both prime
numbers, (b) p and q are both congruent to 1 mod 4, and (c) = -1, i.e., p is
not a quadratic residue mod q. The following lemma from [74] shows that the LPS
construction produces spectral expander graphs with large girth.
Lemma 2.3.1. The LPS construction produces a (bipartite) p + 1-regular graph with
q - q vertices, A <; 2 , and girth at least 4 logP(q) - logP4.
For completeness, we describe the LPS construction below. The LPS construction
is simply a (p + 1)-regular Cayley graph for the projective linear group of 2 by 2
matrices over the finite field GFq, i.e., PGL(2, q). To be explicit, a famous theorem
of Jacobi (see, for example, [55] for an elementary proof) states that the number
of representations of a positive integer n as a sum of 4 squares is 8 Ed d, where
the sum ranges over all divisors d of n not divisible by 4. Specializing this result
to the case of a prime p congruent to 1 mod 4, it follows that there are precisely
p +1 solutions (over the integers) to the equation p = a2 + a2 + a2 + a2 where ao
is odd and positive. For example, when p = 5, the 6 solutions are (ao, ai, a 2, a3 ) =
(1, 2, 0, 0), (1, 0, 2, 0), (1, 0, 0, 2), (1, -2, 0, 0), (1, 0, -2, 0), and (1, 0, 0, -2). To each of
these solutions, we associate an element of PGL(2, q). Specifically, because q = 1
mod 4, there exists an element x E GF satisfying x2 = -1, i.e., -1 is a quadratic
residue mod q. So, we associate a solution (ao, ai, a2 , a3 ) with the matrix
ao + xai a2+ xa3
-a 2 + xa3 ao - xai
Finally, the graph returned by the LPS construction is simply the Cayley graph of
PGL(2, q) where the generating set S is the set of p + 1 matrices associated with the
solutions (ao, ai, a2, a3 ). Note that this set of matrices is closed under inversion, so
the Cayley graph is undirected.
For future reference, we note that the Cayley graph constructed above is bipartite.
Specifically, PGL(2, q) contains the subgroup PSL(2, q), the projective special linear
group. It is easy to see that PSL(2, q) and its single coset form a bipartition of
PGL(2, q)-the determinant of any matrix in S is p, which by assumption is not
a quadratic residue mod q. Thus, every edge in the Cayley graph must have one
endpoint in PSL(2, q) and one endpoint outside PSL(2, q).
2.3.2 The Margulis Construction
This section describes Margulis' construction of expander graphs, which we use in
Chapter 6 to construct extractors. The construction produces an 8-regular graph G,
with n 2 vertices, where n can be any positive integer. We think of the vertices as
pairs (x, y) of integers modulo n, i.e., x and y are in the range 0, 1, .. . , n - 1. The 8
neighbors of the vertex (x, y) are (x + 2y, y), (x, 2x + y), (1 + x + 2y, y), (x, 1 + 2x +
y), (x - 2y, y), (x, y - 2x), (y, x - 2y - 1), and (x, y - 2x - 1), where all arithmetic
is carried out modulo n. The following lemma, from [44], shows that this graph is a
spectral expander.
Lemma 2.3.2. The graph G, satisfies A2  5v'2 < 8 for every positive integer n.
2.3.3 The Zigzag Product
The zigzag construction of [19] produces a graph using 3 other bipartite graphs.
Depending on the properties of the 3 input graphs, this construction can be used to
construct either vertex expanders or randomness extractors. For example, in Chapter
3, we use the zigzag construction to prove the existence of vertex expanders with an
efficient algorithm to compute the neighbors of a given vertex, and in Chapter 6
we- use the zigzag construction to construct randomness extractors. Although we
do not state this explicitly in Chapter 4, the zigzag construction can also be used
to give explicit linear measurement matrices for our message-passing reconstruction
algorithm, albeit with worse parameters than the best expanders known to exist via
the probabilistic method.
The following lemma, which is just a special case of Theorem 7.1 from [19], sum-
marizes the most important properties of the zigzag construction for our purposes.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let Z1 be the graph produced by the LPS construction (or any suitable
spectral expander graph). For any T, e > 0, there exist suitable constant sized graphs
Z 2 and Z3 such that the output graph Z produced by applying the zigzag construction
to input graphs Z1 , Z 2, and Z3 is a graph with N left vertices, N/T right vertices, and
left degree poly(log(T), 11E). Furthermore, Z is a (Q(EN/(TD)), (1 - e)D)-bipartite
expander.
For completeness, we describe the zigzag construction below. The following is
essentially just a summary of [19], although we make some very minor changes in the
statements of the lemmas from [19] to suit our purposes. To explain the construction,
it will be useful to view bipartite graphs as functions from the left vertices to the right
vertices. Specifically, we associate a bipartite graph with its edge function E(i, j).
The edge function 1 gives the jth neighbor of vertex i on the left, i.e., for a D-
'Note that the letter E is chosen in [19] as an abbreviation for extractor, not edge. The function
E will usually be some kind of randomness extractor, but familiarity with the theory of random-
regular graph with N vertices on the left and M vertices on the right, E goes from
[N] x [D] -+ [M], where we use [N] to denote the set {1, 2, ... , N}.
We will be interested in edge functions with special properties, as summarized
in the following definitions. Note that these are identical to the definitions in [191,
except that we have not taken logarithms. We use the notation UN to denote the
uniform distribution over a set of size N.
Definition 2.3.2. A function E : [N] x [D] -+ [M] is called an (E, A) extracting
conductor if for any 1 < 2 k < ! and any source X over [N] such that Ho(X) > k,
the distribution of E(P, UD) is a (k + log(A), E)-source.
Definition 2.3.3. A function E : [N] x [D] -+ [M] is called a (Kmax, E) lossless
conductor if for any 1 < 2k < Kax and any source X over [N] such that Ho(X) > k,
the distribution of E(P, UD) is a (k + log(D), e)-source.
Definition 2.3.4. A pair of functions E: [N] x [D] -+ [M] and C: [N] x [D] - [B]
is called a (Kmax, e, A) buffer conductor if E is an (E, A) extracting conductor and the
pair (E, C), viewed as a function from [N] x [D] -+ [M] x [D], is a (Kmax, e) lossless
conductor.
As a special case of a buffer conductor, note that if (E, C) is a permutation, then
(E, C) is automatically an (N, 0) lossless conductor.
Definition 2.3.5. A pair of functions E : [N] x [D] -+ [M] and C : [N] x [D] -+ [B]
is called a (E, A) permutation conductor if E is an (E, A) extracting conductor and
the pair (E, C), viewed as a function from [N] x [D] -+ [M] x [D], is a permutation.
Now, we define the graph, i.e., edge function, produced by the zigzag construction.
Let Z 1, Z2 , and Z 3 be input graphs with the following properties. The graph Z1 has
N1 vertices on the left, each with degree D 1 , and M1 B1 vertices on the right, so
the associated edge function is defined from [N1 ] x [D1 ] -+ [MiB 1 ]. Because [M1B1 ]
can naturally be identified with [M1 ] x [B1], we represent the edge function for Z1 as
ness extractors is not needed to understand the zigzag construction. Rather, the connection with
randomness extractors is useful for analyzing the properties of the construction.
(E1 , C1 ), where E1 goes from [N1] x [D1] -+ [M1] and C1 goes from [N1 ] x [D1 ] -+ [B1].
The graph Z2 has N2 vertices on the left, each with degree D2, and D1B2 vertices
on the right. We represent the edge function for Z2 as (E2, C2), where E2 goes from
[N2] x [D2] --+ [D1 ] and C2 goes from [N2] x [D2] --+ [B2]. Finally, Z3 has B1 B 2 vertices
on the left, each with degree D3, and M 3 vertices on the right. We represent the edge
function for Z 3 as E3 : ([BI] x [B2]) x [D3] -+ [M3], where, as before, we have used
the natural correspondence between the sets [B1B 2] and [B1 ] x [B2].
The output graph Z produced by the zigzag construction has N1 N 2 left vertices,
each with degree D 2D3, and M1M 3 right vertices. The only thing left to specify is
the edge function E: ([N1] x [N2]) x ([D2] x [D3]) -+ ([M 1] x [M3 ]). We compute
E((x1,x 2), (r2 ,r 3 )) as follows.
(ri 7zi) (E2, C2) (X2, r2)
(Y1, Z2) A(E1, C1) (x 1, ri1)
Y2 E3((zi, Z2), r3)
E((zi,,X2) , (r2,7 r3)) (Y1, Y2).-
The above construction is well-defined whenever the graphs have the appropriate
sizes and degrees. However, to produce graphs with good expansion, we must impose
additional conditions on Z 1, Z 2, and Z 3 . To prove Lemma 2.3.3, we take Z 2 to be an
optimal buffer conductor of constant size, and we take Z 3 to be an optimal lossless
conductor of constant size. The parameters of such conductors are described by Lem-
mas 4.2 and 4.3 of [19]. For our application, it is convenient to make Z 2 and Z3 left-
and right-regular as well. It is easily verified that essentially the same performance
as in lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 of [19] can be obtained even with the regularity restriction.
2.3.4 The Leftover Hash Lemma
In this section, we describe the Leftover Hash Lemma [59], a simple method for
constructing extractors. Since the proof of correctness is short, we include the proof
to keep this thesis as self-contained as possible. Roughly speaking, the Leftover Hash
Lemma says that a good family of hash functions can be used to construct extractors.
Lemma 2.3.4. Let {hs} be a family of hash functions mapping X to 3. Let | E e22k,
and let 8 denote the index set of the family {h 8 }. Assume that for all x E X, hs(x)
is uniformly distributed over , and that for all x1 # x 2 E X, the collision probability
Pr[hs(xi) = hs(x 2 )] ,
where S is a random variable uniformly distributed over S. Then, the function Ext
X x 8 -* J defined by Ext(X, S) = (hs(X)) is a (k, E)-extractor.
Before proving Lemma 2.3.4, we state a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 2.3.5. Let k be such that 2 k is an integer, and let X be a random variable
such that Ho(X) < k. Then, X can be expressed as a convex combination of random
variables Xi, where each Xi is uniformly distributed over some set of size 2 k.
Proof. Let {1, 2,. . . , n} denote the support of X, and let P1, P2, . - - , pn denote the
probability distribution of X. The condition that Ho(X) > k can be expressed by
the linear constraints
0 < pi < 2 -k for 1 < i < n,
n
i=1
The lemma is equivalent to the statement that any vertex of the polytope specified
by the above constraints has the property that 2 k of the pi's are 2 -k, and the remaining
n - 2k pi's are 0. This is obvious, because any vertex is defined by the intersection of
n linearly independent constraints, and it is easily verified that the intersection of n
of the constraints has the property that every pi is either 0 or 2-
Proof of Lemma 2.3.4. We must show that for any random variable X such that
Ho(X) > k, the distribution of (S, hs(X)) is close to the uniform distribution over 8 x
. From lemma 2.3.5, it suffices to consider random variables X uniformly distributed
over a set of size 2 k, so in the following we assume that X is of this form. For such
X, we must show that
E Pr[S = s and hs(X) y] - I e.
This sum can be rewritten as
Pr[S =s)>3 Pr[hs(X) = y|S = s] - < E.
S y-
The inner sum is the statistical distance between the output of the hash function hs
and the uniform distribution, conditioned on the event S = s, so the sum can be
viewed as the expected value of the statistical (f1) distance D1 (S) between hs(X)
and the uniform distribution, where the expectation is over S. Instead of directly
computing a bound on the expectation of D1 (S), we bound E[D 2 (S) 2], where D2 (S)
denotes the f2 distance.
We analyze E[D 2 (S) 2 ] using the bound on collision probability. Specifically,
E[D2 (2)2] 2 + (Pr[hs(xi) = hs(X2)] -
< 21c.
To complete the proof, note that the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality implies that
E[D 1 (S)] < VIj2~--5k
which proves that Ext(X, S) = (hs(X)) is a (k, E)-extractor.
The following lemma is just a special case of 2.3.4, since the function Ext(x, s) =
(X -s)Lk+21ogeJ clearly satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 2.3.4.
Lemma 2.3.6. (Leftover Hash Lemma) The function Ext(x, s) = (x - s)Lk+21oge is a
(k, E)-extractor. The superscript notation indicates that the output of the extractor is
only the first [k + 2 log Ej bits of the product.
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Chapter 3
Locally Encodable and Decodable
Source Codes
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the problem of constructing locally encodable and de-
codable source codes. As described in Chapter 1, the problem is to construct good
(lossless) source codes satisfying two additional properties-local encodability and
local decodability. Recall that local encodability is the property that when a single
component of the source is changed, it is easy to update the compressed output. Lo-
cal decodability is the property that any component of the source can be recovered
efficiently from the compressed output. For example, it should possible to recover
a single component much more efficiently than by running the decompression algo-
rithm to recover the entire source. It is easy to think of scenarios where source codes
possessing these properties could be useful. We mentioned a couple of scenarios in
Chapter 1, e.g., updating a thesis and storing a database. As another example, in
a high-speed network router one wishes to count the number of packets per flow in
order to police the network or identify a malicious flow. Since packets arrive at very
high speed, and in a large network we may want to quickly determine the number of
packets in an important flow rather than obtain the data for every single flow, we are
naturally led to consider the problem of maintaining dynamically changing integers.
Similar problems appear in many other applications that arise in networks, databases,
signal processing, etc. In the remainder of this chapter, we focus exclusively on the
problem of constructing a locally encodable and decodable source code for a class of
integer sources motivated by the high-speed network router scenario, but we empha-
size that by no means is this the only interesting class of sources to consider. An
important challenge for future work is to construct locally encodable and decodable
source codes for a broader class of sources.
In the high-speed network router scenario and related applications, there are two
key requirements. First, we need to maintain the collection of integers in a dynamic
manner so that any integer can be updated (increment, decrement) and evaluated very
quickly. Second, we need the source to be represented as compactly as possible to
minimize storage, which is often highly constrained in these scenarios. Therefore, we
are interested in source codes capable of storing N integers in a compressed manner
while maintaining the ability to read and write any of these N integers in nearly
constant time.1 Since a source code capable of representing N integers can also be
viewed as a data structure for storing N integers, in the following we use the terms
source code and data structure interchangeably.
3.1.1 Prior work
Efficient storage of a sequence of integers in a compressed manner is a classical prob-
lem of source coding, with a long history, starting with the pioneering work by Shan-
non [107]. The work of Lempel and Ziv [122] provided an elegant universal com-
pression scheme. Since that time, there has continued to be important progress on
compression algorithms. However, most well-known schemes suffer from two draw-
backs. First, these schemes do not support efficient updating of the compressed data.
This is because in typical systems, a small change in one value in the input sequence
leads to a huge change in the compressed output. Second, such schemes require the
'Or, at worst , in poly-logarithmic time (in N). Moreover, we will insist that the space complexity
of the algorithms utilized for read and write/update be of smaller order than the space utilized by
the data structure.
whole sequence to be decoded from its compressed representation in order to recover
even a single element of the input sequence.
A long line of research has addressed the second drawback. For example, Bloom
filters [14, 20, 93] are a popular data structure for storing a set in compressed form
while allowing membership queries to be answered in constant time. The rank/select
problem [24,50,51,63,86, 87,92,98] and dictionary problem [43,92,94] in the field of
succinct data structures are also examples of problems involving both compression
and the ability to efficiently recover a single element of the input, and [95] gives a
succinct data structure for arithmetic coding that supports efficient, local decoding,
but not local encoding. In summary, this line of research successfully addresses the
second drawback but not the first drawback, e.g., changing a single value in the input
sequence can still lead to huge changes in the compressed output.
Similarly, several recent papers have examined the first drawback but not the
second. In order to be able to update an individual integer efficiently, one must con-
sider compression schemes that possess some kind of continuity property, whereby a
change in a single value in the input sequence leads to a small change in the com-
pressed representation. In recent work, Varshney et al. [117] analyzed "continuous"
source codes from an information-theoretic point of view, but the notion of continu-
ity considered is much stronger than the notion we are interested in, and [117] does
not take computational complexity into account. Also, Mossel and Montanari [84]
have constructed space efficient "continuous" source codes based on nonlinear, sparse
graph codes. However, because of the nonlinearity, it is unclear that the continuity
property of the code is sufficient to give a computationally efficient algorithm for
updating a single value in the input sequence.
In contrast, linear, sparse graph codes have a natural, computationally efficient al-
gorithm for updates. A large body of work has focussed on such codes in the context of
streaming algorithms and compressed sensing. Most of this work essentially involves
the design of sketches based on linear codes [16, 17, 25, 35, 48, 60-62, 88, 116, 121].
Among these, [25, 48,60-62, 88,121] consider sparse linear codes. Existing solutions
from this body of work are ill-suited for our purposes for two reasons. First, many of
the decoding algorithms in the literature (LP based or combinatorial) require decod-
ing all integers to read even one integer-notable exceptions include the Count-Min
and Count-Sketch algorithms [21,25], which do support local decoding. Second, most
existing algorithms are suboptimal in terms of space utilization when the input is very
sparse, e.g., the Count-Min and Count-Sketch algorithms do not achieve compression
rates near the information-theoretic limit.
Perhaps the work most closely related to the results in this chapter is that of Lu
et al. [73], which develops a space efficient linear code. They introduced a multi-
layered linear graph code (which they refer to as a Counter Braid). In terms of graph
structure, the codes considered in [73] are essentially identical to Tornado codes [76],
so Counter Braids can be viewed as one possible generalization of Tornado codes
designed to operate over the integers instead of a finite field. In [73], it is shown
that space-efficient Counter Braids exist provided that (a) the graph structure and
layers are carefully chosen depending upon the distributional information of inputs,
and (b) the decoding algorithm is based on maximum likelihood (ML) decoding,
which is in general computationally very expensive. The authors propose a message-
passing algorithm to overcome this difficulty and provide an asymptotic analysis to
quantify the performance of this algorithm in terms of space utilization. However,
the message-passing algorithm may not provide optimal performance in general.
In what follows, we describe the precise problem formulation, our data structure,
and the associated algorithms for local encoding and local decoding. Before detailing
the construction, though, we provide some perspectives. The starting point for our
construction is the set of layered, sparse graphical codes introduced in [73]. In order
to obtain the desired result, we have to overcome two non-trivial challenges. The
first challenge concerns controlling the space utilized by the auxiliary information in
order to achieve overall space efficiency. In the context of sparse graphical codes, this
includes information about the adjacency matrix of the graph. Storing the adjacency
matrix naively, say with an adjacency list representation, requires Q(N log N) space
for an N x 8(N) connected, bipartite graph, which can already be much more than
N log A when A is small compared to N. Therefore, it is necessary to use graphs that
can be stored succinctly. The second challenge concerns the design of local encoding
and decoding algorithms. Linear sparse graph codes have a natural local encoding
algorithm, but it is not clear how to design a local decoding algorithm. As alluded
to in the earlier, most existing decoding algorithms in the literature are designed for
decoding the entire vector rather than just a single component. Therefore, we need
to develop a novel decoding algorithm.
To address the first challenge, we use random graphs based on appropriate Ra-
manujan graphs. These graphs have a succinct description (i.e., O(v log N) space),
efficient 'look up' (i.e., there exists a constant time algorithm that can use the succinct
description to determine the neighbors of any given vertex), and a 'locally tree-like'
property (i.e., girth at least Q(log N)). To address the second challenge, we take
advantage of our graphs' large girth to design a local decoding algorithm based on a
message-passing algorithm. Intuitively, our algorithm can be viewed as a procedure
for obtaining successively refined estimates of a single component of the source based
on the local graph structure.
3.2 Problem Formulation
Source Model. The source x is a vector of N integers, denoted x1, . . , XN, con-
strained so that x lies in the set
S(A, M, N) = {x E NN: lxiii < AN, |ix||,c < M}.
Let M > A without loss of generality, where the average A and maximum M can
be arbitrary functions of N such that A < M < NA. Although our data structure
can be designed for any given value of A, our results are most meaningful in the
regime in which both N and A (and thus M) are large. We wish to design a data
structure that can store any x E 8(A, M, N). Note that we do not assume that x
is drawn from a probability distribution, but rather that x can be any element from
8, so potentially the source might even be chosen by an adversary with the hope of
causing our algorithm to fail.
Performance Criteria. We measure the performance of a data structure by con-
sidering the following performance metrics:
Write/Update. For any i, 1 < i < N, xi can be updated (increment, decrement
or write) in near constant time. That is, the data structure is locally encodable.
Read. For any i, 1 < i < N, xi can be read in nearly constant time. That is,
the data structure is locally decodable.
Space. The amount of space utilized is the minimal possible. The space utilized
for storing auxiliary information about the data structure (e.g., pointers or
random bits) as well as the space utilized by the read and write algorithms
should be accounted for.
Properties and Drawbacks of Some Naive Solutions. We briefly discuss a few
naive solutions, each with some of these properties but not all, that will help explain
the non-triviality of this seemingly simple question. First, if each integer is allocated
log M bits, then one solution is the standard Random Access Memory: it has 0(1)
read and write complexity. However, the space required is N log M, which can be
much larger than the minimal space required (as we'll establish, the minimal space
required is essentially N log A). To overcome this poor space utilization, consider the
following prefix-free coding solution. Here, each xi is stored in a serial manner using a
prefix-free code, for example the Elias delta code [381. Such a prefix-free code requires
roughly log xi+log log xi bits to represent xi (in the limit of large xi), so the prefix-free
coding solution is essentially optimal in that it utilizes (roughly) N(log A + log log A)
bits. However, the read and write/update operations have Q(N) complexity, e.g.,
if the length of xi's prefix-free representation increases, then we must shift over the
representations of x 2 , .. . , XN to make more room for xi.
As a third example, consider the case A = 1/N and M = 1, i.e., the input x has
at most one entry set to 1, and all other entries are 0. For this choice of parameters,
we can use the Hamming code to store x. Specifically, let H denote the parity check
matrix of the Hamming code, i.e., the ith column of H is the binary expansion of i.
Then, our data structure simply stores the syndrome Hx. The write complexity is
O(1).2 The read complexity is also 0(1) in the worst-case, because Hx is nothing but
the binary expansion of the position of the 1 in x. Thus, the Hamming code gives a
solution that uses optimal space (when N is one less than a power of 2), and read and
write both take 0(1) time, so the Hamming code gives an example where the data is
compressed, and read and write can still be accomplished with low complexity.
Note that without loss of generality, M can be chosen so that A < M < AN,
because the maximum must be at least the average, and if the average of a set of
nonnegative numbers is at most A, then the maximum value of any number in the
set is at most AN. Thus, A = 1/N and M = 1 represents the maximum possible
gap between the average and maximum. At the other extreme, consider the case
where A = M. In this case, our first example (the Random Access Memory) uses the
optimal amount of space, and read and write have 0(1) complexity. Thus, at either
extreme of the A/M region, it is possible to perform optimal compression and have
low complexity read and write algorithms. In this chapter, we desire solutions that
achieve similar performance for a broader range of settings of the parameters N, A,
and M.
3.3 Construction
This section describes the construction and corresponding read/write algorithms used
to prove our main result. A caricature of the data structure is portrayed in Figure
3-1.
3.3.1 Overall Structure
Let L denote the number of layers. Let Vo = {1,..., N}, with i E Vo corresponding
to xi. Each vertex i E V has a counter of bo bits allocated to it. Because of this
association, in what follows, we use the terms vertex and counter interchangeably,
2We assume that operations on log N-bit integers take constant time.
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Figure 3-1: An example of the data structure.
e.g., sometimes we call the i t vertex in V the ith counter in V, and vice versa.
Intuitively, the bo bits corresponding to the ith vertex of Vo are used to store the
least significant bo bits of xi, while layers 1 through L are used to store the more
significant bits. Since the average is constrained, we should be able to share storage
for the more significant bits of the xi, because many of these more significant bits
must be 0 to keep the average below A. To formalize this intuition, let V denote
the collection of vertices corresponding to layer f,1 < f L, with |Vel < |V_1| for
1 < K < L. Each vertex i E V is allocated a counter of be bits. The vertices of layers
f - 1 and f, i.e., V_1 and V, are connected by a bipartite graph Ge = (Ve_1, V, E)
for 1 < f < L. We denote the ith counter (stored at the ith vertex) in V by (i, f),
and use c(i, f) to denote the value stored by counter (i, f). The role of GE is to set
up associations between counters in layers f - 1 and f. Roughly speaking, Ge tells us
how to propagate information when a counter overflows. The precise role of Ge will
become clear after Section 3.3.3.
For technical reasons, we create another copy of layers 1, . . . , L with vertices V
and corresponding graphs G' for 1 <i K L. Each vertex in V' has b' bits allocated to
it, G' = (V, V1', E'), and G' (V1, Vj', Et), 2 < f < L. We denote the ith counter
in V' by (i, f)', and we use c(i, f)' to denote the value stored by counter (i, £)'.
3.3.2 Setting Parameters
Now we define the parameters L, be, b', IVL, and IV'l for 0 < K < L. Later, we describe
the graphs Ge and G', 1 K f K L. Let C and K > 3 be positive integers, and let
Layer = 0 Layer = L
E = 3/K. Parameters C and E control the excess space used by the data structure
compared to the information-theoretic limit. Set L as
L (log log 2 A2) - log log (A)) + C,
where x+ max{x, 0}. Set bo = log(K 2 A), and recall that |Vol = N. Let Vii eN,
and let b1  log(12KA). For 2 < f < L - 1, |Vel = 2-(e-)eN, and be = 3. Finally,
|VL= 2(Ls1 )N, and bL = log (2 A2). For the second series of layers, we set
|V1'| = eN, and b' = log(rA), where r = Kpoly (log (K)). For 2 < f K L - 1,
|Vjl = e'N, and b' = r. For the last set, |VL eLN, and b' = log 22
Description of Gj
Here we describe the graphs G, 1 < f K L. Recall that we want these graphs to
have a succinct description, efficient look up, and large girth. We also want the
graphs to 'look random', i.e., the graphs need to be random enough to enable our
analysis. With these properties in mind, we start by describing the construction of
GL. We start with a bipartite graph H with the following properties: (a) H has
|VL-1 vertices on the left and .5/VL-11 vertices on the right; and (b) H is (3,6)-
regular. The construction of such an H will be described later, but first we use it
to define GL. Let O be a graph consisting of flVL-1 disjoint copies of H. For-
mally, G has left vertices vo, v1, ... ,vive-1-i and right vertices wo,wi,..., WiVTLi1.
Connect vo, v 1 ,... ,v fl i- to wowi,...,w _1 using H. Then, connect
VAI ,v 1 V ' 2Viin-1 5 .Vi_1 s 1+.5VIv' --- 7WViiL-1 using
H, and so on. GL is constructed to be isomorphic to G. Specifically, every left
vertex i E {0, ... , |VL-1I - 1} of GL inherits the neighborhood of left vertex Q(i) E
{O ... , IVL-i - 1} of G, where Q(i) is defined as follows:
1. Let F : {0, ... ,|VL_11-1} --+ /VL-1i x VL.-1| be such that F(i) = (r(i), c(i)),
where
r(i) = i mod |VL-1I and
c(i)= i + z mod IVL_1|.
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2. Let the random map R : V VL-1I x VL1 -+ VL-1I X VL-1 be defined as
R(x, y) = (7 1(x), 7 2(y)), where i1 , Ir2 are two permutations of length I/VL-1I
chosen independently and uniformly at random.
3. Q=F-1 oRoF.
To gain some intuition for Q, imagine that we arrange the vertices in VL-1 in a
square flVL-1 -by- IL-1 grid. There are many ways of assigning vertices to cells in
the grid, and the mapping F has the nice property that the left vertices of each copy of
H are mapped so that no two vertices are in the same row or column of the grid. For
example, the vertices vo, v1 ,..., v IvL1-1 are mapped to the main diagonal of the
grid. The random map R corresponds to applying independent random permutations
to the rows and columns of the grid. This interpretation of Q as a mapping applying
random permutations to the rows and columns of the grid is useful in our analysis of
the READ algorithm, specifically in the proof of Lemma A.2.8.
The construction of Ge, 2 < f < L - 1 follows a similar procedure, with a different
number of copies of H used to construct the associated G to account for the varying
size of V (and of course, new randomness to define the corresponding Q). Finally, G1
is constructed in essentially the same way as GL, but with a different (3, K)-regular
base graph H1 . The base graphs H and H1 are based on the LPS construction of
Ramanujan graphs. The details of the construction are given in Appendix 3.8.1.
In summary, the graphs Gf, 1 < f < L constructed above have the following
properties.
Lemma 3.3.1. For 1 < f < L, Ge has the following properties: (a) Gj can be stored
using O(/N log N) space, (b) for any vertex v (in the left or right partition), v's
neighbors can be computed in 0(1) time, and (c) Ge has girth Q(log N).
Description of G'
We require different properties from the Gj's than from the Ge's. We still want graphs
with succinct descriptions and efficient look up, but instead of large girth, we want
the Gj's to be very good (vertex) expanders, as defined in Section 2.3. The Gj's can
be chosen deterministically, because our analysis does not rely on any randomness in
the Gj's. To construct G', we use the zigzag construction described in Section 2.3.3.
In Appendix 3.8.1, we describe the precise choice of graphs we use in the zigzag
construction to guarantee the following properties of the Gj's.
Lemma 3.3.2. For sufficiently large K, there exists constants I = poly(log(K))
and r = l/e such that G' has the following properties: (a) G' can be stored using
0(1) space3 , (b) for any vertex v (in the left or right partition), v's neighbors can be
computed in 0(1) time, and (c) G, is an (1, r)-regular (2/K 2, 2/3)-expander.
3.3.3 Preliminary Illustration of Encoding/Decoding Opera-
tions
In this section we explain how the previously described data structure can be used to
store the source. Specifically, we work out a small example to illustrate the basic steps
required by the read and write algorithms. To this end, consider the situation when
N = 4 and L = 2. That is, Vo = {1, 2,3, 4}. Let V and V2 be such that |Vl =2 and
IV2| = 1. Let bo = 2, b1 = 2, and b2 = 2, and initially let all counters be set to 0, i.e.,
initially the data structure stores the source vector x1  x 2 = x3 = x 4 = 0. We start
by explaining the write algorithm. Say that we want to write x 3 = 2, or equivalently,
we wish to increment x 3 by 2. We accomplish this by adding 2 to c(3, 0). Since the
counters in layer 0 are allocated two bits each, these counters have a capacity of 4,
i.e., they can store any value in the set {0, 1, 2, 3}. Therefore, we add 2 to the current
value modulo 4. That is, the value in counter (3, 0) is updated to 0 + 2 mod 4 = 2.
The resulting 'overflow' or 'carry' is L(0 + 2)/4J = 0. Since the overflow is 0, no
further operations are required. This is shown in Figure 3-2(a).
Now, suppose x3 is increased further by 3. Then, c(3, 0) is changed to 2 + 3
mod 4 = 1, and a 'carry' of [(2 + 3)/4J 1 is added to the counters in layer 1 that
are connected to (3,0) via the graph G1 , i.e., counter (1, 1). Repeating the same
3 Even if we use a model of computation that requires us to store the multiplication tables for
certain finite fields explicitly, the space is o(N).
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Figure 3-2: (a) Add 2 to x 3 , (b) add 3 to x 3 , (c) add 12 to x 2 , and (d) initial config.
for decoding.
process, c(1, 1) is changed to 0+1 mod 4 = 1. The resulting carry is 0, so no further
changes are required. This is shown in Figure 3-2(b). Using a similar approach,
writing x2 =12 will lead to Figure 3-2(c). Note that the same algorithm can be used
to decrement any of the xi, by treating a decrement as an increment by a negative
value.
Finally, we give a simplified example illustrating the intuition behind the decoding
algorithm. Figure 3-2(d) shows the initial configuration. The decoding algorithm uses
the values stored in the counters to compute upper and lower bounds on the value
of a given xi. To see how this can be done for the simple example above, let us
compute upper and lower bounds on x3 . First, observe that the counter (1, 2) stores
0. Therefore, both counters in V did not overflow. Thus, each counter in V must
currently store the sum of the overflows of its neighbors in Vo.
We know c(3, 0), so the problem of determining upper and lower bounds on x 3 is
equivalent to determining upper and lower bounds on the overflow of counter (3,0).
To determine a lower bound, consider the tree obtained by doing a breadth-first search
of depth 2 in G1 starting from (3, 0), as shown in Figure 3-3(a). A trivial lower bound
for the overflow of the bottom two counters is 0. Therefore, 1 - 0 - 0 = 1 must be
an upper bound on the overflow of (3, 0).
Counter 3 Counter 3
1 -3
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Figure 3-3: (a) Breadth-first search tree of depth 2 rooted at (3,0), (b) breadth-first
search tree of depth 4 rooted at (3, 0).
Next, consider the graph obtained by doing a breadth-first search of depth 4 in
G1 starting from (3, 0). This graph is not a tree, but we can pretend that it is a tree
by making copies of vertices that are reached by more than one path, as shown in
Figure 3-3(b). As before, 0 is a trivial lower bound for the overflow of the counters at
the bottom of the tree. Therefore, 2 - 0 - 0 = 2 is an upper bound for both counters
at depth 2 in the tree. This means that 1 - 2 - 2 = -3 must be a lower bound on the
overflow of (3,0). Of course, in this case the trivial lower bound of 0 is better than
the bound of -3 obtained by this reasoning. Since our upper bound on the overflow
is 1 and our lower bound is 0, we haven't recovered the exact value of counter (3, 0)'s
overflow. However, in general, if this type of reasoning leads to matching upper and
lower bounds, then the value of (3, 0)'s overflow, and therefore the value of X3 , is
recovered exactly. One can view our analysis later in this chapter as showing that if
we choose the graphs and counter sizes properly, then it is extremely likely that the
reasoning above does give matching upper and lower bounds very quickly, i.e., long
before the breadth-first search tree reaches a size comparable to N, and therefore we
can use this kind of reasoning to construct an efficient local decoding algorithm.
3.4 WRITE Algorithm
The pseudocode of Algorithm 1 gives a more formal description of the WRITE algo-
rithm illustrated by example in Section 3.3. This algorithm is essentially identical to
the algorithm presented in [73].
1: Initialization - Let y(V, f) be the amount that needs to be added to c(v, f), with
similar notation for the counters (V, )'. We set y(i, 0) c. We implicitly initialize
y(v, f) to 0 for all other counters.
2:
3: So =SO = {i}. Sj = Sj =0 fort= 2,3,...,L.
4: for f= 0 to L - 1 do
5: for each v E Sj do
6: overflow(v) +- [c(v,")±Y(v,")J
7: c(v,E) +- c(v, f) + y(v, f) mod 2be
8: if overflow(v) 7 0 and f < L then
9: Se+1 +- Sf+1 U {u : ((v, f), (u, f + 1)) c E+1)
10: for each u C {u: ((v,f), (u, +1)) C E +1 } do
11: y(u, f + 1) <- y(u, f + 1)+ overflow(v)
12: end for
13: end if
14: end for
15: for each v E S, do
16: overflow(v) <-[c(")' y(vb/ )'
2 R
17: c(v, f)' +- c(v, )'+ y(v, f)' mod 2b'
18: if overflow(v) F 0 and f < L then
19: S+1 *- + U {u : ((v, f)', (u, f + 1)') (E E+1
20: for each E {u : ((v, f)', (u, f + 1)') E Ej+1 } do
21: y(u, f + 1)' <- y(u, f + 1)'+ overflow(v)
22: end for
23: end if
24: end for
25: end for
Algorithm 1: WRITE Algorithm
Lemma 3.4.1. WRITE has worst-case running time at most
2 (1+(log Ag( )-log 1og(A))+) = 2A2Jpoly (max (log
and uses at most
2o(1+(log1og(jM -7L)1og1og(A))+) = poly max log , )
space.
3.5 READ Algorithm
In what follows, we provide a detailed description of READ, the decoding algorithm
that recovers the value xi for any given i. READ has two parts, which we call WHP
and BAILOUT. WHP decodes a single input with high probability, and is based
on the message-passing algorithm proposed by [73]. However, to achieve the local
decoding property, we carefully design an incremental version of the algorithm, so
that WHP has a low expected running time. In the rare event that WHP fails to
recover xi, we run BAILOUT, which is slower but never fails.
3.5.1 WHP Algorithm
The idea behind WHP is that to recover xi, we only need to use local information,
i.e., instead of looking at all counters, we only use the values of counters that are
close (in terms of graph distance) to counter i in layer 0. As illustrated in Section 3.3,
local information can be used to compute upper and lower bounds on xi. Following
this insight, we propose an algorithm capable of computing better upper and lower
bounds as more local information (with respect to the graphical code) is utilized. This
algorithm can then be run incrementally, using more and more information until it
manages to decode (i.e., obtains matching upper and lower bounds).
A formal description of WHP is as follows. First, a subroutine is stated that can
recover the overflow of a single counter in an arbitrary layer of the data structure,
given additional information not directly stored in our structure, namely the values
in the next layer assuming the next layer has infinite sized counters. This subroutine
is used by the 'WHP inner loop' that utilizes more and more local information incre-
mentally as discussed above. The values that would have been stored if the counter
size was infinite are not directly available for any layer f < L, but for the last layer
L and our choice of parameters these values are precisely the values already stored
by our data structure, i.e., the last layer never overflows as long as x E S(A, M, N).
Therefore, using this subroutine, one can recursively obtain the necessary values for
layers L - 1, ... , 0. The 'WHP outer loop' achieves this by selecting appropriate
parameters in the 'WHP inner loop'.
WHP is based on the decoding algorithm introduced by Lu et. al. [73]. Our
contribution is an analysis of a modified version of their algorithm. Specifically, the
subroutine given in Section 3.5.1 can be viewed as a modified version of the algorithm
from [73] that is designed to run incrementally and locally, i.e., since we are only
interested in a single xi, our algorithm only needs to examine a small subset of the
counters stored in the data structure. Our analysis shows that this local version of
the algorithm can be much more efficient than the original algorithm, i.e., most of the
time WHP can determine the value of xi by examining far fewer than N counters.
WHP Subroutine
For any counter (u, J), the goal is to recover the value that it would have stored
if be = o. To this end, suppose the values that would have been stored in the
counters in Ve+1 if bei = oc are already known. As explained before, this will be
satisfied recursively, starting with f + = L. The subroutine starts by computing the
breadth-first search neighborhood of (u, f) in Ge+1 of depth t, for an even t. Hence
the counters at depth t of this breadth-first search, or computation, tree belong to
V (the root is at depth 0). This neighborhood is indeed a tree provided that Ge
does not contain a cycle of length < 2t. We will always select t so that this holds.
This computation tree contains all the counters that are used by the subroutine to
determine the value that (U, f) would have had if be = oo.
Once the computation tree has been computed, the overflow of the root (U, f) can
be determined using the upper bound-lower bound method described by example in
Section 3.3. In the following more formal description, we imagine that the edges of
the computation tree are oriented to point towards the root, so that it makes sense to
talk about incoming and outgoing edges. Let C(v, f) denote the set of all children of
counter (v, f), and let P(v, f) denote the parent of counter (V, f), with similar notation
for counters in V+1 . Also, for a counter (v, f + 1) E Vf+1, let cv denote the value that
this counter would have had if bf+1 = oc, which we recall was assumed to be available.
(Note: for simplicity, we leave out the e + 1 in the definition of c, because cv is only
defined for counters in V+1, hence the f + 1 is redundant.)
1: Initialization - for all counters (v, f) at depth t, set the value of the outgoing
edge so that m(v,)"P(v,) = 0. (Lower bound)
2: Next, we compute the value for edges leaving the counters at depth t - 1, i.e., the
counters just above the leaves. For counter (V, e + 1) at depth t - 1, the outgoing
value is computed as m(v,+1)-p(v,t+1) c- (w,f)EC(V,+1) m(w,)-+(V,t+1). (Upper
bound)
3: The value on an edge leaving a counter (V, f) at depth t - 2 is given by
m(o'f)-P(o) = mi m(w,+ 1)-+(Vf)-
(W,f+1)EC(o'f)
(Upper bound)
4: The value on an edge leaving a counter (v, f + 1) at depth t - 3 is computed the
same way as in step 1, i.e., m(of+1)-P(oe+1) = cV - E(w,f)eC(ve+1) m(w,f)"-(V,+1)-
(Lower bound)
5: The value on an edge leaving a counter (V, f) at depth t - 4 is given by
= max max m( w,j+1)-(vj), 0)
((W,f+1)EC(v)
(Lower bound)
6: We work our way up the tree by repeating steps 2-5, until we reach the root.
7: Termination - When the procedure finishes, we get a value c,,t for the outgoing
value from the root counter (u, f) for a depth t computation tree. To complete the
subroutine, we repeat steps 1-6 with a computation tree of depth t + 2, getting a
value Cu,t+2. If cu,t = Cu,t+2, i.e., we have matching upper and lower bounds, then
the subroutine outputs cut as the value of (u, f)'s overflow. If cut # Cu,t+2, then
the subroutine declares a failure.
Algorithm 2: WHP Subroutine
In the pseudocode of Algorithm 2, m(v,j)-.(w,j+1) denotes the number, or 'message',
associated by the subroutine with the edge pointing from counter (v, f) to counter
(w, i-f+ 1), with similar notation for edges pointing from a counter in V+1 to a counter
in V. This number is either an upper bound or a lower bound on the overflow of
whichever endpoint of the edge is in V. To aid intuition, we indicate in each step of
the pseudocode whether a lower bound or an upper bound is being computed. We
emphasize that although we assumed that the input to the subroutine included values
for all of the counters in V+1, it is clear that the subroutine above only requires values
for the counters in V+1 that also belong to the appropriate computation tree.
We conclude this section by stating two properties of the subroutine above. The
first is Lemma 2 from [73}, which formalizes the intuition that the subroutine computes
lower and upper bounds.
Lemma 3.5.1. Consider running the WHP subroutine on a computation tree of depth
t, where we assume that t is even. For a counter (v, f) at depth t' = t mod 4, the
value on the outgoing edge from (v, f) to P(v, f) is a lower bound on (v, f) 's overflow.
For a counter (v, ) at depth t' - t + 2 mod 4, the value on the outgoing edge from
(v, f) to P(v, f) is an upper bound on (v, f) 's overflow.
As a corollary, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.2. Assume that the WHP subroutine does not fail. Then, the value
returned by the subroutine is the correct value of (u, f) 's overflow.
WHP Inner Loop
Using repeated calls to the subroutine described above, the WHP inner loop deter-
mines the value of xi.
The WHP inner loop has a parameter for each layer, which we denote by t(). The
algorithm proceeds as follows. To recover xi, we start by building the computation
tree of depth t, +2 in G 1, i.e., the computation tree formed by a breadth-first search
of the graph G1 rooted at (i, 0). Next, for each counter in this computation tree that
also belongs to V1, i.e., the counters at odd depth in the computation tree, we form
a new computation tree of depth tfi) + 2 in G2 . This gives us a set of computation
trees in G2 . For each computation tree, the counters at odd depth belong to V3 , so
we repeat the process and build a computation tree of depth t3 ±2 in G3 for each of
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these counters. We repeat this process until we reach the last layer. Figure 3-4 gives
an example of this process.
Now, we work backwards from the last layer (layer L). Each computation tree
in GL has depth t(J) + 2. We run the subroutine described above on each of these
computation trees. When we run the subroutine on a particular computation tree,
we set the input c, for each counter (v, L) in VL that also belongs to the computation
tree to be c(v, L). Intuitively, this means that we are assuming that no counter in VL
overflows. As mentioned earlier, for any x E S(A, M, N), this will be the case.
Assuming that none of the subroutine calls fail, we have computed the overflow
for all the counters that appear in computation trees for GL-1. Let (V, L - 1) be a
counter in VL-1 that also belongs to a computation tree in GL-1. We have computed
(v, L - 1)'s overflow, which we denote by overflow(v, L - 1). To compute the value that
(v, L - 1) would have stored if bL-1 = 00, we simply compute c, = c(v, L - 1) + 2 bL-1
overflow(v, L - 1). Once we have computed these values, we can run the subroutine
on the computation trees in GL-1. Then, we compute the appropriate values for
counters in VL2 using the formula c, = c(v, L - 2) + 2bL2overflow(v, L - 2), and
so on until either the subroutine fails or we successfully run the subroutine on all
the computation trees. Assuming that the subroutine finishes successfully on all of
the computation trees, the final subroutine call gives us the overflow of (i, 0). Then,
xi - c(i, 0) +2booverflow(i, 0). Thus, if none of the subroutine calls fail, we successfully
recover xi.
WHP Outer Loop
The WHP outer loop repeats the WHP inner loop several times. Specifically, the
WHP outer loop starts by running the WHP inner loop. If none of the subroutine
calls fail, then we recover xi and we are done. Otherwise, we run the WHP inner
loop again, but with a new set of parameters t2, ( . . , t (. If some subroutine call
fails, we run the WHP inner loop again with a new set of parameters t (, t (3) , (3)
and so on up to some maximum number M of repetitions. If after M repetitions we
still fail to recover xi, we declare a failure. For our purposes, we set the parameters
as follows. To specify t, we introduce the auxiliary numbers 6(P) and n). For
1 < p log(N)/(log(L)) 2, 1 < f < L, we define (P), nf ), and t( as follows:
6(p) e-LP+l
(P) t__ 1 ~g () o o
1, (1 n Lt = t o+ log - log ,f ~ log d (a 6(p)
where a, c, c1, d, and t* are some fixed constants. Finally, we set M = log(N)/(log(L) 2).
This completes the specification of all the parameters. The following lemma summa-
rizes the performance of WHP.
Lemma 3.5.3. WHP has expected running time
2o ((1+(log log( M-2)-log log(A))) iog (2+(log log( M )-log log(A)))
quasipoly max log 1 ,
and uses
20(2(1+(logi og( 2)-loglog(A)) log(2+(log log( 2 )-loglog(A))
(quasipoly m x (log 1
space. The probability that WHP fails is o (1/N 4 ).
3.5.2 BAILOUT Algorithm
BAILOUT is an algorithm that recovers the source x with 0 probability of failure. It
is similar in spirit to WHP, and only uses the values of counters in V, Vj, ... , V. Like
WHP, BAILOUT recovers the source starting with the last layer and working back
to the first layer. The main difference is that because the entire source is recovered,
BAILOUT operates on the entire graph instead of just a local neighborhood. As with
WHP, we describe BAILOUT by first describing a subroutine, and then showing how
the subroutine can be applied recursively to recover the input.
BAILOUT Subroutine
In this section, we give an algorithm that solves the following problem. We are given
the values that all of the counters in V/ would have stored if b) = 00. The goal is
to recover the values that all counters in V 1 would have stored if b_ 1 = oo. The
algorithm we use to solve this problem is essentially the same as the upper bound-
lower bound method described in Section 3.5.1, except that we modify the algorithm
to run on the entire graph instead of just a computation tree. Algorithm 3 gives a
pseudocode description of the algorithm.
1: Initialization - For all edges ((u, f - 1)', (v, f)') C E, set m(_) 0.
(Lower bound)
2: Next, we compute the values in the other direction. Specifically, for all edges
((u, f - 1)', (v, f)') E E,, set
(w,f -1)'EN(v,f)'- (u,f-1)'
(Upper bound)
3: We update the values from Vj'_1 to V' using the formula
Mmin -(0)
m( (-) (o))' N(u~-)
(Upper bound)
4: We update the values from Vj' to V_1 using the formula
(wf-)'EN v~f)'(u ~ (1)'
(Lower bound)
5: We update the values from V_1 to Vj using the formula
m () =max 0, max mM .)/
(Lower bound)
6: Termination - Repeat steps 2-5 until the values converge. By convergence, we
mean that all the values computed at step 5 stay the same if we repeat steps 2-5
again. When the messages have converged, the outgoing messages leaving any
counter (u, f - 1)' E V_ 1 are all the same, and the value of this message is the
value that we return as overflow(u, f - 1)'.
Algorithm 3: BAILOUT Subroutine
The algorithm maintains two numbers for each edge ((u, f - 1)', (v, f)') E ,
corresponding to a number for each direction. Because the algorithm is iterative,
we denote these numbers by m(1) , and m(,) ,1),, where t denotes the
iteration number. Also, for an edge ((u, f - 1)', (v, )'), we use N(u, f - 1)' to denote
the set of vertices adjacent to (U, f - 1)', and N(u, f - 1)' - (v, f)' to denote the set of
vertices other than (v, )' that are adjacent to (u, £ - 1)'. As in Section 3.5.1, to aid
intuition we indicate whether the numbers being computed represent upper or lower
bounds.
BAILOUT Loop
Now, we show how the BAILOUT subroutine can be used to determine the value
of xi. As with WHP, we work backwards from layer L. Specifically, we run the
BAILOUT subroutine to recover the overflows of all counters in V'1. When we run
the subroutine on VLj, 1, we set the input c, for each counter (v, L)' to be c(v, L)'. Once
the subroutine finishes, we have computed the overflow for all the counters in V .
To compute the value that (v, L - 1)' would have stored if b' 1 = o, we compute
c= c(V, L - 1)'+ 2 "'- 1 overflow(v, L - 1). Once we have computed these values, we
can run the BAILOUT subroutine on V- 2, and so on until we have computed the
overflow for all counters in V0. Then, xi = c(i, 0)' + 2 "' overflow(i, 0).
The following lemma states that the BAILOUT algorithm works as desired.
Lemma 3.5.4. The BAILOUT algorithm recovers the overflow for all counters in Vo
correctly.
For technical reasons, we cannot use a naive implementation of the BAILOUT
subroutine. Specifically, in the first layer, the numbers stored on the edges can be
at least as large as I. Thus, a naive implementation that stores the numbers
associated with each edge using log(K ) space will use at least 3N log(K) space
for just the first layer, while we want the workspace used by the algorithm to be
much less than N log A. In Appendix A.1, we show how to modify the BAILOUT
algorithm so that it uses a small amount of space, albeit at the cost of an increased
running time.
Lemma 3.5.5. The modified BAILOUT algorithm has running time O(N) and uses
at most 4N + O(E log(1/e)N) space.
Before moving on, we note that the BAILOUT subroutine can be interpreted
as an algorithm for compressed sensing. As alluded to in Chapter 1 and described
formally in Chapter 4, one of the basic problems in compressed sensing is recovering a
signal with very few nonzero entries from a small set of linear measurements. Lemma
3.8.7 can be viewed as saying that the BAILOUT subroutine is capable of recovering
nonnegative signals with at most an nonzero components when the measurement
matrix is a suitably good expander graph. Note that there is nothing special about
the choice of sparsity an-for any k and n, we noted in Chapter 2 that suitable
expanders with O(k log(n/k)) right vertices exist, so the BAILOUT subroutine can
be used to recover nonnegative signals with at most k nonzero components from
0(k log(n/k)) measurements. In Chapter 4 we explore the connection between the
BAILOUT subroutine and compressed sensing further, and show that the BAILOUT
subroutine can provide an f/I reconstruction guarantee.
3.6 Space
We conclude this section with the following two lemmas, which prove that for large
A, the data structure uses close to the optimal amount of space.
Lemma 3.6.1. With the choice of parameters given in Section 3.3.2, the generic data
structure uses
1+ 2E + N log (A) +0 N log (
space.
Lemma 3.6.2. Any data structure that can recover the input with probability 1 must
use space at least N log A. ' Also, there exists a data structure using space at most
N (log (A) + n
+A lIn(2)
which is capable of recovering the input with probability 1, albeit with a computationally
very expensive recovery algorithm.
'If we allow a small probability of failure, then the lower bound is reduced, but it can be verified
that the loss is negligible.
3.7 Main Result
Finally, we can state the main result of this chapter, Theorem 3.7.1.
Theorem 3.7.1. With the choice of parameters given in Section 3.3.2, the generic
data structure has the following properties:
1. Write- There exists an algorithm WRITE(i, c) that increments xi by (a possi-
bly negative) c with worst-case running time
2 0(1+(loglog )-ogog(A)(2A-poly (maX o 1
2. Read-The exists a (randomized) algorithm READ(i) that returns xi. The
expected running time of READ(i) is
0 ((1+(log M log(A) log(2±(log logo 2KA- ) -log log(A))
- quasipoly max log ).
3. Space-The data structure uses
1+ 2E + N log (A) +0 (Nlog
space.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3.4.1, 3.5.3, 3.5.5, and 3.6.1.
Remarks:
1. Theorem 3.7.1 shows that our data structure is optimal in terms of space uti-
lization, as Lemma 3.6.1 shows that the space required is at least Nlog A;
encoding/decoding can take poly(log N) time at worst, e.g., when A = 0(1)
and M = N0 for some a E (0, 1), but in more balanced situations, e.g. when
M = N 0 and A = Na/2, the encoding/decoding time can be 0(1).
2. For the running time bounds in parts 1, 2, and 3 of Theorem 3.7.1, the constant
hidden inside the big-O may depend on C and E. However, the constant hidden
inside the big-O for the space bound in part 4 of Theorem 3.7.1, does not depend
on C or E.
3. For READ, we emphasize that the probabilities are over the random choices of
the data structure. We are not assuming any probability distribution on the
input, and the expected running time bound holds even if the input is generated
adversarially.
4. Lemma 3.6.2 shows that any data structure capable of recovering the input
must use at least N log A space. Thus, in the limit of large N and A, our
data structure uses essentially the optimum amount of space. Looking at the
expression given in part 3 of Theorem 3.7.1, we see that in the limit of large A, C
should be chosen as large as possible, and E should be proportional to 1/log A,
in order to minimize the space. Of course, choosing small values of E and large
values of C increases the complexity of READ and WRITE exponentially, so in
practice one might be forced to use more space, i.e., choose a larger value of E
and/or a smaller value of C, so that READ and WRITE have reasonably low
complexity.
5. We emphasize that when we calculate the space used by our data structure, we
are not just counting the space used by counters. The space bound in Theorem
3.7.1 includes the total space needed to implement the structure, i.e., the space
bound includes the space needed to store the graphs and the work space used
by READ and WRITE.
3.8 Analysis
To prove Theorem 3.7.1, we must analyze the space used by our data structure, and
the complexity of the READ and WRITE algorithms. First, in Section 3.8.1 we prove
Lemmas 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, showing that the graphs used in our data structure have all
the desired properties. Next, we analyze the space used by our data structure in
Section 3.8.2. Section 3.8.3 analyzes the complexity of WRITE by proving Lemma
3.4.1, and Section 3.8.4 analyzes the complexity of READ by proving Lemmas 3.5.3
and 3.5.4. Because the analysis of READ is the most involved part of the proof of
Theorem 3.7.1, we relegate some of the technical details to Appendices A.1 and A.2.
Note that in all proofs, when measuring complexity, we make an assumption similar
to the random access memory (RAM) model of computation. Specifically, we assume
that basic arithmetic operations on O(log A + log N)-bit integers take 0(1) time.
3.8.1 Basic Properties of our Graphs
In this section, we prove Lemma 3.3.1 and Lemma 3.3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1
First, we explain how to construct the base graphs H and H 1. Then, we prove Lemma
3.3.1.
To construct H, we start with the graph produced by the LPS construction with
p = 5 and some q. This gives us a 6-regular graph. As noted in Chapter 2, this graph
is actually bipartite. The only reason that we cannot use the graph produced by the
LPS construction directly as H is that the 2 partite sets have the same size. To get
a (3,6)-regular graph from the 6-regular bipartite Cayley graph, we need to double
the size of the left partite set. To do this, we split each left vertex, i.e., each vertex
corresponding to an element in PSL(2, q), into two vertices, each with degree 3. For
example, let v be a vertex in PSL(2, q). It is connected to siv, s 2v,..., s6 v. We split
v into vi and v2, where vi is connected to siv, s2v, and s3v, while v2 is connected to
s4 v, s5 v, and s6v. Repeating this for all vertices in PSL(2, q) gives us a (3, 6)-regular
graph. This is the graph that use as the base graph H. It is obvious that this splitting
process does not reduce the girth, so H also has girth Q(logp(q)).
To construct H 1, we use a similar procedure, but we start with the graph produced
by the LPS construction with p = K - 1 and some q. This is a K-regular bipartite
graph. Instead of splitting each vertex in PSL(2, q) into two copies, we split each
vertex into K/3 copies. Each copy has degree 3 as above, i.e., we split the generating
set S into K/3 sets of size 3 and assign neighbors accordingly. This gives us a (3, K)-
regular graph with large girth, and we use this graph as H1 .
Note that the above constructions of H and H1 assume that K - 1 is a prime
number congruent to 5 mod 12, and that v2-(L-2)N and 6v/N/K are both of the
form q3 - q for some prime q =1 mod 4 such that either ( =) -1 or (K1) = -1 so
that the LPS construction gives a graph with the correct number of vertices. These
assumptions can easily be removed. Also, we observe that the (3, 6)-regular graph
H constructed above is essentially the same as the graph constructed in [104]. The
(3, K)-regular graph H1 can be viewed as a natural generalization of the construction
in [104] to higher degrees.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1. The base graph H can be stored explicitly in adjacency list
form using o(N) space. The two permutations /R and wc and their inverses can be
stored using o(N) space. With this information, it is obvious that we can compute
the neighbors of any vertex using 0(1) memory lookups and computations involving
0(log N)-bit numbers.
Regarding the girth, it is clear that the girth of Gf is at least the girth of H. From
Lemma 2.3.1, we know that the girth of H is Q(log N). 0
The reader may have noticed that we do not actually have to store H explicitly.
The description of the LPS construction given in Section 2.3.1 shows that the neigh-
bors of a vertex in H are given by an explicit formula, and hence we don't need to
store the neighbors in an adjacency list. However, this savings does not affect the
asymptotic space since the majority of the space used by our data structure is in the
counters.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2
We use the zigzag product, as described in Section 2.3.3, to construct the expander
graphs needed in our analysis of the BAILOUT subroutine. As per Theorem 7.1
of [19], we take Z1 to be the rotation map of the Ramanujan graph produced by the
LPS construction. This is a permutation conductor, and from the description of the
LPS construction given in Section 2.3.1, it is clear that the edge function for this
permutation conductor can be computed in 0(1) time. We take Z 2 to be an optimal
buffer conductor of constant size, and we take Z 3 to be an optimal lossless conductor
of constant size. The parameters of such conductors are described by Lemmas 4.2
and 4.3 of [19]. We choose Z 2 and Z 3 to be both left- and right-regular-as noted in
Section 2.3.3, this does not significantly affect the achievable performance.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2. We store the small graphs Z 2 and Z 3 explicitly in adjacency
list form, which requires 0(1) space. As noted above, we can compute the neighbors
of a vertex in the graph produced by the LPS construction without storing the graph.
Therefore, it follows directly from the definition of the zigzag product (as given in
Section 2.3.3) that we can compute the neighbors in the zigzag product in 0(1) time.
In a little more detail, from the definition of the edge function, it is clear that given
any vertex on the left, the neighbors on the right can be computed in constant time,
because the edge functions for Z 1, Z 2 and Z 3 can all be computed in constant time.
Also, given a vertex on the right of Z, we can compute its neighbors on the left by
inverting the edge function for Z. Clearly the edge functions for Z 2 and Z 3 can be
inverted in constant time, and from the description of the LPS construction given in
Section 2.3.1, it is clear that the edge function for Z1 can also be inverted in constant
time. Therefore, we can invert the edge function for Z in constant time as well.
Finally, it is clear that Z1 is left and right regular, and it is easily verified that if
the input graphs are left and right regular, then the output graph Z produced by
the zigzag product is also left and right regular. The expansion property is a direct
consequence of Lemma 2.3.3. El
3.8.2 . Analysis of Space Requirements
Proof of Lemma 3.6.1. Since the workspace used by the READ and WRITE algo-
rithms is bounded by Lemmas 3.4.1, 3.5.3, and 3.5.5, we can complete the proof of
Lemma 3.6.1 by adding up the space used by the counters and the graphs. Lemmas
3.3.1 and 3.3.2 show that the space used by the graphs is o(N). Thus, we just have
to count the space used by counters. In the following analysis, for simplicity we ig-
nore ceilings. Because there are only O(N) counters in the entire date structure, this
means that we only have to add O(N) to the bound obtained by ignoring ceilings.
In V, each counter uses log(K 2A) bits each. The counters in V1 use log(12AK)
bits each. Thus, the space used by the first layer is N log(K 2 A) + eN log(12AK). V2
through VL-1 use 3 bits per counter, and since the number of counters decreases
geometrically, this give us a total space of O(N). VL uses log(1 + 2K 2A2) bits
per counter, and there are 2(L-1)eN counters in this layer. Thus, VL uses at
most 2-(c- 1)eNlog(A) + O(N) space. Similarly, V' contributes eNlog(Ar) space,
V,...,)VL_1 contribute a total of O(eNlog(r)) space, and VI contributes at most
e2-0 N log(A) +0(N) space. Adding together all these contributions, we see that the
total space used by counters is (1 + 2e + 3E2- 0 ) N log (A) + 0 (N log(K)). O
Proof of Lemma 3.6.2. To prove the first part of the lemma, observe that the number
of possible inputs satisfying the constraints is at least AN. To see this, note that if
each xi is chosen from the set {0, 1, ... , A - 1}, then the input does satisfy all the
constraints because E xi is clearly less than AN, and the maximum is less than M.
Thus, there are at least AN inputs satisfying the constraints, which means that a
lower bound on the space used by any data structure is N log A.
For the second part of the lemma, note that an optimal data structure only requires
space at most [log(number of inputs)], because with this much space every possible
input can be encoded to a different state of the data structure, and hence the mapping
from inputs to states is invertible. To get an upper bound on the number of inputs
satisfying the constraints, we neglect the constraint max x < M. Then, the number
of possible inputs is given by the binomial coefficient ((A+1)N-1). It is well-known
(cf. [28]) that
log (A+1N-I < N ((A + 1) log (A + 1))
-NA log (A),
and applying the inequality ln(1 + x) < x, we see that
log (A+ N - 1 < N (A +1) log (A) + - NA log (A)
N 1AI
N log (A)+ )
3.8.3 Analysis of WRITE
In this section, we analyze the WRITE algorithm.
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1. We can analyze the complexity of WRITE by counting the
number of counters that the algorithm looks at in the course of processing a query.
Each counter we examine requires us to perform a constant number of basic arithmetic
operations, and by assumption these operations take constant time. So, within a
constant factor, the complexity is upper bounded by the number of counters that the
algorithm examines. To upper bound the number of examined counters, note that
in the worst case, every counter we modify (except in VL and Vi) overflows. If this
happens, then we must update 3 'K counters in V and lt counters in V. Summing
up the number of counters examined in all the layers, we see that the complexity
of WRITE is O(1L). Since L = (loglog( 2K A2) - loglog(A))+ + C, the proof is
complete.
3.8.4 Analysis of READ
In this section we prove Lemmas 3.5.3 and 3.5.4.
WHP Analysis
To prove Lemma 3.5.3, we must prove that the algorithm actually works, i.e., that
xi is recovered with high probability, and that the algorithm has a low expected
running time. We begin with proofs of some preliminary results needed to establish
Lemma 3.5.3. First, we summarize the discussion in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.1 with the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.8.1. Assume that WHP does not fail. Then, the value returned by WHP
is the correct value of xi.
Proof. Lemma A.2.1 (proved in Section A.2.1) shows that the counters in VL never
overflow. Thus, when the WHP subroutine is first called in the last layer, the c,
values are correct. From Lemma 3.5.2, it follows that this property is maintained
as an invariant, i.e., provided that the subroutine calls are successful, the cv values
are always correct as we move back towards the first layer. This implies that x is
recovered correctly. E
Lemma 3.8.1 says that WHP never makes an undetected error. Thus, we can just
focus on the probability of failure.
Lemma 3.8.2. Consider the pth repetition of the WHP inner loop, and assume that
the WHP subroutine has run successfully on all computation trees in Gf+ 2, . .,GL-
Then, the probability that the WHP subroutine fails for any computation tree in Gj+1
is at most 6(P)/L.
The proof of Lemma 3.8.2 is more technical than the other proofs in this chapter,
so we relegate it to Appendix A.2. Lemma 3.8.2 allows us to bound the probability
that WHP fails.
Lemma 3.8.3. WHP fails with probability at most 6(M)
Proof. Let A, be the event that any subroutine call fails in layer f during the ph
repetition. Lemma 3.8.2 states that P(AP) < 6(P)/L. Now, the probability that
the pth repetition fails can be upper bounded using the union bound. Specifically,
p(pth repetition fails) = P(UfAP) < E P(AP) < L6(P)/L = 6(). The probability
that WHP fails is the probability that the last repetition fails, which we have shown
is at most 6 (m). [3
Now, we bound the expected running time of WHP. First, we state another pre-
liminary lemma.
Lemma 3.8.4. The running time of the pth repetition is O(n%.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 3.8.4 is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 3.4.1.
Specifically, WHP performs a constant number of basic arithmetic operations for each
counter examined. Thus, we can bound the complexity of the pth repetition by the
number of counters that WHP examines during the pth repetition. Let n* denote the
number of counters in V that are examined during the pth repetition. The following
formula gives a recursion for ni:
T(p)
n* < n* c _,
where c is some constant related to the graph Gf. Specifically, the size of the compu-
tation tree in each layer grows exponentially in the depth of the tree, and c represents
how quickly the tree grows. For example, for a (3, 6)-regular graph, one valid choice
of c is c = 40.
It is easily verified that the definition of n j) given in Section 3.4 satisfies the above
recursion, and therefore the number of counters in V that are examined during the
th(P) railpit repetition is at most n 2). Also, it clear from the definition that n, grows rapidly
as a function of f. In particular, n j') > 2n ") Thus, the total number of counters
examined is at most E, n() = 0 (n().
Lemma 3.8.4 lets us bound the expected running time of WHP.
Lemma 3.8.5.
E[running time of WHP] = 2 0(Llog(L))
Proof. Let T, be the running time of the pth repetition, and let p, be the probability
that the first p repetitions fail. Then, the expected running time is given by
E[running time] = T1 + T2p1 + Tp 2 +... + TMpM-1.
Now, Lemma 3.8.4 says that T, =O(n). Also, from the proof of lemma 3.8.3, it is
clear that pp < 6(). Thus, the expected running time is upper bounded by
E[running time] = 0 (n(1) + n ()6() +... + n(M)6(M-1)
Substituting the definitions of 6(r) and n, given in Section 3.5.1 into the above
formula, we see that the expected running time is at most
M
O(L log(L)) -L'O((i+1)Llog(L))
i=2
Clearly all terms inside the sum are less than 1, so the running time is dominated by
the eO(L log(L)) term. l
Proof of Lemma 3.5.3. This lemma is a corollary of Lemmas 3.8.3 and 3.8.5. The
running time bound is obtained by substituting the value of L into the expression
given in Lemma 3.8.5. It is easily verified that 6(M) = o(1/N 4).
BAILOUT Analysis
Now, we prove Lemma 3.5.4. Lemma 3.5.4 follows easily from four preliminary lem-
mas. First, the following lemma is the analog of Lemma 3.5.1 for the BAILOUT
subroutine. The proof follows from the same arguments used to prove Lemma 3.5.1,
so we omit the proof.
Lemma 3.8.6. Let (u, - 1)' be a counter in V1. When the BAILOUT subroutine is
run on G', the numbers mB s rounsrun n G, te ber  2t)are monotonically nondecreasing lower bounds
on the overflow of counter (u, f- 1)', and the numbers m (2t1) are monotonically
nonincreasing upper bounds on the overflow of counter (u, f - 1)'.
The next lemma shows that the BAILOUT subroutine recovers overflows properly
in a single layer, provided that most of the overflows are 0.
Lemma 3.8.7. Let G be a (c, d)-regular bipartite (2an, 1/2 + E)-expander, for some
E > 0, with n vertices on the left and m vertices on the right. When the BAILOUT
subroutine is run on G, the overflow is computed correctly for all vertices provided
that the number of left vertices with nonzero overflow is at most an.
Proof. Define the set W2t to be the set of vertices whose lower bounds are wrong after
2t iterations of the BAILOUT subroutine. Initially, IWol < an. To start our analysis,
note that Lemma 3.8.6 implies that the BAILOUT subroutine must terminate, since
the lower bounds are monotonically nondecreasing integers upper bounded by M.
Also, if t > s, then W2t C W2,. Thus, to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that if
0 < |W2t| I an, then |W2t+2| < |W2t1, because this implies that for sufficiently large
t, W2t must be empty.
Now we prove that if 0 < IW2 t| < an, then |W2t+21 < IW2t I. To prove this, we
just have to show that some vertex in W2t is not in W2t+2 . This is where we use the
expansion of G. Let S be the set of vertices adjacent to some vertex in W2t. Then,
|SI < clW 2t1. Now, consider the set T of vertices such that all of their neighbors are
in S-T includes W2 t by definition. We know that |TI < 2|W 2t1, because |W2tI an
and G is a good expander. We claim that T contains all vertices whose upper bounds
at time 2t + 1 are wrong. To see this, note that an upper bound leaving a vertex u
on the left at time 2t + 1 is correct as long as one of its neighbors v is not in S. This
is because if v is not in S, then all the incoming lower bounds to v are correct, so the
upper bound computed by v for u's overflow must also be correct.
To complete the proof, note that |TI < 2an, so the expansion property guarantees
that there is a vertex w E T with a unique neighbor, i.e., there exists a w E T and
an x E S such that w is connected to x, and x is connected to no other vertex in
T-for a more detailed derivation of this fact, see Section 4.5.1. By construction, this
w must belong to W2t. Also, because x is a unique neighbor, x's neighbors other than
w all lie outside of T, and thus have correct upper bounds. Therefore, w computes
the correct lower at the next iteration. This proves that w E W2e but wV W2t+2,
which proves the lemma.
The next lemma proves that the initial c, values in VJ are correct.
Lemma 3.8.8. No counter in Vi can overflow.
Proof. We prove that the largest possible value that needs to be stored in a counter
in VL is at most K'2. Because 2b' > 2 2 , none of these counters overflow.
To verify the upper bound, consider the first layer. By assumption, the inputs
have maximum value M. Therefore, the overflow is at most [m)]. Now, each counter
in V' computes the sum of the overflows associated with its r neighbors in V. Let s
denote this sum. Then, the overflow is given by [] . Thus, the overflow is bounded
by4 < My Ar - K2A2-
Now, each counter in V2' takes the sum of the overflows of its r neighbors in Vj',
and each of these overflows is at most A2 . Thus, the overflow for counters in 7' is
bounded by
M
rK4A2 M
r K 2A 2
Continuing down to the last layer, we see that in the last layer the counters in VL_1
have an overflow of at most 2 . Since each counter in V is connected to r counters
in VL_ 1, the largest possible value that a counter in V needs to store is at most
Mr El
K 2 A 2 -
The next lemma bounds the number of overflowing counters in V, ... , VL_ 1.
Lemma 3.8.9. The fraction of counters that overflow in V' is at most 1/K 2 .
Proof. Recall that the input must satisfy E xi < AN. Thus, at most a 1/K 2 fraction
of the inputs have values that are greater than or equal to K2 A, which proves the
claim for V. Because G' is (1, r)-regular, the average value associated with counters
on the right is at most r/K 2 , and therefore at most 1/K 2 of the counters in Vj' are
greater than or equal to r, let alone Ar. Repeating this analysis for the future layers,
we see that at every layer at most 1/K 2 of the counters overflow.
Proof of Lemma 3.5.4. The proof is straightforward given Lemmas 3.8.7, 3.8.8, and
3.8.9. As usual, we work backwards from the last layer. From Lemma 3.8.8, we
know that the c, values assigned to counters in V are correct. From Lemma 3.8.9,
we know that at most a 1/K 2 of the counters overflow in VL-1. Also, G' is an
(1, r)-regular (2/K 2, 2/3)-expander, so Lemma 3.8.7 implies that the overflows are
recovered properly. Therefore, the BAILOUT algorithm maintains as an invariant
the property that the c, values are correct at each layer. Thus, when the algorithm
terminates, all inputs have been recovered correctly. 0
3.9 Conclusion
Our main contribution is a locally encodable and decodable data structure for storing
N nonnegative integers satisfying average and maximum constraints. We view this
as a step towards developing general locally encodable and decodable source codes.
There are many directions for future work. One direction is to explore whether a
variant of our data structure can be made practical. Our main result, Theorem 3.7.1,
only provides asymptotic performance guarantees. For moderate values of N, e.g.,
N < 1, 000, 000, significant optimization issues remain to develop a practical data
structure using space near the information-theoretic limit. For example, our choices
for the number of layers, the number of counters in each layer, and the number of bits
allocated to the counters in each layer are sufficient to prove asymptotic statements,
but all of these parameters will have to be finely tuned to achieve good performance
for moderate N. Also, it is quite likely that irregular graphs can achieve better per-
formance than the regular graphs considered in this chapter. An important question
to answer in this context is how to construct irregular graphs that are suitable for
local encoding and decoding, i.e., irregular graphs with a compact description that
still allows efficient computation of the neighbors of any given vertex. Although it
may be difficult to prove rigorous results for irregular graphs, since constructing ir-
regular graphs with large girth is an open problem, it may be easy to show through
simulation that any reasonably random construction of irregular graphs achieves good
performance.
In a more theoretical direction, the data structure considered in this chapter shows
that for certain settings of the parameters N, A, and M, i.e., for certain classes of
sources, there exist source codes achieving rates close to the information-theoretic
limit that still possess constant time or nearly constant time algorithms for local
encoding and local decoding. This suggests the following two avenues for exploration.
First, are there other classes of sources for which there exist (nearly) optimal locally
encodable and locally decodable source codes? For example, do there exist locally
encodable and decodable source codes for every discrete memoryless source? Before
answering this question, one would need to determine what the correct notion of local
encodability is for a probabilistic source. To see why this is not completely trivial, note
that implicit in the concept of local encoding is the fact that the source gets updated
over time, and for many natural update models, even if the initial source distribution
is i.i.d. P for some distribution P, after several updates the source may no longer
be distributed i.i.d. P. One possibility for addressing this issue is to generalize the
average and maximum constraints considered in this chapter to arbitrary constraints
on the type of the source, e.g., a Bernoulli source might be modelled as a binary source
constrained so that after every update, the fraction of 1's in the source is always less
than p.
Coming at the problem from the other direction, are there nontrivial lower bounds
on the complexity of local encoding and local decoding in terms of the gap between
the space achieved by a particular source code and the information-theoretic limit?
In the context of succinct data structures, [951 shows how to construct a locally
decodable version of arithmetic codes. For local encoding, one might hope to obtain
lower bounds via a metric embedding argument. In more detail, one could try to
show that any function mapping the source into a small number of bits must map
two source realizations that are close to each other, e.g., that differ in only one
component, to bit strings that are far apart, e.g., differ in half of the coordinates. If
one had such a lower bound, one could conclude that even if auxiliary computation
is free, just updating the compressed version of the source is complex because half
of the coordinates need to be changed. Unfortunately, the results of [84] shows that
there exist very sparse nonlinear graph codes that approach the information-theoretic
limit for Bernoulli sources. Thus, if there are any nontrivial lower bounds for locally
encodable source codes for Bernoulli sources, then such bounds must rely on the
computational model and not just a metric embedding argument. Thus, it seems
likely that if there are nontrivial lower bounds on the complexity of locally encodable
and decodable source codes, proving such bounds may have to rely on the fact that
the code is simultaneously locally encodable and locally decodable, since the above
results suggest that one can construct codes possessing either property individually.
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Chapter 4
Sparse Graph Codes for
Compressed Sensing
In this chapter, we explore the use of sparse graph codes for compressed sensing. In
Section 4.1, we formally define the compressed sensing problem considered in this
thesis and summarize some of the prior work. Then, we present some positive results
regarding the use of sparse graph codes for compressed sensing. Specifically, we
analyze a simple message-passing algorithm for the compressed sensing of nonnegative
signals. We show that our message-passing algorithm can not only recover sparse
signals, but can also provide a nontrivial E1 f1 guarantee-see Section 4.4 for a formal
statement of our results.
In the second half of this chapter (Section 4.6), we prove that two classes of
matrices-binary matrices (matrices whose entries are either 0 or 1) and very sparse
matrices-do not behave well with respect to the restricted isometry property (RIP)
for the E2 norm. We define the RIP and give some background on its importance in
Section 4.6, but the reader familiar with compressed sensing knows that the RIP is the
main tool used in known constructions of algorithms providing E2/fi guarantees, and
that f2/f1 guarantees are desirable because they are stronger than E1/E1 guarantees.
Thus, our results suggest that either sparse graph codes are inherently not capable of
providing E2/1 guarantees, or a new proof technique is needed to prove such strong
recovery guarantees for sparse graph codes.
4.1 Background on Compressed Sensing
The basic compressed sensing problem is to estimate a vector x E Rn from a set of
linear measurements y = Ax, where y E R"' and A is a known m-by-n matrix. As
briefly discussed in Chapter 1, the key idea in compressed sensing is that if the signal
" is constrained to be sparse or approximately sparse, then it is possible to recover
x even when m << n. More precisely, one of the basic results in compressed sensing
is that there exist matrices A with only m = O(k log (n/k)) rows such that for all
k-sparse x, i.e., all x with at most k nonzero components, we can recover x exactly
from Ax. Furthermore, [35] and [16,17] observed that recovery can be accomplished
in polynomial time via linear programming (LP), provided that the measurement
matrix A satisfies certain technical conditions.
When defined over a finite field, the problem of recovering a sparse vector from
linear measurements, e.g., recovery of a sparse vector from linear measurements over
GF(2), is essentially the fundamental problem in the design of binary linear error-
correcting codes. In essence, compressed sensing and coding theory both aim to
design a matrix A and an estimation or decoding algorithm that allows for faithful
recovery of x from y when x is constrained to be sparse.
Given the close connection between the goals of compressed sensing and error-
correcting codes, it is natural to ask if the message-passing algorithms that have
been so successfully applied to the decoding of error-correcting codes can also be
applied to compressed sensing. In the first half of this chapter, we take a step in
this direction by analyzing the performance of a message-passing recovery algorithm
when the matrix A corresponds to the adjacency matrix of a bipartite graph with
good expansion properties. Results of a similar flavor are well-known in the context
of coding theory, but are only beginning to be explored in the context of compressed
sensing. We summarize some of the related work in this direction below.
Compressed sensing was first put forward in [35] and [16,17], and as mentioned
previously, these works proved that linear programming (LP) can be used to find
the sparsest solution to y = Ax under certain conditions on the measurement matrix
A. Since then, many reconstruction algorithms have been proposed [11, 25, 26, 47,
48,61,62,90,116,121]-see, e.g., [62] for a summary of various combinations of mea-
surement matrices and algorithms, and their associated performance characteristics.
Most existing combinations fall into two broad classes. In the first class, inspired by
high-dimensional geometry, the measurement matrix A is typically dense (almost all
entries are nonzero), and the recovery algorithms are based on linear or convex opti-
mization. The second class consists of combinatorial algorithms operating on sparse
measurement matrices (A typically has only 0(n) nonzero entries). Examples include
the algorithms of [11,62,121]. In particular, Algorithm 1 from [121] is essentially
identical to the Sipser-Spielman message-passing algorithm [113]. The algorithm we
consider in this chapter also falls into the second class, and is a minor variant of the
algorithm proposed in [73]. 1 Very recent work on the use of a message-passing algo-
rithm to identify compressed sensing thresholds appears in [36, 37]. Relative to our
analysis, [36] and [37] are more general in that arbitrary (i.e., even dense) matrices A
are considered. However, [36, 37] restrict attention to a probabilistic analysis, while
we perform an adversarial analysis, and thus we are able to provide deterministic
reconstruction guarantees for arbitrary (nonnegative) x.
On the coding theory side, we briefly recall some of the results alluded to in Chap-
ter 1. Specifically, Spielman [113] proved that when the Tanner graph of an LDPC
code has sufficiently high expansion, a simple bit-flipping algorithm can correct a
constant fraction of errors, even if the errors are chosen by an adversary. In [15], this
result was extended to show that a broad class of message-passing algorithms, includ-
ing common algorithms such as the so-called "Gallager A" and "B" algorithms, also
correct a constant fraction of (adversarial) errors when there is sufficient expansion.
Finally, [40] suggested decoding LDPC codes via LP, and [41] proved that this LP
decoder can correct a constant fraction of (adversarial) errors when there is sufficient
expansion. We show that similar techniques can be used to analyze the performance
of the message-passing algorithm proposed considered in this chapter.
'For the reader who has already read Chapter 3, the algorithm is just the BAILOUT subroutine
of Section 3.5.2.
4.2 Problem Formulation
In Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, we describe and analyze a message-passing algorithm
for the compressed sensing of nonnegative signals. As our problem model, we seek
to estimate a vector x E R of interest from observations of the form y = Ax E R"rn
where A = [Ai] E {0, 1}"xn is a known measurement matrix (R+ denotes the set
of nonnegative real numbers). Associated with A is the following bipartite graph
G = (X, Y, E). We define X = {1,. . . , n}, Y = {1,. .. , m}, and E = {(i, j) E
X x Y : Aij = 1}. Next, associated with vertex i E X is xi, the ith component of x,
and with vertex j E Y is yj, the jth component of y. Further, we define
Nx(i') ={j E Y: (ij) GE E, for all i EX,
Ny(j) = {i E X : (ij) E E}, for allj EY.
Note that the degrees of i E X, j E Y are INx(i)|, |Ny(j)|, respectively. The structure
in A is specified via constraints on the associated graph G. Recall the definition of a
(c, d)-regular (k, a)-expander given in Chapter 2.
Definition 4.2.1 (Expander graph). A given bipartite graph G = (X, Y, E) is a
(c, d)-regular (k, a)-expander if every vertex i G X has degree c, every vertex j E Y
has degree d, and for all subsets S C X such that |S| < k, we have |F(S)| > acISI,
where F(S) U jEsNx(i).
4.3 An Iterative Recovery Algorithm
The message-passing algorithm for iteratively recovering x is identical to the BAILOUT
subroutine defined in Section 3.5.2. For convenience, we describe the algorithm again
below. The algorithm maintains two numbers for each edge (i, j) E E, corresponding
to a message in each direction. Let t > 0 denote the iteration number, and let m)Z
and mj denote the two messages along edge (i, J) E E in the tth iteration. The
principle behind the algorithm is to alternately determine lower and upper bounds
on x. Specifically, m 2t and m 2_+1 are lower bounds on xi for all t > 0; mit+j and
mj-,i are upper bounds on xi for all t > 0. Also, these lower (respectively, upper)
bounds are monotonically increasing (respectively, decreasing). That is,
Formally, the algorithm is given by the following pseudocode.
1: Initialization (t = 0): for all (i, j) E E, set m9_ , = 0.
2: Iterate for t = 1, 2, ... :
kE- 
(4.1)
kENy (j)\i
2t-1 =m (m2 2)mi = min (m 
-- )
1EN,(i)
2t-1 
y 
-
= j 
- E
a) t = t + 1, update messages for all (i, j) E E via
m = yj - (4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)2t F-m .= max 0, max
I eNx(i)
n 2t-1
m 21)(m- )I
b) Estimate xi via i = m, for s = 2t - 1, 2t.
3: Stop when converged (assuming it does).
Algorithm 4: Recovery Algorithm
4.4 Main Results
Our results on the performance of the message-passing algorithm are summarized in
the following two theorems. The first establishes that the algorithm is able to recover
sparse signals exactly.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let G be a (c, d)-regular (L 2 k + 1], 1 + E)-expander. Then, as
long as k > ||x||o = I{i E X : xi -f 0}|, the estimate produced by the algorithm satisfies
V = x, for all t > T = O(log1+(k))
The second theorem establishes that the algorithm can approximately recover
x that are not exactly k-sparse, i.e., the algorithm can provide an f1/i1 recovery
guarantee.
Theorem 4.4.2. Let G be a (c, d)-regular (L- +11, 1 + E)-expander. Let x(k) denote
the best k-sparse approximation to x, i.e.,
x(k) = min N - z11.
zER n:||zllo<k
Then, for all even t > T = O(logi+e(k) logi+e(cd)),
x- '||1 < 1+ | | x - X(k)1.
Discussion: As a sample choice of parameters, we mentioned in Chapter 2 that
there exist (c, d)-regular (k, > .5)-expanders with c =O(log(f)) and d =O(). With
such expanders, Theorem 4.4.1 implies that the message-passing algorithm can recover
any k-sparse x from O(k log(2)) measurements in time O(n log(n) log(k)). Compared
to the Sipser-Spielman algorithm [113], the message-passing algorithm requires less
expansion (0.5 vs. 0.75), but the Sipser-Spielman algorithm works for arbitrary (i.e.,
not just nonnegative) vectors x. In [67], it is shown that recovery of nonnegative
x is possible from far less expansion, but the recovery algorithm proposed in [67] is
significantly slower. In particular, they are only able to prove a running time bound
of O(nk2 ).
Similarly, with appropriate expanders, Theorem 4.4.2 implies that the message-
passing algorithm can be implemented to use O(k log(f)) measurements, and the
factor multiplying the error in the f, / guarantee is 0 (f). The algorithm can be im-
plemented sequentially in O(n(log( 2))2 log(k)) time, or in parallel O(2 log(k) log(2))
time using O(n) processors. In particular, when k = E(n)-a regime typically of
interest in information-theoretic analysis-the algorithm provides a constant factor
f1/41 guarantee with 0(n log(n)) running time. In this regime, our algorithm is faster
than almost all existing algorithms, e.g., [47,48,90]; the only exception is [62], which
is faster, and stronger, in that the multiplier in the E1/E1 guarantee is only (1 + ) for
the algorithm of [62], rather than O(f). However, relative to the algorithm of [62],
ours has the advantage of working with a smaller expansion factor (albeit at the cost
of requiring expansion from larger sets), and is easily parallelizable. In addition, we
believe that this message-passing algorithm may be applicable in more general set-
tings, e.g., providing guarantees for recovering "random" vectors when the graph is
not an expander, but possesses other properties, such as large girth.
4.5 Analysis
4.5.1 Analysis of Sparse Recovery
(Note: The proof of Theorem 4.4.1 is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 3.8.7,
but because we use Theorem 4.4.1 as the starting point for our proof of Theorem 4.4.2,
we repeat the proof below.)
We start by recalling a certain monotonicity property of the messages. For each
i E X, the messages mig are monotonically nondecreasing lower bounds on xi, and
the messages mt+l are monotonically nonincreasing upper bounds on xi. This can be
easily verified by induction. Given this monotonicity property, clearly the messages
at even and odd times have limits: if these messages are equal after a finite number
of iterations, then the algorithm recovers x. We establish that this is indeed the case
under the assumptions of Theorem 4.4.1.
To this end, define W2t = {i E X : x > m,,.}, i.e., W2t is the set of vertices whose
lower bounds are incorrect after 2t iterations. Clearly, |Wo| < k since ||x||o < k, and
the lower bounds to zi, m2., are nonnegative for all t. The monotonicity property
of the lower bounds implies that for 0 < s < t, W2t E; W2,. Therefore, it is sufficient
to establish that IW2t+21 < (1 - 2E)|W 2t| if 0 < |W2tI K k; this implies that after
O(log(k)) iterations, W2t must be empty.
Suppose 0 < |W2t| K k. Since W2 t+2 C W2t, it suffices to show that at least a 2E
fraction of the vertices in W2t are not in W2t+2 . We prove this by using the expansion
properties of G. Let V = F(W2t) c Y be the set of all neighbors of W2t. Let T c X
be {i E X : N,(i) c V}. Since G is (c, d)-regular, |V| cjW 2t|. Also, by definition
W2t C T. We state three important properties of T:
P1. |T| < 2|W 2t|/(1 + 2E). Suppose not. Then, consider any T' C T with |T'l =
L2|W 2t|/(1 + 2e) + 1]. We reach a contradiction as follows:
c|W 2t| > |VI IF(T')| I |T'|(1 + 2e)c > |W2 tIc.2
P2. Let U = {' E X : mjt > xj}. Then, U C T. This is because m2t+ = xi
if there exists j C Nx(i) such that j ( V. To see this, note that for such a
j, all k E Ny(j) \ i are not in W2t, and hence Xk = m _, for all these k, so
YJ - EkENy(j)\i
P3. Let T1 = {i c T : 3j E V s.t. Ny(j) n T - {i}}. Then, IT1 l 2E eT1. To see
this, let A= |{j c V : |Ny(j) n T= 1}|, and let B =VI - A. Then, number
of edges between T and V is at least 2B + A, and since G is (c, d)-regular, the
number of edges between T and V is at most cITI. Therefore, A + 2B < cITI.
Now, by [P1], IT| < 2k/(1 + 2E), so |F(T) > clTl(1 + 2E)/2. Therefore,
A + B > cITl(1 + 2e)/2, whence A > 2ecITI.
To complete the proof, note that T1 C W2t, and |T1 l 2E ITI by [P3]. For each i C T,
let j(i) C V be its unique neighbor in the definition of T 1, i.e., Ny(j(i)) n T = {i}.
Then, [P2] implies that for all k c Ny(j(i)) \ i, we have m2+1 Therefore
m =1 x, so M2t+2 = xi. Thus, i ( W2t+2, i.e., T 1 c W2t \ W2t+2, completing the
proof of Theorem 4.4.1.
4.5.2 Analysis of fi/E1 Recovery
This section establishes Theorem 4.4.2 in two steps. First, using techniques similar to
those used to prove Theorem 4.4.1, we obtain a very weak bound on the reconstruction
error. Next, we improve this weak bound, by showing that when the error is large, it
must be reduced significantly in the next iteration. This yields the desired result.
Given x E RS, let X(k) denote the best k-term approximation to x. Let X+ = {i E
X: X k) $ 0}, and let X 0 = X \ X+. For an arbitrary S C X, let et(S) = iss(wi-f)
at the end of iteration t; recall that Vj is the algorithm's estimate after t iterations.
Note that 2, < X < 9s+1 , so et (S) 2 0 for even t, and et(S) < 0 for odd t.
Now, we state the first step of the proof, i.e., the weak bound on reconstruction
error.
Lemma 4.5.1. Let G be a (c, d)-regular (|+ ±1], }+E)-expander, for some E > 0.
Then, after t = O(log k) iterations,
X - V ||1 5 0 ((cd)0 (og(k)) log(k)) ||x - x(k) 1.
Proof. We use ideas similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 4.4.1. Let V
F(X+) be the set of neighbors of X+, and let S' = {i E X: N (i) C V}. Also, define
sets Sj, f > 0 as follows:
So = X \ S', Si= {i E S' : j EE V s.t. NY(j) n S' = {i}},
and for > 2
Se {i E S' : 3j E V s.t. Ny(j) n (S' \ UL,<eSv) = {i}}.
We note that by arguments similar to those used to establish property [P3], it follows
that |Sl > 2ES' \ Ue'<Sel. Also, [P1] implies that |S'l < 2. Therefore, Se is
empty for f > O(log k).
Adapting arguments used in the proof of Theorem 4.4.1, we bound e2f(S,) for
f > 0. First, by definition So C Xo, so e0(So) 5 |X - w(k)11. Now, consider e2 (S1).
By definition, each vertex i E Si has a unique neighbor j, i.e., a neighbor j such that
Nv(j) \ i C So. Therefore,
i'ENy(j)\i
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Each i' E So, so for each i' we have a neighbor j' V, i.e., Ny(j') C Xo. Therefore,
2-xi, < > (Xi// - i
i"/ENy(j')\i'
where all i" E X0 . Thus,
X,2 < >3i/ >3 ,
i'ENV(j)\i i"ENy(j')\i'
and summing over all i E S1, we obtain
e2(Si) < >3 -
iES1 i'ENy (j)\i i"ENy (j')\i'
Now, we bound the number of times a particular vertex i" E So can appear on
the right-hand side of the above inequality. i" can only occur in sums corresponding
to a vertex i E Si such that there exists a walk of length 4 between i" and i in
G. Therefore, i" can occur in at most (cd) 2 terms; hence, e2(SI) < (cd)2eo(SO).
Similarly, we can bound e21(Se) for f > 1 by induction. Assume that for all f' < f,
e2f(Sf) < (cd)2 '||x - x(k)|11. For each vertex i E Se, there exists a unique neighbor
j, i.e., j satisfies Ny(j) \ i C Ue'<tSe. Thus, xi - i' < EiENy(j)\j~i i- - xi). As
before, each i' has a unique neighbor j', and summing over i C Se, we obtain
e21(St) > >3 ( (Xi, - ij- 2)
iESt i'ENy (j)\i i"ENy (j')\i'
where all i" E Ue<t_iS. Again, each i" can only occur (cd)2 times, so we conclude
that
f-2 f-2
e2 (St) (cd) 2 >32-2 (Se,) )2 2te 
_d (cd)2 3ee(SO,
e'=o f'=o
f-2
(cd)2 ((cd) 2e'ix-x(k)lli < (cd)2e' IXX(k) ,
e=0
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where the second inequality is true because of the monotonicity property of the lower
bounds. Thus, we have shown inductively that e21(Se) < (cd) 2eI1X _ x(k)|11 for all f.
Since there are at most O(log k) nonempty sets Sj, it follows that after t = O(log k)
iterations,
||x-i'||1 < e2 (Sf) < 0 ((cd)0(log(k)) log(k)) |x-x(k) I.
On one hand, Lemma 4.5.1 gives a weak bound on the reconstruction error, as
the multiplier is poly(n). On the other hand, it provides good starting point for us to
boost it to obtain a better bound by using the second step described next. To that
end, we first state a definition and lemma adapted from [41].
Definition 4.5.1. Given a (c, d)-regular bipartite graph G = (X, Y, E) and a subset
S C X, let B(S) = {i E X \ S : N,(i) n F(S) > !}. For a given constant 6 > 0, we
say that S has a 6-matching if there exists a set M C E such that: (a) Vj E Y, at
most one edge of M is incident to j; (b) Vi E S U B(S), at least 6c edges of M are
incident to i.
Lemma 4.5.2. Let G = (X, Y, E) be a (c, d)-regular ([t + 1, 1 + e)-expander, for
some E > 0. Then, every S C X of size at most k has a 1 + e-matching.
To keep this chapter self-contained, we include the proof of Lemma 4.5.2. The
following proof is essentially identical to Proposition 4 and Lemma 5 in [41].
Proof. We construct a 1 + E-matching by analyzing the following max-flow problem.
Consider the subgraph of G induced by the set of left vertices U = S U B(S) and
right vertices V = F(S U B(S)). We assign a capacity of 1 to every edge in this
subgraph, and direct these edges from U to V. Finally, we add a source s with an
edge of capacity (I + e)c pointing to each vertex in U, and a sink t with an incoming
edge of capacity 1 from every vertex in V. If the maximum s - t flow in this graph is
(I + E)cIUI, then we have constructed a 1 + E-matching. To see this, recall that if the
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capacities are integral, then the maximum flow can always be chosen to be integral,
and the edges between U and V with nonzero flow values in an integral maximum
flow form a 1 + E-matching.
To complete the proof, we show that the minimum s - t cut in the max-flow
problem constructed above is (I + e)c|UJ. To see this, consider an arbitrary s - t
cut s U A U B, where A C U and B C V. The capacity of this cut is (I + e)c(jUI -
JA) +| B + C, where C is the number of edges between A and V - B. Assume, for
sake of contradiction, that 1(A) gt B. Then, from the above formula it follows that
we can produce a cut of at most the same value by replacing B by B U F(A). In
more detail, imagine that we move the vertices in F(A) n V - B to B one by one,
i.e., we move these vertices from the t-side of the cut to the s-side of the cut. Each
time we move such a vertex, |BI goes up by 1, and C decreases by at least 1 because
by definition we are moving vertices in F(A). Therefore, without loss of generality
we can assume that F(A) C B. Now, an argument similar to that used to prove P1
shows that JA) < [Lfl]: |S) < k, so if JA) > [LS. + 1], then there exists a set of size
k' = [L + 1] with at most clS| + v(k' - |S|) < (I + E)ck' neighbors, contradicting
the ([ + 1], } + E)-expansion of G. Therefore, |F(A)| I (I + e)cIAI, so the min-cut
has capacity at least (' + e)c()UI - JAI) + (} + E)cJA| = (I + E)cJUI. l
We use 3-matchings to prove that the reconstruction error decays by a constant
factor in each iteration.
Lemma 4.5.3. Let G be a (c, d)-regular ([ + 1], } + E)-expander, for some E > 0.
Then,
1 -2e 2t2d
e2+2(X+) < I + 2 (X+) + 1 e2t (Xo).1 + 2E 1 + 2E
In our proof of Lemma 4.5.3, we make use of the following lemma establishing a
simple invariance satisfied by the message-passing algorithm. Since this invariance
was used earlier in the proof of Lemma 4.5.1, a proof is omitted.
Lemma 4.5.4. For any i C X, construct a set S as follows. First, choose a vertex
j E N,(i). Next, for each i' E Ny(j) \ i, choose a vertex w(i') E Nx(i') (note that
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these choices can be arbitrary). Finally, define S as Ui' eNy(j)\i Ny(w(i')) \ i'. Then,
no matter how j and w(i') are chosen,
( ,2t+2) (- 2t)
i"ES
Proof of Lemma 4.5.3. Lemma 4.5.2 guarantees the existence of a 1 + E-matching,
say M, for the set X+ of (at most) k vertices in X. We use this 1 + E-matching
to produce a set of inequalities of the form given in Lemma 4.5.4. By adding these
inequalities, we prove Lemma 4.5.3.
For each i E X+, let M(i) be the set of neighbors of i in the - + E-matching.
We construct an inequality, or equivalently, a set S, for each member of M(i). We
construct the sets S sequentially as follows. Fix i and j E M(i). For each i' E Ny(j)\i,
we must choose a neighbor w(i'). If i' X+ or i' E B(X+), set w(i') to be any vertex
in M(i') that has not been chosen as w(i') for some previously constructed set. If
i' E X \ (X+ U B(X+)), choose w(i') to be any element of N,(i') \ F(X+) that has
not been chosen as w(i') for some previously constructed set. Although it may not be
immediately apparent, we will see that this process is well-defined, i.e., i' will always
be able to choose a neighbor w(i') that has not been used previously. First, however,
we complete the proof assuming that the process is well-defined.
To that end, we establish Lemma 4.5.3 by adding together all the inequalities
associated with the sets S constructed above. First, consider the left-hand side of
this sum. The only terms that appear are Xi - (2t+2) where i E X+, and each of
these appears at least (1 + E)c times since IM(i)I > (I + E)c for all such i. On the
right-hand side, we must count how many times each term xi - 12t) appears in some
inequality, i.e., how many times vertex i appears in the second level of some set S. We
break the analysis up into two cases. First, assume that i E X+. Then, xi - J 2t) can
appear in the second level of a set S only if some vertex in Nx(i) was chosen as w(i')
for some i' f i when we were defining S. This is only possible for i' E X+ U B(X+).
To bound the contribution due to such i', note that the vertices in M(i) can never
be chosen as w(i') for i' $ i, and that every vertex in UiEx±M(i) is chosen at most
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once. Therefore, xi - 2t) appears at most (1 - E)c times. To bound the number of
appearances of x)- 2t for i g X+, note that any vertex can appear in some set S
at most cd times. To see this, note that any vertex in Y can appear as w(i') for a set
S at most d times, once for each of its neighbors, because a single vertex in X never
chooses the same neighbor as its w(i') more than once. The bound then follows since
each vertex in X has degree c. Hence,
+E ce 2t+2(X+) G - c e2t(X+) + c d e2t(Xo),
or equivalently,
2t X~<1 -2 2t 2d
e2+2(X+) - e2 t (X+) + 2 e2t (Xo).
We complete the proof by showing that the process for constructing the sets S is
well-defined. The analysis above implicitly establishes this already. First, note that
every i' c X+ U B(X+) has at least (i + E)c distinct neighbors that can be chosen as
w(i'), and by definition every i' E X \ (X+ U B(X+)) has at least E distinct neighbors2
that can be chosen as w(i'). Therefore, in order to prove that the construction
procedure for the sets S is well-defined, it suffices to show that every vertex can
appear as an i', i.e., in the first level of some S, at most E times. For i' E X+ U B(X+),
at least (I + E)c of i"'s neighbors are in the 1 + E-matching, so any such i' appears at
most - e)c times. For i' E X \ (X+ U B(X+)), by definition N2(i') n 1(X+) < j,
so any such i' appears at most E times. L-
2
Completing the proof of Lemma 4.4.2. We combine lemmas 4.5.1 and 4.5.3. First,
from Lemma 4.5.1, after t =O(log(k)) iterations, the error satisfies the bound
|Ix - Il||1 < O((cd)0(log(k)) log(k))||x - x(k)|l.
Lemma 4.5.3 implies that after an additional O(log(k) log(cd)) iterations, the error
satisfies
|x - st+O(og(k)og(cd)) I ( + ) x - x(k)|.
104
To see this, apply the inequality
2t+ 2 (X+) < - 2Ee2t(X+) + 2de 2t (Xo)- + 2E 1 + 2e
repeatedly, and note that e21(Xo) is monotonically nonincreasing as a function of t,
so e2t(Xo) < e0(Xo). r-1
4.6 Negative Results for Sparse Graph Codes
In this section, we define the RIP and give some background to explain its importance
in the context of compressed sensing. Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 prove that binary and
very sparse matrices have bad performance with respect to the RIP.
4.6.1 Background on the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP)
As mentioned in Section 4.1, [35] and [16,17] showed that when the measurement
matrix A satisfies certain technical conditions, LP can be used to recover sparse
signals. In particular, [18] introduced the RIP, as a useful tool for proving this
result.
Definition 4.6.1. Let A be an m x n matrix. Then, A satisfies the (k, D) - RIPp if
there exists c > 0 such that for all k-sparse x E R",
c|| Ax||p < ||x||p : cD|| Ax||p.
Here | -||, denotes the fp norm. c is a scaling constant that we include for convenience
in what follows.
In the following, we suppress the subscript p when the results being reviewed are
valid for any choice of p. The RIP is useful because it can be shown that if a matrix
A satisfies the RIP, then LP can be used recover a k-sparse signal x from Ax. We
note that there are other properties besides the RIP that can be used to prove that
a matrix can be used for compressed sensing (cf. [66]). However, one nice aspect of
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the RIP is that the RIP allows one to prove bounds on the reconstruction error in
the case that x is only approximately sparse and/or the measurements are corrupted
by noise, e.g., the RIP 2 can be used to prove f2/f1 reconstruction guarantees.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, f 2/ 1 guarantees are stronger
than f1/LI1 guarantees, so constructing matrices satisfying the RIP 2 is a natural prob-
lem to consider. It is well-known that there exist matrices satisfying the RIP 2 with
O(k log (n/k)) rows, and this is within a constant factor of a lower bound which states
that Q(k log (n/k)) rows are necessary (see, for example, [5]). However, the proof that
such matrices exist uses the probabilistic method, and an explicit construction of such
a matrix remains elusive.
The currently known explicit constructions ( [89], [26], [31]) use many more rows
than the best (randomly constructed) matrices. Specifically, these constructions re-
quires Q(k 2) rows. One would hope that these constructions could be improved to get
explicit matrices with close to O(k log (n/k)) rows. For example, the results of [9,10]
show that explicit matrices can be constructed that satisfy the RIP 1 . Specifically,
there exist (non-explicit) matrices with only O(k log (n/k)) rows which satisfy the
RIP1 . In addition, there are explicit matrices with O(k2g o "ogn)O0)) rows that satisfy
the RIP 1 . Another nice property of these matrices is that they are sparse, in the sense
that most of the entries are 0. Sparsity is desirable because it can make algorithms
for computing Ax and recovering x from Ax more efficient [9,10.
In Section 4.6.2, we show that for the RIP 2 , a fundamentally different approach is
needed. In particular, the previously mentioned explicit constructions all use binary
matrices, i.e., matrices whose entries are 0 or 1. We show that binary matrices require
substantially more than O(k log (n/k)) rows to satisfy the RIP 2. In Section 4.6.3, we
show that even if one relaxes the binary constraint, matrices that satisfy the RIP 2
must have significantly more nonzero entries that matrices satisfying the RIP1 .
4.6.2 Binary Matrices are Bad With Respect to the RIP 2
In this section we prove that binary matrices cannot achieve good performance with
respect to the RIP 2. First, we make a couple of definitions that will be used in what
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follows. Given a binary matrix A, let f be the minimum fraction of 1's in any column
of A, i.e., fm is the minimum number of ones in a column of A. Also, let r be the
maximum number of l's in any row of A. By permuting the rows and columns of A,
we may assume that A1,= 1 for 1< i < r, i.e., that the first row of A has a 1 in
the first r entries. In the following proofs, we assume that this reordering has already
been done.
The following theorem shows that binary matrices require substantially more rows
than optimal matrices satisfying the RIP 2.
Theorem 4.6.1. Let A be. an m x n binary matrix satisfying the (k, D) - RIP2 . T hen,
m > min k 2 n
Before proving Theorem 4.6.1, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6.1. Let A be an m x n binary matrix satisfying the (k, D) - RIP2 . Then,
f5p.
Proof. To start, we square the inequalities defining the (k, D) - RIP 2 to obtain
c 2Ax| 1 | X c2 D 2| JAxj|.
We can bound c by considering the 1-sparse vector x = ej, where ej is a standard
basis vector with a 1 in a coordinate corresponding to a column of A with fm 1's.
Then, the inequalities above give c2fm < 1 < c 2 D2fm. We will only need the second
inequality, which we rewrite as
1
-~ D2 fm. (4.5)
Now, consider the vector x with 1's in the first k positions and O's elsewhere, i.e.,
x = _ ej. Let w(i) denote the number of l's in row i and in the first k columns
of A. From the definition of f, the first k columns of A contain at least fimk 1's, so
Z w(i) > fimk. Applying the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we obtain
||Ax| =2 w(i) 2 > (Z 1  i) > (fk) 2 M.
i=1
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But
||Ax| 12 D 2 f mk,
so putting the two inequalities together gives (fk)2 m < D 2 fmk. Cancelling out fimk
from both sides gives f < D .
Now, we prove Theorem 4.6.1.
Proof. Lemma 4.6.1 gives us a bound on f that will be useful when r > k. We can
obtain a second bound on f from the obvious inequality f mn < number of l's in A <
rm. Thus, f < '. As we will see, this bound is useful when r < k.
For notational convenience, let s = min{r, k}. Consider the vector x with 1's in
the first s positions and 0's elsewhere, i.e., x = e. For this choice of x, we see
that ||Ax1|2 > s 2, because the first entry of Ax is s. Note that because s < k, the
inequalities defining the (k, D) - RIP 2 apply to x. Thus, we can apply equation 4.5
to get
s2 < ||Ax|| 1 < D2fms.
We now plug in our two bounds on f. If r > k, then s = k, and we use the bound
from Lemma 4.6.1. This gives
k2 D2 k k,k
so m 2 . Similarly, if r < k, then s = r, so using our second bound on f gives
2 2
r < D2-Mr.
n
Thus, in this case m > g. Putting the two bounds together, we see that m >
min{1 2, n}, completing the proof. D
Note that our lower bounds on m are essentially tight for a large range of param-
eters. Specifically, assume that D 0 O(1) and that k = 0( 0 ) for some constant
0 < a < .5. Then, the matrices constructed in [31] achieve m = O((L) 2 ), so these
matrices are within a constant factor of our lower bound.
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4.6.3 Very Sparse Matrices are Bad with Respect to the RIP 2
Using an argument similar to that in the previous section, we can show that sparse
matrices (with arbitrary nonzero entries) do not achieve good performance with re-
spect to the RIP 2 . Define the density p of A as
number of nonzero entries in A
n
i.e., p is the average number of nonzero entries per column. We have the following
result.
Theorem 4.6.2. Let A be an m x n matrix that satisfies the (k, D) - RIP2. Assume
that A has density p. Then, p > min {4 4M, I 2 .
Proof. Because there are no restrictions on the entries in A, we can rescale A, and
thus without loss of generality we may assume that the c appearing in the definition
of the RIP 2 is 1. Now, by Markov's inequality, if the density is p, then at most 2
columns of A have more than 2p nonzero entries. If we discard these columns, the
modified matrix A' still satisfies the (k, D) - RIP 2 , and has at least 1 columns. All
columns of A' have at most 2p ones. Now, by considering the definition of the RIP 2
when x is a standard basis vector, we see that the norm of every column of A' > 1,
and therefore every column of A' has an element with absolute value > 1
Now, associate each column of A' with the row of the largest element (in absolute
value) in the column, breaking ties arbitrarily. Then, by the pigeonhole principle,
some row has at least n columns associated with it. By appropriately permuting the
rows and columns, without loss of generality we may assume that columns 1.... , n
are associated with the first row. Consider the vector x = 2m sgn(A1 ,j)ej, where
sgn(A1 ,j) denotes the sign of the ith entry in the first row of A, i.e., sgn(A1 ,i) = 1
if the ith entry is positive, and -1 otherwise. Clearly IIxI1| = ', but A'x has first
entry at least n"g. Thus, if n < k, then x is k-sparse, and we have
n 2 < ||A'x| |2< D2 n
8pm2 - - 2m
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Rearranging this inequality, we see that p > 4D'm
On the other hand, if n > k, we can consider the k-sparse vector x = kt 1 sgn(A1 ,j)ej.
This gives us
- 2 ||A'x|| D 2 k,2 p
So p .
Theorem 4.6.2 gives us a lower bound on the density for matrices that are (asymp-
totically) optimal with respect to the RIP 2. Namely, Theorem 4.6.2 implies that to
have m = O(k logf), p must be at least min{Q( 4 2,"og n), k }. For example, in the
case that D 0 O(1) and k = nc for some 0 < oz < 1, we see that matrices satisfying
the RIP 2 with m =O(k log 1) must have density at least Q(nfminjo'1-a-o(1). This is
in contrast with the case for the RIP1 , where the results of [9, 10 imply that there
exist (non-explicit) matrices with density O(log f) and O(k log(!)) rows that satisfy
the RIP1 .
4.7 Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter, we performed an adversarial analysis of a sim-
ple message-passing algorithm for recovering a vector x E R"i from measurements
y = Ax E R', where A E {0, 1}"n. We showed that when x has at most k nonzero
entries and A corresponds to a bipartite graph with expansion factor greater than
0.5, the message-passing algorithm recovers x exactly. For approximate recovery, we
proved that when A corresponds to a bipartite graph with expansion factor greater
than 0.5, the message-passing algorithm produces an estimate i satisfying an f1/f1
recovery guarantee of the form ||x - s||1 < O()||x - x(k)|| 1, where x(k) is the best
k-sparse approximation of x. Choosing appropriate expanders, this implies that the
message-passing algorithm can recover k-sparse x from O(k log(2)) measurements in
time O(nlog(!)log(k)), and can recover arbitrary x with an £1/f 1 guarantee from
O(klog(f)) in time O(n(log(E)) 2 log(k)). As noted in Section 4.4, these results are
better than almost all algorithms in the literature, with the exception of [62]. Viewed
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more broadly, our results can be interpreted as a further step toward formally con-
necting the theory of message-passing algorithms with that of compressed sensing,
which we anticipate being of growing importance to further advances in the field.
In the second part of this chapter, we showed that sparse graph codes are inher-
ently limited with respect to the RIP 2 . Finding an explicit construction of matrices
satisfying the RIP 2 remains an interesting open problem. We showed that existing
constructions have essentially been pushed as far as possible, in the sense that our
bound on the number of rows required by binary matrices is within a constant factor
of the construction in [31]. We also proved that matrices satisfying the RIP 2 must
have significantly more nonzero entries than matrices satisfying the RIP 1 . This sug-
gests that from the point of view of developing efficient algorithms, either a new class
of codes, or a new analysis technique, is required to design efficient (linear or nearly
linear time) algorithms providing stronger reconstruction guarantees, e.g., E2/fl guar-
antees.
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Chapter 5
Lossy Source Coding
This chapter presents several results on lossy source coding. In the first half of this
chapter (Sections 5.2 and 5.3), we show that for a broad class of rate-distortion prob-
lems, LDPC codes can achieve rates arbitrarily close to the rate-distortion function.
In addition, our proof technique shows that if one ignores computational complex-
ity, there is a strong connection between channel coding and rate-distortion coding.
Specifically, we show that for a broad class of rate-distortion problems, a channel code
achieving low probability of error (under ML decoding) for the reverse channel [28]
automatically achieves low distortion (using an optimal quantizer) for the original
rate-distortion problem. In particular, as the code rate approaches the capacity of
the reverse channel, the distortion approaches the rate-distortion bound.
In retrospect, this result is not surprising-many authors, for example [28], have
observed that there is a connection between the standard random coding arguments
used for channel coding and lossy source coding. However, the fact that the random
coding solutions are related does not mean that a given good channel code can be used
for lossy source coding. Phrased differently, just knowing that on average, randomly
chosen codes are good for both channel coding and lossy source coding does not allow
one to conclude that every good channel code is a good lossy source code. In fact,
recent work on lossy source coding suggests that lossy source coding and channel
coding are not as closely related as one would hope. For example, [80] suggests that
although LDPC codes are much better than LDGM codes for channel coding, LDGM
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codes may be fundamentally better than LDPC codes for lossy source coding. Our
results do not rule out the possibility that LDPC codes are worse than LDGM codes
when complexity is taken into consideration, but they do show that the connection
between the lossy source coding and channel coding problems is stronger than just
a relationship between random codes-ignoring complexity, any given good channel
code must be a good lossy source code.
In the second half of the chapter (Sections Section 5.4 and Section 5.5), we in-
vestigate different sparse graph structures to see how the choice of graph structure
impacts the tradeoff between graph sparsity, i.e., the number of edges in the graph-
ical representation of the code, and the best achievable rate-distortion performance.
For the problem of compressing a binary symmetric source under Hamming distor-
tion (BSS-HD) (see Section 5.1 for a precise definition of this problem), we provide
lower bounds on the number of edges in the graph representing an LDGM code or
an LDPC code as a function of the rate-distortion performance. More precisely, we
show that even if an optimal (and potentially computationally expensive) quantiza-
tion algorithm is used, the average degree of the vertices in the graph representing
an LDGM code or an LDPC code most grow like Q(log(l)) in order for the code to
come within E of the rate-distortion bound. Contrast this with a compound code
formed by concatenating LDGM and LDPC codes. It has been shown [79] that using
an optimal quantization algorithm, the compound construction can produce codes
achieving performance arbitrarily close to the rate-distortion bound for the BSS-HD
problem [79], and the average-degree remains uniformly bounded regardless of the
gap E to the rate-distortion bound.
We emphasize that the lower bounds on sparsity for LDGM codes and LDPC
codes should not be viewed as a strong argument against using these codes. The
logarithmic dependence of the average degree on the gap to the rate-distortion bound
is identical to the famous lower bound from [45] on the performance of LDPC codes
for the BSC as a function of the average check node degree. Despite this lower
bound, LDPC codes remain one of the best practical solutions to many channel coding
problems, and our lower bounds by no means preclude either LDGM or LDPC codes
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from being practically useful for lossy source coding. However, our lower bounds
represent a first step towards extending some results from channel coding to the
context of lossy source coding. Specifically, in the context of channel coding for the
BEC, LDGM codes cannot achieve low block error rates, and [106] shows that the
average degree of the vertices in good LDPC codes must grow logarithmically as
a function of the gap to capacity. On the other hand, the compound construction
formed by concatenating LDGM codes and LDPC codes can achieve rates arbitrarily
close to channel capacity (under ML decoding) for any memoryless binary input
output-symmetric channel [581. Furthermore, several classes of compound codes have
been found that achieve capacity for the BEC under message-passing decoding with
uniformly bounded complexity [58,96]. In summary, for the BEC, these results show
that compound codes offer fundamental advantages over either LDGM codes or LDPC
codes in the limit of long blocklengths and very small gaps to capacity.
Our lower bounds show that it is possible that compound codes offer a similar
advantage in the context of lossy source coding. Of course, to formalize the analogy
between lossy source coding and the BEC one would have to develop an efficient
quantization algorithm for compound codes, and as mentioned previously, our lower
bounds do not rule out the possibility of efficient quantization algorithms for LDGM
codes and LDPC codes, just as the lower bound from [45] did not rule out efficient
algorithms for decoding LDPC codes over the BSC. All one can conclude from our
lower bounds is that if a message-passing algorithm, or similar algorithm whose com-
plexity is proportional to the number of edges in the graph, is used for quantization,
then compound codes can potentially achieve performance near the rate-distortion
bound with lower complexity than LDGM codes or LDPC codes.
5.1 Rate-Distortion Problem Formulation
In this section, we review the rate-distortion problem [109] and define some notation.
In the standard rate-distortion problem formulation, X and denote finite source
and reconstruction alphabets, respectively, and Px denotes a probability distribution
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over X. Let d : X x I -+ R denote the per-symbol distortion function, and let
M denote the maximum value of d over X x J. We consider a quantizing an i.i.d.
source X" where each symbol is distributed according to Px. Given two strings
" E X" and y" E 4, define the distortion as the sum of the per-letter distortions,
i.e., d(X", y") = E d(xi, yi). The goal is to represent X" using as few bits as
possible, subject to the constraint that the expected distortion between X' and the
reconstruction Yn(Xn) is at most Dn, or equivalently, the expected average distortion
per source symbol is at most D. We define the rate-distortion function R(D) as the
minimum rate of any code capable of quantizing X" to within expected average
distortion D. As shown in [109],
R(D) = min I(X; Y),
QYIx:EpXQYIX [d(X,Y)|<D
where X is a random variable distributed according to Px, Y is a
variable, Qyix denotes the conditional distribution of Y given X,
notes expectation with respect to the distribution where the pair
i.e., p(x, y) = Px(x)Qyix(ylx) for all pairs x E X, y C I.
Here are three examples of rate-distortion problems considered
-valued random
and EPXQYIX de-
X,Y ~ PxQyix,
in this chapter.
* Binary Erasure Quantization: The binary erasure quantization (BEQ) problem
has X {0, 1, *} and = {0, 1}. The distortion function is given by
d(x, y) =
for
for
for
X E {0,1} and x = y
xE{0,1}andxz y
z = *
The source distribution Px is specified in terms of the erasure probability e.
Given e C [0, 1], Px(*) = e and Px(0) = Px(1) = '. The associated rate-
distortion function at 0 distortion is R(0) = 1 - e.
e Quantization Of A Binary Symmetric Source Under Hamming Distortion: The
problem of quantizing of a binary symmetric source under Hamming distortion
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(BSS-HD) is the rate-distortion problem where X = {0, 1}, Px(x) = .5 for
both x = 0 and x = 1, and
d~x, y) 0 for x = y
1 for x y
The associated rate-distortion function is R(D) =1 - hb(D), where
hb(D) = -D log(D) - (1 - D) log(1 - D) denotes the binary entropy function.
* Quantization of a Gaussian Source Under Mean-Square Distortion: Quantiza-
tion of a Gaussian source under mean-square distortion is the rate-distortion
problem where iV = =Z, X - N(0, 1), and d(x, y) = (x - y) 2. The associated
rate-distortion function is R(D) = 1log(l). Note that this problem does not
satisfy our definition of a rate-distortion problem because X and 1 are not finite,
but as we will see in Section 5.3, our proof techniques can easily be extended
to this case.
5.2 LDPC Codes are Good for BEQ
To start our study of lossy source coding, we reexamine the BEQ problem, which was
first considered in [80]. The following lemma, from [801, gives a useful relationship
between good codes for the BEC and good codes for BEQ.
Lemma 5.2.1. A linear code C with block length n can recover from a particular
erasure sequence (under ML decoding) if and only if the dual code C' can quantize
the dual sequence, i.e., the sequence where all the erased symbols have been turned into
unerased symbols and vice versa. Also, if C can recover from an erasure sequence using
message-passing decoding, then C' can quantize the dual sequence using a dualized
form of message-passing decoding. (For the details of how to dualize message-passing
to work for BEQ, see [80].)
Based on Lemma 5.2.1, one can show that LDGM codes that are duals of capacity-
achieving LDPC codes for the BEC achieve the rate-distortion function for BEQ (at 0
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distortion). On the other hand, in [80] the authors prove that low complexity LDPC
codes are not effective for this problem. Specifically, they prove that for BEQ, if an
LDPC code is capable of quantizing the source so that the distortion is exactly 0
with high probability, then the check degree must be at least Q(log n). This result
would suggest that LDPC codes are bad quantizers, because even for the simple
distortion in BEQ, the check degree must grow at least logarithmically to achieve
good performance.
As we will demonstrate, there is a simple way around the lower bound proved
in [80]. The bound in [80] is reminiscent of the Q(log n) lower bound on the check
degree for LT codes [75] on the BEC. By combining LT codes with a precode, Raptor
codes [110] are able to beat the lower bound for LT codes and achieve constant
complexity encoding and decoding per bit. So, let us consider the dual of a Raptor
code. Figure 5-1 shows the graph representing a Raptor code, and Figure 5-2 shows
the graph representing the dual of a Raptor code.
LT Code
LDPC Precode
Figure 5-1: Raptor code-this code performs well on the BEC.
Dual LT Code
Dual Precode
Figure 5-2: Dual Raptor code-this code performs well for BEQ.
Figure 5-2 warrants some explanation. If we define G to be a generator matrix for
the LT part of a Raptor code, and H to be a parity check matrix for the precode, then
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a Raptor code is the set {clax s.t. xG = c, HxT = 0}. Therefore, the dual is the set
{yIaz s.t. GyT + (zH)T= 0}. To see this, note that for any vectors c and y satisfying
these constraints, cyT = xGyT = x(zH)T = xHTzT = (zHXT)T = 0. Thus, the set
of y's defined by our constraint must be contained in the dual code. Assuming that
G and H have full rank, it is easy to see that the dimension of our set of y's is the
maximum possible value, which shows that the constraint exactly specifies the dual.
Translating the constraint into normal graph notation [42], computing GyT can be
accomplished by dualizing the LT part of the Raptor code, i.e., switch the variable
and check nodes as in the top part of Figure 5-2. 1 To compute (zH)T we just dualize
the precode, i.e., switch the variable and check nodes as in the bottom part of Figure
5-2. Thus, the constraint GyT + (zH)T = 0 is exactly captured by the graph in Figure
5-2. Because the dual constraint only asks for some z to exist, to interpret Figure
5-2 properly, the codeword is placed on the top set of variable nodes, and the bottom
variables nodes are all erased, i.e., we can set them arbitrarily in order to satisfy the
check nodes.
Because Raptor codes are capacity-achieving for the BEC, it follows from Lemma
5.2.1 that the duals of Raptor codes achieving the rate-distortion function for BEQ.
Now, imagine redrawing Figure 5-2 with all the variable nodes on the top, i.e., move
the variables nodes corresponding to the dual precode to the top of the figure. Then,
we see that a dual Raptor code is really just an LDPC code. The important point is
that the variable nodes corresponding to the precode are always erased, i.e., a dual
Raptor code is an LDPC code where a few variable nodes are always erased. This is
analogous to the situation in channel coding. Intuitively, the reason that LT codes
must have Q(log n) average degree to achieve low error probability is that otherwise
there are always a few variable nodes that are never connected to any checks. The
LDPC precode of a Raptor code allows a Raptor code to beat the Q(logn) lower
bound because the precode covers every variable node, so there are no longer any
'As noted in Chapter 2, for LDGM and LDPC codes drawn using Forney's normal graph notation
[42], the dual code can be obtained by swapping the variables nodes with the check nodes. More
generally, swapping the variables nodes with the check nodes allows us to compute GyT if we do not
view the check nodes as constraints, but instead think of them as producing outputs.
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isolated variable nodes. In the context of BEQ, the key idea in the proof of the
Q(log n) lower bound from [80] on the check degree for LDPC codes is that if the
degree is too small, then some check nodes will not be connected to any erased
variable nodes, and with probability .5 such check nodes will be unsatisfiable. The
dual of the precode allows dual Raptor codes to beat this lower bound because by
padding the input with a small number of erased variable nodes, every check node is
now guaranteed to be connected to at least one erased variable node. Put differently,
just as the LDPC precode in a Raptor code "fixes" the few variable nodes we could
not recover by decoding the LT code, the LDGM dual precode of a dual Raptor code
fixes the few parity checks we could not satisfy using the dual LT code. Thus, the
simple modification of reserving a set of variables nodes in an LDPC code to always
be erased, i.e., padding the input with a few erasures, allows LDPC codes to achieve
optimal performance for BEQ. This suggests that we should not give up on LDPC
codes so quickly, and as we show in the next section, it turns out that LDPC codes
can perform quite well for the BSS-HD problem, at least when we assume that an
optimal (and potentially computationally complex) quantization algorithm is used.
5.3 LDPC Codes are Good for Hamming Distor-
tion
In this section, we prove that LDPC codes can achieve points arbitrarily close to the
rate-distortion bound for the BSS-HD problem. We actually prove a more general
statement which roughly says that good channel codes are also good lossy source
codes. The proof is based on two simple ideas. First, if a channel code allows reliable
transmission, then intuitively it is clear that the typicality regions associated to dif-
ferent codewords cannot overlap significantly. The second idea is to take advantage
of the concentration of measure phenomenon in high dimensional spaces. Specifi-
cally, we can use isoperimetric inequalities to show that for any code, the distortion
is tightly concentrated around its expectation. We note that this approach has been
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pursued in [30]. Our results are essentially identical to the results derived in [30],
but we state the results in more generality, and we simplify the presentation by using
Azuma's inequality instead of the Blowing Up Lemma of [30].
Now, we proceed with the formal argument. The usual proof that rates above
R(D) are achievable, as given in [109] or [28], uses a random coding argument. For our
purposes, it is useful to instead prove achievability in a manner similar to that of [30].
Roughly speaking, this achievability proof picks a certain channel (corresponding to
the minimizing Q in the formula for R(D)), and shows that a code coming very close
to the capacity of this channel is also a good code for the original rate-distortion
problem. The following theorem summarizes our formal result.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let Q* denote the minimizing conditional distribution in the for-
mula for R(D). Define the reverse channel Q' : -+ X so that when X, Y - PxQ*,
Q' is the conditional distribution of X given Y. Let C be a code for the reverse
channel Q' with rate R that has average error probability at most .5. Then, when
an optimal quantization algorithm is used (i.e., an algorithm that always encodes the
source to the codeword minimizing the distortion), the code C achieves expected aver-
age distortion at most D + 2\/ R(D) - R + f(R) + o(1), where f (R) is a continuous
function of R satisfying limR+R(D) f (R) 0, and the o(1) is with respect to n. In the
case that the reverse channel is symmetric, we can choose f(R) = R(D) - R.
Before proving Theorem 5.3.1, we note that the theorem easily implies that LDPC
codes are good for the BSS-HD problem.
Theorem 5.3.2. For every 0 < 6 < .5 and every E > 0, there exist LDPC codes of
rate 1 - hb(6) + E achieving expected average distortion 6 for the BSS-HD problem.
The maximum degree of any node in the graphs of these codes is O(log(j)).
Proof. It is well-known that the reverse-channel for the BSS-HD problem with dis-
tortion constraint D = 6 is simply BSC(6). It is also well-known [45,77] that LDPC
codes can achieve rates arbitrarily close to the capacity of BSC(6) with vanishing
probability of error under ML decoding. In particular, Mackay's ensemble [77] gives
a family of LDPC codes with rate 1 - hb( 6 ) - e that achieves probability of error at
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most .5 (in fact, the probability of error decays exponentially with the blocklength
n), and the maximum degree of any variable node in the Tanner graphs associated
with this family of codes is O(log(l)). (We can also construct codes such that the
maximum degree of any node, variable or check, is at most O(log())).) Although [77]
does not explicitly state the above bound on degree, the bound follows immediately
from the equation right after equation 42 in [77]. Applying Theorem 5.3.1, noting
that BSC(6) is symmetric, so that we may take f(R) = R(D) - R, it follows that
this family of codes achieves expected average distortion at most 6 + 2v 2E + o(1),
completing the proof. E
Now, we proceed with the proof of Theorem 5.3.1. As alluded to above, this
theorem is essentially identical to Thin. 2.3 of [30]. The main difference is that we
state the theorem in a form that makes it explicitly clear that the theorem provides
a nontrivial bound on the distortion obtained from codes that are not quite capacity-
achieving, while the statement in [30] may leave the reader with the impression that
the distortion can only be bounded for codes that achieve the capacity of the reverse
channel. To prove Theorem 5.3.1, we need the following lemma, which is just a special
case of Theorem 7.4.2 from [3], which in turn is a special case of Azuma's inequality.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let P1, ... , P be probability distributions over X, and let P = 1 i
be the product probability distribution over {0, }, i.e., P generates each source sym-
bol independently. Consider a set S C Xn, and define
S, = {x" E X" : -x" E S such that x" and x'" differ in at most en coordinates}.
L2 n 2n
If P(S) > e-2, then P(S2e) 1- e 2
This lemma captures the isoperimetric inequality/concentration of measure that
we need to prove Theorem 5.3.1. In [30], the equivalent lemma is the Blowing Up
Lemma. Our lemma is much simpler to prove, and although our lemma does not give
the optimal isoperimetric constants that one could obtain by applying, for example,
Harper's isoperimetric inequality [56], our slightly cruder estimates are sufficient to
prove Theorem 5.3.1.
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Proof of Theorem 5.3.1. We prove Theorem 5.3.1 by showing that the typical sets for
the codewords in C are approximately disjoint from each other. Then, we use the
union of these typical sets as the set S in Lemma 5.3.1 to obtain the Theorem.
Formally, since C has average probability of error at most .5 when used on the
reverse channel Q', it follows that for at least one quarter of the codewords c E C, the
conditional probability of error given that c is sent is at most .75. We classify these
codewords according to their types (see Chapter 2 for a quick review of some basic
results in the method of types). Let C' be the code consisting of only those codewords
in the type that contains the maximum number of codewords, and let Py denote the
type of the codewords in C'. Then, C' clearly achieves average probability of error at
most .75. Therefore, there exists a channel Q such that |IQPy - Q'PyI|1 < 1, and
so that conditioned on the event that the empirical channel Qxiy = Q, the average
probability of error is at most .8. Note that without loss of generality, we may assume
that the decoding rule is deterministic, i.e., we can always choose a deterministic ML
decoding rule. Performing one more level of expurgation, we see that for at least one
tenth of the codewords c E C', the conditional probability of error given that c is sent
and that the empirical channel is Q is at most .9, and that this guarantee is achieved
by a deterministic decoding rule. Let C" be this set of codewords. Then, we have
shown that all codewords in C" have the same type, and for every codeword c E C",
the probability of error given that c is sent and that the empirical channel is Q is at
most .9. Also, because the total number of types is at most (n + 1)I'I, we see that
C"/ > ICI
- 40o(n+ 1)M
Let P be the type induced by Q and Py, i.e.,
P>(x) =E[Py (y)Q(x~y).
Fix a codeword c E C", and let T denote the size of the set X" E Xn such that
the conditional distribution Qxiy induced by X" and c is equal to Q. Note that by
symmetry, it does not matter which codeword c is chosen since the size of this set
only depends on the type, and all codewords in C" have type Py. Now, because
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the decoding rule for C" is deterministic, we conclude that for each c E C", there
is a decoding region D(c) of size at least .1T such that the decoder declares c when
the decoder's input is in D(c), and the decoding regions D(c) and D(c') are disjoint
whenever c # c'. Therefore, we conclude that I Ucc D(c)| > .1TIC"|. We apply
Lemma 5.3.1 with S =UEc"D(c). Since the source is i.i.d., we choose all the Pi's to
be Px, so that the product distribution P is the distribution of the i.i.d. source X'.
Then, Sanov's theorem implies that
P(S) > .1T|C"|~i -(D(P\|Px )+H($))n
where H(.) denotes entropy and X denotes a random variable distributed according
to P. From [28] we know that T > ( ,xI) where Y is a random variable distributed
according to Py, and the joint distribution of X and Y is QPy. Thus,
P(S) > 1 e(H(XIY)+R-D(PIPx)-H(k))n
--) 400(n + 1)3|xilII
Let a -(H(XIY) + R - D(P|Px) - H(X)). Then, Lemma 5.3.1 implies that
P(S 2 ,+o 1 )) > 1 - a
To complete the proof, we must bound a and the expected distortion. First,
we bound a. Since a = I(X;Y) - R + D(PI|Px), we bound I(X; Y) - R and
D(P |Px) separately. Recall two basic facts about the rate-distortion problem. First,
the capacity of the reverse channel Q' is the same as the capacity of the channel Q*.
Second, for any DMC, the capacity-achieving output distribution is always unique,
and the capacity-achieving output distribution for Q' is Px. The first fact implies
that I(X; Y) R(D), so I(X; Y) - R < R(D) - R. The second fact allows us to
bound D(P||Px). Specifically, let
f(R) = sup D(P'IIPx),
Pj,:I(X';Y');>R
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where Py, denotes a probability distribution over , Y' denotes a random variable dis-
tributed according to Py, X' denotes a random variable distributed so that (X', Y')
QP', and P denotes the marginal distribution of X'. The second fact implies
that the function f is continuous and limR-R(D) f(R) = 0, and the converse to
the coding theorem [30] implies that f + o(1) is an upper bound on D(P||Px).
In the case of a symmetric reverse channel, we know that the capacity-achieving
output distribution is uniform, and that H(XIY) does not depend on the distribu-
tion of Y. Therefore, in this case, to achieve rate R = R(D) - g, we must have
H(X) > log(IX|) - g - o(1). Thus, D(X'||X) = log(IX|) - H(X') < g, which proves
that we can take f(R) = R(D) - R in the case of a symmetric reverse channel. In
any case, we have shown that a < f(R) + R(D) - R + o(1).
Now, we bound the expected distortion. By definition, E[d(X, Y)] < D, so
EQ[d(X, Y)] < D + 1 . Therefore, whenever x" E S, the distortion is at most
D + M , and since the distortion measure is additive and bounded by M, it follows
that for all X" E S2 y+o(1), the distortion is at most D + 2M4/ + o(1). Since the
distortion is always at most Mn, we conclude that the expected distortion is at most
D + 2MV/& + o(1) + Mne-".
Comments:
1. The authors of [82] analyze the performance of MacKay's ensemble for BSS-
HD. One might hope for a more direct proof that LDPC codes are good for
quantization by strengthening their approach. We briefly explain why their
approach is not sufficient to prove that LDPC codes with sublogarithmic degree
can come close to the rate-distortion bound. The authors of [82] provide a
fairly complicated proof, but the same result can be derived using Chebyshev's
inequality and bounding the covariance term. However, even with this method,
choosing codes from MacKay's ensemble still gives a logarithmic degree bound.
Intuitively, the reason MacKay's ensemble does not give a better bound is that
it takes n ln n steps before a random walk on a hypercube has mixed well enough
for the covariance term to be small.
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A more fundamental limitation of the proof in [82] is that this proof is based on
trying to lower bound the probability that all (or almost all) possible syndromes
can be written using only a few columns of the parity check matrix. This
approach makes it impossible to prove any bound of better than logarithmic
degree for MacKay's ensemble. Specifically, if we want to be able to write
all syndromes, the matrix we look at must have full rank. However, one can
easily show that if we use a constant (or sublogarithmic) degree in MacKay's
ensemble, then with high probability the matrix will have a row where every
entry is 0. Thus, with high probability the matrix does not have full rank. The
probability of every row having at least one entry set to 1 does not become large
until the degree becomes logarithmic, which explains why the analysis in [82
only produces a logarithmic degree bound.
2. The authors of [82] observe that for dense parity check matrices, convergence
to the optimal distortion is exponential, i.e., the probability that the realized
distortion is larger than the expected distortion by any fixed constant decays
exponentially with the blocklength. Lemma 5.3.1 shows that this exponential
convergence is actually a property of any code. However, in the context of rate-
distortion, we can actually ask for something stronger. Specifically, there exist
codes that come close to the rate-distortion function for quantization under a
Hamming distortion in the worst-case, i.e., the covering radius can be made close
to the optimal distortion. To see this, say we have a code with expected distor-
tion 6. From Lemma 5.3.1, with probability at most - the observed distortion
n
is greater than 6 + /2n ln(n). So, to create a worst-case quantizer, repeatedly
try to quantize a given source by adding independent, uniformly chosen strings
to the given source. A simple union bound argument shows that after n trials,
with high probability the worst-case distortion is at most 6 + 2n ln(n). This
only increases the rate by "92, so we see that asymptotically we achieve the
same distortion and rate as before, but now with a worst-case guarantee. 2 If we
2As noted in the proof of Theorem 5.4.1, we can assume without loss of generality that n is as
large because we can always repeat a code without changing its performance, so we can get into the
asymptotic regime where l-9n becomes negligible.n
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restrict ourselves to linear codes, the arguments in [6] show that we can append
a few extra columns (or rows for LDGM codes) so that the resulting linear code
works well in the worst-case. The basic idea is that by adding O(log n) suit-
ably chosen columns, we can "fix" the original code to cover the small fraction
of words that previously would have been quantized with high distortion. The
drawback of this method is that the resulting code may no longer be sparse, i.e.,
the matrix may now have O(n log n) nonzero entries instead of 0(n) entries.
We close this section by observing that Theorem 5.3.1 can be extended to the problem
of quantizing a Gaussian source under mean-square distortion. The argument is
essentially the same, except that instead of Lemma 5.3.1, we apply the Gaussian
isoperimetric inequality [114].
Lemma 5.3.2 (Gaussian Isoperimetric Inequality). Let X7 be distributed i.i. d. N(O, 1),
and for an arbitrary (Lebesgue measurable) set S c R"n, let S, denote the set of points
whose Euclidean distance to S is at most ey/ . Then, for all positive 6 and E,
argmin Pr[X" E SF]
S:Pr[X-ES|;>
is a halfspace chosen so that Pr[X" C S] 6.
Theorem 5.3.3. Let X" be a source whose components are i.i.d. N(O, 1). Let C be
a code of rate R for the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with noise
variance D that has average error probability at most .5. Then, when an optimal
quantization algorithm is used (i.e., an algorithm that always encodes the source to
the codeword minimizing the distortion), the code C achieves expected average mean
square distortion per symbol of at most D + 2/ R(D) - R + o(l).
Proof. The proof proceeds along similar lines to the proof of Theorem 5.3.1, so we
will be brief. Because a Gaussian source is continuous, we cannot use types the way
we did for discrete memoryless sources. However, because the reverse channel for a
Gaussian source under mean-square distortion is the AWGN channel, we can take
advantage of spherical symmetry. In particular, we replace the notion of type with
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the power of the codewords, and then quantize the power into a suitable number
of bins. This allows us to define decoding regions D(c) as before, and we obtain a
similar formula for a. Since the Gaussian channel is symmetric, the same method of
bounding f(R) applies. Now, from Lemma 5.3.2, we see that if the probability of a
set S under the Gaussian measure is e-an, then the probability of S,; is at least
1 - e~, , so we obtain the required bound on the distortion. 0
5.4 A Lower Bound on the Degree of LDGM Codes
Now, we move on to the problem of proving lower bounds. In this section, we show
that LDGM codes cannot come arbitrarily close to the rate-distortion bound for
the BSS-HD problem unless the average variable node degree becomes unbounded.
Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4.1. Let d be the average degree of the variable nodes in some LDGM
code. Let R be the rate of the code, and let 6 be the expected distortion. Define
E = 6 - 6 opt, where Sopt is the optimal distortion for rate R, i.e., R + hb(Jopt) = 1.
Then, d = Q(log ).
Note that Theorem 5.4.1 applies to any code, not codes drawn from some specific
random ensemble. Before proving Theorem 5.4.1, we state the following lemma,
which is closely related to Lemma 5.3.1, and is also just a special case of Theorem
7.4.2 from [3].
Lemma 5.4.1. Let P1,... , Pn be probability distributions over X, and let P = H Pi
be the product probability distribution over Xn, i.e., P generates each source symbol
independently. Let C C '" be a code, and let D be the distortion when X" is quantized
to the codeword in C that minimizes the distortion. Then, Pr[D - E[D] > EM] <
E2n
e 2 .
Thus, for any code, the distortion is tightly concentrated.
Proof of Theorem 5.4.1. This is a simple application of Lemma 5.4.1. Consider a
code with rate R and average variable node degree d. We prove Theorem 5.4.1 by
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proving a lower bound on E in terms of d. Let D be a random variable denoting
the realized distortion. From Lemma 5.4.1, we know that Pr[D > oopt + 2E] < e-.
Thus, since the source is uniform, at least 2 - 2 ( 1- )n 2" words have distortion
less that 6opt + 2E.
Let E1 be a parameter that we set later. If we flip "' information bits of the
code, and these bits correspond to variable nodes with degree < 2d, then the triangle
inequality implies that the distortion increases by at most ein. Note that if the
average variable node degree of the code is d, then it follows that at least half of
the variable nodes have degree at most 2d, so we do have quite a bit of freedom in
our choice of which Ein bits to flip. We take advantage of this freedom by counting
the number of (codeword, source) pairs such that the relative distance between the
codeword and the source is < 6opt + 2E + Ei in two different ways.
First, from the point of view of codewords, the number of such pairs is clearly
2RnVol(n, (6opt+2E+Ei)n), where Vol(n, d) denotes the number of words in a Hamming
ball of radius d in an n-dimensional space. We already observed that almost every
source word has a codeword within distance 6opt+ 2E. Therefore, using our observation
about flipping information bits, the number of such pairs is at least 2"Vol(;", n).
Now, we may assume without loss of generality that n is as large as we like. This is
because if we are given a code C with block length no, we can construct a code with
block length Kno with the same rate, average check degree, and expected distortion,
where K is any integer greater than 1. This code is simply the repetition of C K
times, i.e., the code quantizes a source of length Kno by splitting the source into K
blocks of length no and applying the code C separately to each block. Therefore, we
consider the limit as n -- oc, so that the exponent becomes the important term in
each of the two ways of counting (codeword, source) pairs. Specifically,
2RnVol (n, (6 opt + 2e + E1) n)- 2 (R+hb(6pt+2e+Ei))n
and
2"Vol Rn Ein 2 (1+.5Rhb(-l))n2 ' 2d
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Therefore, for sufficiently large n, the condition
2RnVol (n, (6pt + 2e + I)n) > 2"Vol (Ij 7
implies that R + hb( 6 opt + 2E + e1) > 1 .5Rhb(j ), provided that 6 opt + 2E + 1 < .5.
To complete the proof, observe that hbO is a concave function, so hb(6 opt+2E+Ei) <
hb(oopt) + h'( 0 pt)(2E + &1). This means that h'(60pt)(2E + E1 ) > .5Rhb(-), i.e.,
E - &1). Now, we optimize over 61. Taking the derivative with respect
to Ei, we find that
d (.5Rhb(f) .5 Rd
-& -i = h 0~ log 1 i - 1.de h'(6opt) dh'(6opt) E1
Setting this expression to 0, we find that the optimal value is E* . Assume
for the moment that this value of E* satisfies the inequality 6 opt + 2E + El < .5, so that
E* is a valid value of E1. Then, substituting in E*, we find that
1 .5Rhb( e
E > -ds*
2 h'stoopt)
.5 R2dh'(6 0  t) log I + 22dh (3ot))2 h' (oopt ) 1 + 22d bo
.5R 22(J0,) 1 + 2 2dh '(0 t) Rd
h'(6op) 1 + 2 2dh'(6,,t) 2 2dh'(3,)) 1 + 2 2dh' (6ot)
log' + 2dh'6
.5R 22dh'(o) -(pt)> 2h~ d'Jt log 1 +2 2-d'bo)
S 2h'(opt) 1 + 22dh'( ob±)
R (1 - 2 -1-2dh'(ot)
- 4h'o) 1 + 22dh'(5obt)
fR 1
- 8h's(8ot) 1 + 2 2dh'(6opt)
To obtain the second to last inequality, we have used the inequalities x ln (1 + 1) >
1 - -L and log(e) > 1. In the last inequality, we have used the fact that h'(60 pt) is2x i the ls
nonnegative, so the first term in the numerator is at least 1. If we invert the last
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log -1I
inequality, we see that d > , proving that d must be Q(log (1)).
Finally, we must address the case that e* is invalid, i.e., opt + 2E + e* > .5. For
8 < .25(.5 - 6 opt), this implies that E* > .25 - .56 opt. Now, there exists a constant do
depending only on Jopt such that for d > do, E* < .25 -. 5 6opt, so we will be done if we
can show that if there exists a code with average degree d achieving distortion opt +,
then there exists a code with average degree larger than do that achieves at most the
same distortion. But this is clear because we can always add, say 2do variable nodes
that are connected to every single check node, and hence make the average degree
greater than do. Adding variable nodes clearly cannot increase the distortion, and
applying the repetition trick used previously, we see that we can make the additional
rate 2d9 as small as we want, so the proof is complete. I
n
Discussion: This bound is tight in the sense that log(-) is the correct scaling of
the average degree as a function of the gap to the rate-distortion bound. In more
detail, one can show that there exists LDGM codes within E of the rate distortion
bound and with maximum variable node degree d = O(log(l)). One way to see this
is to consider a dualized form of MacKay's ensemble. 3 Alternatively, we can use
the simpler Poisson ensemble considered in [79). This ensemble will have a few nodes
with large (logarithmic) degree, but a simple argument combining Lemma 5.3.1 with
an expurgation argument where we delete the few variable nodes with large degree
shows that if d = O(log ( )), then the gap can be reduced to E.
In another sense, the bound in Theorem 5.4.1 is quite loose. The bound says
8 = Q(2) for some constant a, while the random ensembles described above have
a much larger value of E. (Note : we can optimize the bound without using the
simplification of approximating hb by a first order Taylor series expansion. However,
this does not improve the bound significantly.)
3By"dualized" form of MacKay's ensemble, we mean an ensemble that selects each row of the
generator matrix independently using a random walk. This is not quite the dual of MacKay's ensem-
ble, since the dual would select each column independently. However, selecting rows independently
is more convenient since this guarantees a bounded maximum variable degree. The proof that the
dualized form of MacKay's ensemble works is similar to [79], but involves quite a bit of algebra.
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5.5 A Lower Bound on the Degree of LDPC Codes
To complete the picture, we now show a similar lower bound for LDPC codes.
Theorem 5.5.1. Let d be the average degree of the check nodes in some LDPC
code. Let R > 0 be the rate of the code, and let 6 be the expected distortion. Define
E = 6 - 60,<, where 6 opt is the optimal distortion for rate R, i.e., R + hb(6opt) - 1.
Then, d = Q(log(l)).
As with LDGM codes, in some sense this bound is tight, since Theorem 5.3.2
shows that MacKay's ensemble achieves a gap of E to the rate-distortion bound with
maximum variable node degree bounded by O(log( )).4
Before going into the details, we summarize the main ideas of the proof of Theorem
5.5.1. Our proof is similar to the well-known proof from [45] that LDPC codes cannot
come arbitrarily close to the capacity of the BSC with uniformly bounded degree.
Specifically, let H denote the parity check matrix of the code under consideration,
and let w be a random vector whose components are generated i.i.d. with probability
6 of being 1 and probability 1-6 of being 0. Then, assuming that the check nodes have
bounded degrees, the syndrome Hw does not look close to uniform-in particular, the
syndrome has expected (normalized) Hamming weight less than .5. Next, we apply
Azuma's inequality to bound deviations from the mean, and this allows us to count
the number of syndromes that can be realized by inputs with normalized Hamming
weight 6. In particular, the number of syndromes is substantially smaller than the
number of syndromes we would need for an optimal rate-distortion code, and it is
this gap in the number of syndromes that allows us to prove that the average degree
of the check nodes must grow as Q(log(l)).
Now we fill in the details to complete the proof sketch above. We start with two
simple lemmas.
Lemma 5.5.1. Let H be an m x n parity check matrix for some code such that the
average Hamming weight of the rows of H, i.e., the average check degree of the code,
4As for LDGM codes, we can also delete the few check nodes with large degree to get codes with
maximum variable node and check node degree bounded by O(log( )). Note that deleting check
nodes cannot increase the distortion.
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is d. Let w C {0, 1}" be a vector whose coordinates are generated i.i.d. with probability
6 of being 1 and probability 1 - 6 of being 0. Then,
1 - (1 - 26)d
2
Proof. Let wi be the Hamming weight of the ith row of the parity check matrix. The
expected Hamming weight is
M 1 - (1 - 26)"'s
2
i=1
Applying Jensen's inequality, we see that this sum is upper bounded by m 1~(1 2)d
Note that for a random linear code, the expected Hamming weight would be E, so
we see that the expected Hamming weight is noticeably smaller for a code with low
average check degree. This is the key fact in our proof.
Our second preliminary lemma, Lemma 5.5.2, is like Lemmas 5.3.1 and 5.4.1 in
that it is also a special case of Theorem 7.4.2 from [3].
Lemma 5.5.2. Let H be an m x n parity check matrix for some code, and assume
that every column of H contains at most c l's. Let w E {0, } be a vector whose
coordinates are generated i.i.d. with probability 6 of being 1 and probability 1 - 6 of
being 0. Then,
Pr[I\HwIH - E[|Hw|HI > E& 2e2.
Now, we combine Lemmas 5.5.1 and 5.5.2.
Lemma 5.5.3. Let H be an m x n parity check matrix for some code such that the
average Hamming weight of the rows of H is d. Let w E {0, } be a vector whose
coordinates are generated i.i.d. with probability 6 of being 1 and probability 1 - 6 of
being 0. Then, for any 0 < e, f < 1, there exists a set Sf, c {0, }In with size at
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most 2 f "Vol(m(1(122)d + E)) such that
E 
2 nf2
Pr[Hw ' Sf,,] < 2e 2(1-f)>2 (1-R)
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that the parity check matrix has
been permuted so that the columns are sorted in descending order of Hamming weight.
Let the columns in sorted order be ci, . . . , cn. The first frn columns cI, . .. , Cfn induce
at most 2fn possible syndromes, i.e., there are at most 2fn syndromes formed by
taking linear combinations of only the first fn columns. We denote these syndromes
bysi, . . ., s 2f"-
We define the set Sf,e as follows. Let B(x, d) to be the Hamming ball of radius d
around x. Then, we define
sj, n I1 - (1 - 26)d
S5,F =U B si, M 2 +E
i=1
Note that Sfy contains at most 2f/Vol(m, m( 1- + e)) strings, as required.
To complete the proof, we show that with high probability, the syndrome lands
inside the set S. Observe that for the syndrome to land outside of the set S, it
is necessary that the syndrome induced by the columns c1+fn,... , cn has Hamming
weight at least m( 1-(122 6 )d + E), because otherwise the syndrome of the whole word
will be close to the si corresponding to the induced syndrome for the first fn columns.
Thus, it suffices to bound the probability that the syndrome induced by the columns
C1+fn,..., cn has Hamming weight at least m( -(1 2 .)d + E). This probability can be
bounded easily by applying Lemmas 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 to the submatrix H' of H induced
by columns C1+fn, .. . , cn. First, since we have thrown away some columns, it is clear
that the average weight of the rows of H' is at most the average weight of rows in H.
Lemma 5.5.1 implies that E[IH'w|H] < nhb(Sopt) -2)d . Next, observe that every
column of H' has weight at most f- R). To see this, note that average weight of the
rows of H is d, so the average weight of the columns of H is d(1 - R). Thus, at most
a fraction f of the columns of H can have weight larger that d(-R), which means
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that columns C1+fn, ... , c have weight at most d(1~R)
Because the column weight is bounded, we can apply Lemma 5.5.2. Lemma 5.5.2
implies that
Pr[ H'w|H - E[|H'wH > A] < 2e2(1-f)nd 2(1-R) 2
Combining this with our bound on E[IH'wH, we see that
E 2n
2
Pr[Hw V S] < 2e 2(1-f)d1(1-R)7. [-1
We use Lemma 5.5.3 to count the number of syndromes induced by vectors with
Hamming weight at most 6n. First, we recall an elementary bound on binomial
coefficients.
Lemma 5.5.4. Let w be generated i.i.d. with probability 6 of being 1. Assume that
6n is an integer. Then, Pr[|wlH 6n] - o(1)).
Proof. Apply Stirling's approximation n! = nne-"v2irn(1 + o(1)) to the expression
( n n!In(-)
n) (6n) (n)!(( - )n)! 
6)n
Lemma 5.5.5. Let H be an m x n parity check matrix for some code such that the
average Hamming weight of the rows of H is d, and let f, E, and S5,, be as in Lemma
5.5.3. Then, the number of syndromes induced by vectors w E {0, 1}" with weight
<6n that are outside Sf,, is at most
e2nf2(1 + 6n)2b(6 )" 2wr(1 - 6)ne-2(1-d'(1-2R).
Proof. Consider the distribution on w analyzed in Lemma 5.5.3, i.e., the distribution
where each bit of w is generated i.i.d. with probability 6 of being 1. Lemma 5.5.4
says that
1
Pr[IwIH = 6n] = (1 + o(1)).
276(1 - 6)n
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Combining this with Lemma 5.5.3, we see that
E2nf2
Pr[Hw g SfWH 6n] 226( 6)ne2(1-f)d2(1-
Now, since each bit of w is generated i.i.d., it is obvious that conditioned on
the event {|lWH = 6n}, w is distributed uniformly over all strings with weight 6n.
Therefore, the probability above is just the fraction of inputs with weight 6n whose
induced syndromes are outside the set Sf,s. Using the inequality (j") 2hl(), we see
that the number of syndromes outside of S that can be represented by inputs with
weight exactly 6n is at most
E2 2
2 hb(6)n 2-6(1-- 6)rie2(1-f)d2(1-R)2
To complete the proof, note that we can repeat the analysis for all weights less
than 6n as well. Specifically, Lemma 5.5.3 holds for all 6, and the bound above is
monotonically increasing in 6 for 6 < .5. Thus, we see that the number of syndromes
outside of S that are representable by w such that |WIH 6n is
e 2,
(1 + 6n)2hb( )" 2i(1 - 6)e 2(1-f)d2(1-R)2.
Proof of Theorem 5.5.1. To prove Theorem 5.5.1, we essentially just have to set f
and E appropriately in Lemma 5.5.5. As in the proof of Theorem 5.4.1, note that we
can assume without loss of generality that n is as large as we want because repetition
preserves the rate, average degree, and expected distortion. Thus, the important part
of the bounds in Lemmas 5.5.3 and 5.5.5 is the exponent.
From Stirling's approximation and Lemma 5.5.3, we know that size of Sf,, is at
most n2fn+nhb( 1-12 )+R). The exponent of this expression is
fn +hb (1 - (1 - 26)d + E
2 1 - R)
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The exponent for the expression in Lemma 5.5.5 is
n 2(1 - f)d 2 (1 - R)2)-
If both of these exponents are less than n(1 - R), then it follows that for sufficiently
large n, a negligible fraction of the syndromes are represented by inputs with weight
at most on. Thus, with probability going to 1 the (normalized) distortion is bigger
than 6, so the expected distortion is also bigger than J.
Now, to make the first exponent sufficiently small, we need to choose E small
enough so that the balls we draw around each si have normalized radius less than .5.
We choose E = (1 - R) (12)d. We set f = I((1-)d )2. Then, using the inequality
hb(I - x) < 1 - 42,5 we see that the first exponent is in fact less than n(1 - R). To
make the second exponent sufficiently small, we need
hb(6) - - < (1 - R).2(1 - f)d 2(1 - R) 2
Since hb(-) is concave, it follows that hb(6) < 1 - R + h' (6pt)(J - 6opt), so it suffices
to choose 6 such that
h' - 6,) - 2f22< 0.
2(1 - f)d 2 (1 - R)<
Using our expressions for E and f, it is easily verified that
(1 - 25t )6d
6 < +2 19d2(h' (opt) +
is a valid choice for 6. Thus, the expected distortion for any code is lower bounded
by the quantity on the right hand side of the last inequality. Inverting this inequality,
we see that d = Q(log(1)), completing the proof. El
5This inequality is easily derived using Taylor series.
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5.6 Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter (Sections 5.2 and 5.3), we proved that LDPC codes
can be used for certain rate-distortion problems. First, we proved that a slight mod-
ification allows one to construct LDPC codes that are good for BEQ. Next, we im-
proved the results of [82] by showing that if an optimal encoding algorithm is used,
then LDPC codes can come arbitrarily close to the rate-distortion function for the
BSS-HD problem. Our proof also shows that for many rate-distortion problems, any
channel code that works well for the reverse channel will be good for the associated
rate-distortion problem, provided that an optimal quantization algorithm is used.
The key ingredient in the proof is an appropriate isoperimetric inequality. For our
purposes, Azuma's inequality was sufficient for discrete sources, while the Gaussian
isoperimetric inequality was used for the case of quantizing a Gaussian source under
mean-square distortion. These isoperimetric inequalities allow us to show that in high
dimensions, good sphere-packings, i.e., good channel codes, are also good coverings,
i.e., good lossy source codes.
In the second half of this chapter (Sections 5.4 and 5.5), we proved lower bounds
on the average degree for LDGM and LDPC codes, and our lower bounds are within
a constant factor of the upper bounds we computed in the first half of the chapter. In
particular, our results imply that the compound construction from [79] achieves lower
average degree than LDGM codes or LDPC codes can achieve individually. Thus, it
seems that combining LDGM codes and LDPC codes could potentially lead to more
efficient algorithms for the BSS-HD problem. For the special case of the BEC, this is
already known to be the case [58,96].
Probably the most important problem related to this chapter is developing efficient
algorithms for quantization. Given the slow rate of growth for our bounds on average
degree, i.e., d = E(log(l)), even algorithms for LDGM or LDPC codes could be
very useful. One could argue that from a practical point of view that the BSS-HD
problem is essentially solved. For example, convolutional codes with a relatively
short constraint length already come quite close to the rate-distortion bound. Even
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short random codes converge to the rate-distortion bound quickly. However, from a
theoretical point of view, developing algorithms for BSS-HD with complexity per bit
that provably scales subexponentially as a function of ), where e denotes the gap to
the rate-distortion bound remains an open problem, although there has been some
recent progress [68].
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Chapter 6
Code Constructions for Wiretap
Channels
In this chapter, we consider code constructions for secure communication. Security
was first considered from an information-theoretic perspective in the classic paper by
Shannon [108]. One of the key results in [108] is that from an information-theoretic
perspective, the one-time pad is an optimal strategy for transmitting a secret message
from a transmitter to a receiver. From a practical standpoint, this result poses a
major problem, because it means that in order for a transmitter to send n bits to a
receiver securely, the transmitter and receiver must already share a key of n (uniformly
random) bits that is kept secret from the eavesdropper. Thus, the results from [108]
essentially say that to transmit a message of n bits securely over a channel in the
presence of an eavesdropper, the transmitter and receiver must meet in private and
agree to a secret key of n bits, which means that the transmitter and receiver might
as well exchange the message while they meet in private and not use the channel at
all.
In many introductory treatments of cryptography, this result is used as motiva-
tion for weakening the notion of security. Specifically, instead of requiring secure
transmission against an arbitrary eavesdropper, one can place the constraint that
the eavesdropper has limited computational power. Exploring this model turns out
to be very fruitful. Assuming that certain widely believed (but unproven) claims in
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computational complexity are true, e.g., the existence of one-way functions and trap-
door functions, it is possible to implement many useful cryptographic protocols such
as public key cryptography, pseudorandom generators, signatures, etc. Of course,
these schemes are only secure against computationally bounded eavesdroppers, and
the security proofs rely on unproven assertions in computational complexity theory.
As an alternative to placing computational constraints on the eavesdropper, Wyner
introduced the wiretap channel as a new way of constraining the eavesdropper [120].
In the wiretap channel, we assume that communication occurs over a broadcast chan-
nel. Specifically, the transmitter can send information over a (potentially noisy)
channel to the intended receiver. The constraint on the eavesdropper is that the
eavesdropper only gets to see a noisy version of what the transmitter sends to the
intended receiver, i.e., although there may be a noisy channel between the transmitter
and the intended receiver, there is also a noisy channel between the transmitter and
the eavesdropper. The motivation for such a model is that at the physical layer, bits
are sent over noisy channels, so rather than abstract away the channel noise by as-
suming that channel coding has been used to create a clean channel, we may be able
to take advantage of the inherently noisy nature of the channel to accomplish secure
transmission. In [120], Wyner analyzed some simple channel models and showed that
when the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is "noisier" than the
channel between the transmitter and the intended receiver, it is possible to construct
coding strategies that allow the transmitter and intended receiver to exchange mes-
sages at a positive rate (measure in terms of bits/channel use) in such a way that the
eavesdropper learns very little information about the sent message. The notion of se-
curity proposed by Wyner is rather weak, however. In [83] and [29] a stronger notion
of security was proposed, and it was shown in [83] that the maximum achievable rate
for this stronger notion of security is identical to the maximum achievable rate for
Wyner's weaker notion of security, so there is no rate loss associated with using the
stronger notion of security. In Section 6.2, we describe the wiretap channel and the
associated security criteria more formally.
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the wiretap channel, as well as
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several other models of information-theoretic security. For example, in the context
of biometrics and secret-key generation, [81] presents some methods for securely ex-
tracting a shared secret when an eavesdropper has side information about the key.
This line of work also generalizes the notion of security by considering various notions
of security, some weaker and some stronger in the sense of giving the eavesdropper
stronger attack capabilities, e.g., [33, 34]. Also, several code constructions have been
proposed for specific wiretap channel models. For example, [105,115] construct codes
for a wiretap channel where the channel between the transmitter and the intended
receiver is noiseless and the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper
is a BEC, or a binary input additive white Gaussian noise channel. However, these
papers only consider the weak notion of security proposed by Wyner, and the com-
plexity of the proposed encoding algorithms is potentially 0(n2 ), as it depends on
the encoding algorithm for LDPC codes proposed in [101], and it is unclear that ap-
propriate degree distributions can be designed to so that the resulting codes can be
encoded in subquadratic time by the algorithm from [101] while still providing even
weak security guarantees. Other than in the special case of the BEC, the proposed
codes do not achieve the maximum possible rate for secure communication.
6.1 Summary of Results
In this chapter, we start by describing the wiretap channel and the associated se-
curity criteria considered in [120] and [83]. Then, we introduce a new notion of
security which is slightly stronger that the notion considered in [83]. We call this
new notion of security semantic security, because of the close connection between our
notion and the notion of semantic security [49] widely used in computational cryp-
tography. Next, we introduce a new channel model that we call the constant-capacity
compound wiretap channel. This channel model is a special case of the compound
wiretap channel introduced in [71]. Roughly speaking, the constant-capacity com-
pound wiretap channel attempts to address one drawback of the standard wiretap
channel, namely that the standard wiretap channel assumes that the transmitter has
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complete knowledge of the channel between himself and the eavesdropper. In practi-
cal situations, it seems unlikely that the transmitter can obtain this information, and
the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel attempts to address this concern by
assuming that the transmitter only knows the capacity (or at least an upper bound
on the capacity) of the channel connecting himself to the eavesdropper. We define
the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel more formally in Section 6.2. We
believe that finding coding strategies that provide security under weaker constraints
on the channel connecting the transmitter to the eavesdropper than those imposed by
the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel is an important open problem that
could have strong implications for the use of codes providing information-theoretic
security guarantees in practice.
After introducing the new notion of security and the constant-capacity compound
wiretap channel, we provide a simple reduction from the wiretap and constant-
capacity compound wiretap channel problems to the well-studied problem of channel
coding. Specifically, in Section 6.3, we show how to achieve the secrecy capacity of
a wiretap or constant-capacity compound wiretap channel by separately designing
a precode with good security properties and a good channel code for the channel
between the transmitter and the intended receiver. This reduction uses randomness
extractors [19] (see Chapter 2 for a quick review of randomness extractors). We note
that extractors were also used in [83], but we apply them in a different manner.
Our reduction is useful because it means that the design of codes for the wiretap
or constant-capacity compound wiretap channel can be separated into the design of
a good channel code and a precode with good secrecy properties, and the channel
code and the precode can be designed completely independently of each other. Our
reduction is able to provide strong security in the sense of [83], but unfortunately it
does not provide semantic security. Using some simple constructions of randomness
extractors, we show the existence of coding schemes possessing strong security for the
wiretap and constant-capacity compound wiretap channels achieving rates up to the
secrecy capacity of the (degraded) wiretap channel and up to one-half of the secrecy
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capacity of the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel. 1 The encoding and
decoding complexity of these schemes is only O(n log(n) log log(n)), where n denotes
the block length of the code.
In Section 6.4, we construct a coding scheme that achieves rates up to the secrecy
capacity and possesses semantic security for the special case of a noiseless channel to
the intended receiver and a BEC to the eavesdropper, i.e., the same channel considered
in [115]. Our codes have encoding and decoding complexity 0(n), and importantly,
the complexity is uniformly bounded regardless of how close we wish to come the
secrecy capacity. Finally, in Section 6.5, we construct a coding scheme that achieves
rates up to the secrecy capacity and possesses semantic security for the case of BECs
to the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. Our codes have encoding and decoding
complexity O("(log(l))2 ), where E is a measure of the gap to the secrecy capacity
(see Section 6.5 for a formal statement of the result).
6.2 Formal Model and Discussion of Various No-
tions of Security
The wiretap channel model introduced by [120] is essentially identical to the standard
broadcast channel, but the goals of communication are very different. Figure 6-
1 depicts a wiretap channel. There is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) Q1
with input alphabet X and output alphabet connecting the transmitter to the
intended receiver, and another DMC Q2 with input alphabet X and output alphabet Z
connecting the transmitter to the eavesdropper. Recall the definition of a DMC given
in Chapter 1-if x" is the input to the wiretap channel, then the channel outputs Y"
and Z" at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper are random variables distributed
'A degraded wiretap channel is a special case of a wiretap channel satisfying a technical condition
that roughly states that the channel between the transmitter and the intended receiver is less noisy
than the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper. See Section 6.2 for a precise
definition.
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Transmitter Noisy Channel Q , Intended
Receiver
Noisy Channel Q 2 Eavesdropper
Figure 6-1: Wiretap channel. Communication is carried over a broadcast channel
composed of a channel Q1 connecting the transmitter to the intended receiver, and a
channel Q2 connecting the transmitter to the eavesdropper.
according to
n
P(Y" = -y"|X") = fQQi(yilX,)
i=1
n
P(Z" = z"|lx") = ] Q2 (ziIxi).
i=1
Note that the joint distribution of Y" and Zn is irrelevant for our purposes.
In addition to the standard wiretap channel, we define the constant-capacity com-
pound wiretap channel as follows. The constant-capacity compound wiretap channel
is specified by two parameters-a channel Q1 between the transmitter and the in-
tended receiver, and a capacity constraint C2. In the constant-capacity compound
wiretap channel, the eavesdropper is allowed to choose the channel Q2 to be any DMC
with capacity at most C2. Note that the eavesdropper is allowed to make this choice
in an adversarial manner even after seeing the coding scheme that the transmitter
and intended receiver have agreed upon, so we must design a coding scheme that is
secure no matter which channel the eavesdropper chooses.
As usual in information theory, we consider codes that map messages to code-
words consisting of n elements from X. Formally, we define a coding scheme to be a
sequence of codes {Mn, En, Dn}, where M, denotes the number of messages that the
nth code can transmit, E, denotes the encoding function, which maps the M, mes-
sages to elements of X", and Dn denotes the decoding function used by the intended
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receiver. Note that E, can be randomized, but we do not allow the transmitter and
the intended receiver to share common randomness. Intuitively, it is clear that al-
lowing randomness in the encoding procedure makes achieving security easier, since a
randomized encoding function should increase the eavesdropper's uncertainty about
which message the transmitter sent. One can allow randomized decoders D" as well,
but it is easy to see that this will not help, e.g., we can always choose a deterministic
MAP decoder.
There are three important performance metrics associated with a coding scheme
{M, E,, D,}. The first is the rate of the coding scheme, defined as
R = lim inf log Mn
n-*oo n
(Note that we could equally well have chosen lim sup-this will not change any of
our results, and in any case, in the sequel we always construct coding schemes for
which the liminf in the definition of the rate is actually a limit, i.e., the sequence
converges.) The second performance metric is probability of error. Formally, let
M denote the sent message, so that M is a random variable uniformly distributed
over the set {1, 2,... , Mn}. Let Y" denote the output of the channel Q1 when M is
sent, i.e., Yn is the output when En(M) is the channel input. Then, we define the
probability of error in the standard way, i.e.,
Pe,n = Pr[Dn(Y") # M],
where the subscript n denotes the probability of error for the nh code in the coding
scheme.
The final performance metric of interest is the security guarantee of the scheme.
As discussed in the introduction, we consider three notions of security. Let Z" denote
the output of the channel Q2 when M is sent, i.e., Z" is the output received by the
eavesdropper when En(M) is sent. The first notion of security is weak security, the
definition given by Wyner.
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Definition 6.2.1. We say that a coding scheme possesses weak security if
lim I(M; Z") =0.
n-oo n
The motivation for such a definition is that if one accepts that mutual informa-
tion I(M; Z") captures how useful Z" is in determining M, then the normalized
mutual information I(M;Z") represents the rate of information leakage to the receiver.
n
Compared to other notions of security widely used in the cryptographic community,
however, this notion of security is unacceptable, which is why we refer to this notion
as weak security. As an example, note that a scheme for which the eavesdropper is
always able to learn the first # bits of M can still satisfy the definition of weak se-
curity, while in many cryptographic applications we want to guarantee that learning
even 1 bit of M is difficult. This motivates our next definition.
Definition 6.2.2. We say that a coding scheme possesses strong security if there
exists an e > 0 such that
I (M; Z") < 2 -,F.
Strong security was first defined in [83]. Note that strong security at least elimi-
nates the problem posed by our previous example-a coding scheme that allows the
eavesdropper to reliably learn the first \/n bits of the message will certainly not have
I(M; Zn) decay exponentially with n.
Our final notion of security, semantic security, is a very slight strengthening of
strong security. We define semantic security so that it is the analog for the wiretap
channel of semantic security as defined by [49] for computationally secure cryptosys-
tems. Before stating the definition, we briefly recall the motivation given by [49] for
their definition of semantic security. At an intuitive level, we want our definition of
security to capture the idea that the eavesdropper learns no information after ob-
serving the ciphertext, or in our case, the outputs of the channel Q2. The weak and
strong notions of security are an attempt to capture this fact, but instead of directly
moving to mutual information as a measure of the information leakage, the approach
taken by [49] is to give an operational definition of security. This is similar to the
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standard channel coding problem in information theory. In [107], Shannon defined
an operational notion of capacity, and then proved that the operational definition
of capacity happens to coincide with the mutual information. As we will see in a
moment, the operational definition of security embodied in the definition of semantic
security is closely related to the definition of strong security given above, i.e., mutual
information will appear as a reasonable measure of information leakage, but by giving
an operational definition we will see that a small modification of strong security can
be interpreted as giving a strong operational definition of security.
We now state the definition of semantic security. As in [49], we capture the idea
that the eavesdropper learns no information from the channel output by saying that
if the eavesdropper is capable of computing some function of the sent message after
observing the output of the channel Q2, then the eavesdropper is capable of computing
the same function without ever looking that the output of the channel Q2. The key
extension of semantic security beyond the previous notion of strong security is that
we consider the case that the eavesdropper may have some side information about the
sent message. We model this side information by assuming that the eavesdropper's
prior on the message may not be uniform.
Definition 6.2.3. Let { Mn, En, D,} denote a coding scheme. Given a set 8, a func-
tion fn : Mn -+ 8, and a probability distribution P, over {1,..., Mn}, let pg =
maxE9 Pr[fn(M) = y], where M is a random variable distributed according to Pn.
We say that the coding scheme {Mn, En, Dn} possesses semantic security if there
exists an E > 0 such that for all sufficiently large n, all probability distributions Pn
over Mn, all functions fn, and all functions An : Z" -> 8,
Pr[An(Z") = fn(M)] <; pg + 2 ",
where M is a message distributed according to Pn and Z" denotes the output of Q2.
Note that pg represents the maximum probability that the eavesdropper can guess
fn(M) correctly without any knowledge except the probability distribution P, and the
function fn. Thus, the definition above formally captures the idea that regardless of
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any side information (modelled by the probability distribution F), the eavesdropper
cannot compute any function of the sent message after seeing the channel output
unless he could compute the function without looking at the channel output at all.
However, this definition appears quite unwieldy. Fortunately, as shown in [49], the
definition can be simplified as follows.
Proposition 6.2.1. The following definition is equivalent to Definition 6.2.3. A
coding scheme possesses semantic security if and only if there exists an E > 0 such
that for all sufficiently large n, all pairs of messages M1 , m 2 E {1,..., M7 }, and all
functions An : Z -+ {mi, M2}
1
Pr[An(Z") = M] < - + 2En,
2
where M denotes the random variable that is equally likely to take on the values m1
and n 2, and Z" denotes the channel output when M is transmitted.
The proof of equivalence in [49] is complicated by the fact that they are dealing
with the computational setting. In our situation, where arbitrary functions An are
allowed, the proof of equivalence is simpler.
Proof. The definition given in Proposition 6.2.1 cannot be stronger than Definition
6.2.3, because the side information can always be chosen so that Pn places probability
.5 on messages mi and m 2 . Thus, the definition give in Proposition 6.2.1 is just a
special case of Definition 6.2.3.
In the other direction, note that the best algorithm An for the definition given in
Proposition 6.2.1 is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate of the message given
Z", and since the two messages are equally likely, the probability that this estimate
is correct is simply 4 + lP(Z"|mi)-P(Z"|m2)||, where P(Z"|mi) denotes the probability
distribution of the eavesdropper's channel output given that message mi is sent, and
I- II denotes the El-norm. Thus, the definition given in Proposition 6.2.1 implies that
the E-distance between any two conditional distributions P(Z"|mi) and P(Z"|m2)
is exponentially small.
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We complete the proof with a simple hybrid argument. Let F, and fn denote the
side information and function to guess, respectively. Let M denote the message that
the transmitter sends to the intended receiver, and let Z" denote the corresponding
channel output observed by the eavesdropper. Imagine that instead of En(M), the
input to channel Q2 is actually En(M'), where M' distributed according to Pn, and
M' is independent of M. Let Z'" denote the corresponding channel outputs. If the
eavesdropper is given access to Z" instead of Z", clearly the probability that the
eavesdropper guesses fn(M) correctly is at most pg, since Z" is independent of M.
To complete the proof, observe that the distribution of (M, Z") is very close to the
distribution of (M, Z'"). Specifically, the definition given in Proposition 6.2.1 implies
that IP(ZnIM = m) - P(Z'")||1 < 22-,, for m = mi and m = M 2 . Therefore, for
any algorithm An, Pr[An(Zn) = M] < Pr[An(Z'n) = MI + 22-en. L
Proposition 6.2.1 starts to make the connection with strong security clearer. As
a simple corollary, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2.1. Any coding scheme possessing semantic security also possesses strong
security. Conversely, given any coding scheme possessing strong security, perform-
ing a negligible amount of expurgation produces a coding scheme of the same rate
possessing semantic security.
Proof. First, we show that semantic security implies strong security. Note that
I(M; Z") = D(Pni||Pn)
where Pzn denotes the distribution of Zn when the sent message M is chosen uni-
formly from the set {1, ... , Mn }, and PZnIm denotes the distribution of Z" condi-
tioned on the event that M = m. Semantic security implies that for some 6 > 0,
||Pznim - Pzn||i < 2-n for all messages m. From the E1-bound on entropy [281, it
follows that D(Pznim||Pzn) ||PZnIm - Pzn||1, so I(M; Z") 2-7", showing that
semantic security implies strong security.
In the other direction, assume that the coding scheme {Mn, En, Dn} possesses
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strong security. Pinsker's inequality [28] implies that
I PznIm - Pz| 2--n,
so by Markov's inequality, at least half of the messages m have the property PZnim -
Pzn 12 22-n. Therefore, if we expurgate the coding scheme by only including this
half of the messages, we end up with a scheme such that for any messages mi1 , m 2,
PZniM- PZnim2 11i < 2 2 . Thus, the expurgated coding scheme possesses semantic
security, and the rate loss is only 1 bit, i.e., , so the expurgated scheme has the same
rate.
Before proceeding, we make a couple of remarks. First, the proof of Lemma 6.2.1
makes it clear that there is yet another equivalent definition of semantic security
that may perhaps looks more natural to information theorists. That is, we can also
define semantic security as the condition that I(M; Z") < e-," for all M, where M
denotes a random variable that can have any distribution over the message set, not
just the uniform distribution, and Z h denotes the channel output received by the
eavesdropper when M is the sent message. Second, note that although the proof of
Lemma 6.2.1 shows that we can turn a code possessing strong security into a code
possessing semantic security by expurgating a vanishing fraction of the messages, the
expurgation procedure may not be computationally efficient. An interesting open
problem is to provide a computationally efficient reduction from strong security to
semantic security.
Finally, we can define the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel.
Definition 6.2.4. The secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel is the supremum of the
rate computed with respect to coding schemes that (a) satisfy limna, Pen = 0, and
(b) possess semantic security.
Lemma 6.2.1 shows that in the above definition, the secrecy capacity is unchanged
if we replace semantic security with strong security. As mentioned in the introduction,
[83] shows that if we replace strong security with weak security the secrecy capacity
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is unchanged as well, so the secrecy capacity for weak security is identical to the
secrecy capacity for semantic security. We recall the following formula from [29] for
the secrecy capacity of degraded wiretap channels (degraded channels are a special
case of channels where Q1 is less noisy than Q2 in the sense of the following lemma).
Lemma 6.2.2. We say that the channel Q1 is less noisy than Q2 if I(U; Y) > I(U ; Z)
for every distribution PuPx1uPy,zix, where U is any auxiliary random variable such
that U is independent of Y and Z conditioned on X. The capacity of a wiretap
channel where Q1 is less noisy than Q2 is given by
max I(X; Y) - I(X; Z),
Px
where the maximization is over all distributions Px over X.
From the above formula, it is clear that the secrecy capacity of the constant-
capacity compound wiretap channel is at most C1 - 02, where C1 denotes the capacity
of the channel connecting the transmitter to the intended receiver. As we will see
in the next section, the rate C1 - C2 is achievable, so we define the capacity of the
constant-capacity compound wiretap channel as C1 - C2.
Since there is no rate loss associated with using a stronger definition of security,
from the point of view of code design, we should try to design codes meeting the
strongest definition of security. This is the goal of the rest of this chapter. In the
next section, we prove that one can construct a (possibly computationally complex)
precode to provide strong security for either the wiretap channel or the constant-
capacity compound wiretap channel, and this precode can be designed independently
of the channel code used to guarantee reliable communication between the transmitter
and the intended receiver. We illustrate the utility of this approach by providing two
concrete precodes with moderate computational complexity. In Sections 6.4 and 6.5,
we construct low complexity coding schemes possessing semantic security for the
special case where the channels Q1 and Q2 are both BECs.
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Figure 6-2: Proposed coding strategy. We split the code construction problem into
the design of a precode with good security properties and a good channel code for
the channel Q1 connecting the transmitter to the intended receiver. A good precode
can provide strong security, and a (non-constructive) expurgation scheme can provide
semantic security.
6.3 General Approach for Strong Security Using
"Invertible" Extractors
In this section, we start by proving a general reduction that splits code design for
the wiretap channel and the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel into the
separate problems of designing a channel code and a precode providing secrecy. Then,
we provide some concrete examples to illustrate the kind of performance one can
achieve with this approach.
Figure 6-2 shows the coding strategy we propose for the wiretap and constant-
capacity compound wiretap channels. To encode a message, first we use a precode
based on a randomness extractor, followed by a good channel code for the channel
between the transmitter and the intended receiver. Before presenting a formal analysis
of this coding strategy, we provide some intuition for why this strategy should provide
security. As mentioned in Chapter 2, randomness extractors are functions that purify
randomness, i.e., a randomness extractor takes as input a source of randomness with
min-entropy k and produces k bits that are approximately uniformly distributed.
Now, to communicate a message m securely, imagine that we start by computing a
random preimage of m under a randomness extractor. Assuming that the extractor
has suitable properties, when m is a random k bit message, and we choose a random
preimage, we end up with a uniformly distributed k'-bit message, where k' > k is a
parameter we can tune based on the rate we are trying to achieve. To complete the
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encoding, imagine that we encode this k'-bit preimage with a good channel code for
Q1. The intended receiver can decode the code, hence recover the k'-bit preimage, and
compute m reliably. Now, because the eavesdropper's channel Q2 is noisier than Q1,
intuitively we should be able to arrange things so that the eavesdropper's conditional
distribution over the k'-bit preimage given the channel output Zn has min-entropy
k. Then, the extraction properties of the precode imply that the eavesdropper's
conditional distribution over the k-bit message given Z' is approximately uniform,
i.e., the eavesdropper essentially learns nothing about the message m.
We formalize the intuition above with the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3.1. Let Q1 and Q2 denote two discrete memoryless channels (with the
same input alphabet), and let C2 denote the capacity of Q2. Given a channel code
C for Q1 with rate R and an (R - C2 - E, 2 -*)-extractor Ext with the property that
Ext(X, S) is uniformly distributed when X and S are uniformly and independently
distributed, we can encode a message m of rate R - C2 - E by computing a random
preimage p of m under Ext. Then, encoding the seed s and the preimage p with C
produces a code possessing strong security.
Proof. First, we analyze the intended receiver. By assumption, the channel code C
achieves low probability of error, so the intended receiver can decode the channel
input, i.e., the intended receiver can decode both p and s. Therefore, the intended
receiver can recover the message by computing Ext(p, s).
Now, we must show that most of the time, the eavesdropper learns very little after
observing the channel output. As mentioned above, the rough idea is to show that for
the eavesdropper, the conditional distribution of the channel input given the channel
output is exponentially close (in terms of statistical, i.e., f1, distance) to a distribution
with min-entropy (R - C2 - e)n. Then, the definition of (strong) extractor implies
that the conditional distribution of the message is essentially uniform. We fill in the
details below. (Note: for notational convenience, in the following proof we use E to
refer to any constant that can be made arbitrarily small. For example, using this
notation, E + E = E.)
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First, we must show that the conditional distribution of the channel input given
the channel output is close to a distribution with large min-entropy. For simplicity,
we assume that the eavesdropper has access to the seed s-clearly this can only
help, and as we will see, the definition of a strong extractor implies that giving the
eavesdropper the seed does not help him much anyway. Thus, we are only interested
in the distribution of the channel input corresponding to p. We prove that with
high probability (over the choice of m, s, and the channel noise), the conditional
distribution of the channel input given the channel output is a ((R - C2 - E)n, 2~En)-
source. To prove this, we group the codewords according to their type. Assume that
the sent codeword's type has at least 2 (R-e)n codewords. Note that this happens with
probability at least 1 - poly(n)2-En because there are only polynomially many types.
Next, assume that the channel noise is typical. Specifically, assume that the joint type
Pxz between the sent codeword and the channel output satisfies ||Pxz - PxQ2| 1 E.
where Px denotes the type of the sent codeword. Again, it is well-known that such
typical sets have probability at least 1 - 2-. We show that when the sent codeword
and the channel noise satisfy the above two assumptions, the conditional distribution
of the channel input given the channel output is a ((R - C2 - E)n, 2--")-source.
We can model the situation with a bipartite graph. The left vertices correspond
to the codewords with type Px, and the right vertices correspond to all channel out-
puts with the type Pz, where Fx and Pz are the marginal distributions induced
by Pxz, i.e., Px is the type of the sent codeword and Pz is the type of the eaves-
dropper's channel outputs. We connect two vertices if they induce the joint type
PXZ. Thus, we have 2 (R-)n vertices on the left, and every vertex on the left has the
same degree. This degree is at least 2n(H(ZIX)-e), where X, Z ~ PxQ2. There are
2n(H(Z)+e) vertices on the right, so we see that the average degree of a vertex on the
right is 2n(R+H(ZIX)-H(Z)-e) > 2 n(R-C 2 -e). Note that by the symmetry of a discrete
memoryless channel, when we observe a particular channel output, the conditional
distribution of the channel input is uniform over the left vertices adjacent to the right
vertex corresponding to the observed channel output. Therefore, we simply need to
analyze the probability that the observed channel output has degree exponentially
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smaller than the average degree. It is obvious that this happens with exponentially
small probability. In more detail, every edge of the graph is equally likely, so we just
need to bound the fraction of edges that are incident to right vertices with degree
less than 2 ~-" times the average degree, and clearly the fraction of such edges is at
most 2-En. Therefore, we have shown that with probability 1 - 2e", the conditional
distribution of the channel input given the channel output is an ((R - C2 - E)n, 2-en)-
source.
To complete the proof, note that the definition of a strong extractor implies that
even with knowledge of the seed, with (exponentially) high probability the output of
the extractor is close to uniform.
We emphasize that the above coding scheme also works for the constant-capacity
compound wiretap channel, because the coding scheme does not require any knowl-
edge of Q2 other than the capacity (so that the rate of the extractor can be set
appropriately). Also, note that same arguments work for the AWGN channel and for
stationary ergodic channels, i.e., channels with a typical set, and that we can use the
same arguments to achieve the secrecy capacity for a given degraded wiretap channel
by shaping the channel code appropriately.
6.3.1 Precodes Based on the Leftover Hash Lemma
We now present a simple, but quite effective, precode construction based on the
Leftover Hash Lemma [59]. Recall from Chapter 2 that the Leftover Hash Lemma
provides a very simple construction of extractors. The extractor takes as input a
string of n bits, and uses a seed of n bits. We can naturally view an n-bit binary
string as an element of GF(2"). Then, the extractor is simply Ext(x, s) = x -s, where
- denotes multiplication over GF(2n). We recall Lemma 2.3.6 from Section 2.3.4,
restated below for convenience.
Lemma 6.3.1. (Leftover Hash Lemma) The function Ext(x, s) = (x . s)Lk+21oge is a
(k, E)-extractor. The superscript notation indicates that the output of the extractor is
only the first Lk + 2 log EJ bits of the product.
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(Note: The domain of x is the set of nonzero elements of GF(2"), while the domain
of s is all elements of GF(2"). With these domains, it is easily seen that when X and
S are uniform, the output of the extractor is uniform, so Theorem 6.3.1 applies.)
Using this extractor construction in Theorem 6.3.1, we get a simple precode that
can be used for the wiretap or constant-capacity compound wiretap channel. The
complexity of encoding and decoding the precode is quite low. Specifically, encoding
requires us to select a random seed, invert it, and perform a single multiplication with
a random padding of the message. To decode, we just multiply the channel input
with the seed. Developing efficient algorithms for arithmetic over finite fields is a
well-studied problem, and although naive algorithms for multiplication and inversion
might take Q(n 2 ) time, using recent improvements to some well-known algorithms
for finite field arithmetic [46], the complexity of multiplication and inversion can be
reduced to O(n log(n) log log(n)). 2
The main drawback of this construction is the seed length. For the constant-
capacity compound wiretap channel, since the seed is as long as the input message,
this means that we achieve a rate of C1 2C 2 instead of C1 - C2. On the other hand,
for the scenarios usually considered in the literature, i.e., where we are only trying
to construct a secure code against one possible eavesdropping channel, the seed can
be chosen once and does not need to be transmitted. Phrased differently, the seed
plays the role of a random ensemble of codes, and Theorem 6.3.1 and Lemma 2.3.6
imply that with exponentially high probability over the choice of the seed, the re-
sulting (deterministic) precode is very good for any particular eavesdropping channel
with capacity at most C2. Thus, for the standard wiretap channel where we only
need to be secure against a single eavesdropper channel, this construction achieves
rate C1 - C2, and satisfies the definition of strong security. By shaping the channel
2 There is a minor technicality here. We assume that n is of the form (p - I)pd for some integer
d and some prime p such that 2 is a generator of Z* and 2P- # 1 mod p2 . The complexity of
the algorithm from [46] depends on p. In particular, the stated running times bounds hide a factor
depending on p in the big-O constant. For our purposes, it suffices to note that 3 is a valid choice
of p, so this means that for any n, we can find an n' in the range n < n' < 3n of the appropriate
form with p = 3. Thus, the condition that n be of the form (p - I)pd is not a severe restriction. In
fact, since many small primes satisfy these conditions, e.g., 5 and 11 are also valid choices of p, we
can find an n' in a much smaller range than [n, 3n], but we do not pursue this further.
158
code appropriately, we can achieve any rate up to maxpx I(X; Y) - I(X; Z) with this
extractor, i.e., we can achieve the capacity of any degraded wiretap channel. To sum-
marize, we see that for the usual wiretap channel, the interesting remaining questions
are whether we can construct codes that achieve capacity with a linear running time
and/or codes that possess semantic security. For the special case where Qi and Q2
are both BECs, we address these questions in the next two sections by giving schemes
that achieve semantic security with linear running time, but even for the case of a
noiseless channel to the intended receiver and a BSC to the adversary, the problem
of designing a linear time precode that possesses strong or semantic security remains
open.
For the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel, constructing codes that
can achieve the capacity is also an interesting challenge. Based on the previous
discussion, it should be clear that we could get closer to the capacity if we started
with an extractor with better seed length. In particular, it is well-known in the
extractor literature that a seed length of En is sufficient to guarantee 2" statistical
distance to a uniform source (see, for example, [19]). In fact, relatively recently
(over the last decade), many extractors have been constructed that achieve much
better performance than the simple hashing-based construction above-in particular,
the performance is nearly optimal in terms of the seed length. For example, the recent
algebraic construction [54] produces extractors with parameters sufficient to achieve
rates arbitrarily close to the capacity of the constant-capacity compound wiretap
channel. However, existing constructions of extractors, although polynomial time,
are not very efficient. Furthermore, the extractor constructions in the literature do
not concern themselves with the problem of computing a random preimage, which is
crucial in our setting. For example, it is not even clear that a random preimage for
the construction in [54] can be found in polynomial time, let alone near-linear time.
The zigzag product was not designed for the case of exponentially small statistical
distance that we have in mind, but we can use the zigzag construction to construct
a precode providing security somewhere between weak and strong security. In more
detail, if we use the Margulis expanders (described, for example, in Section 2.3.2)
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instead of the LPS construction in the zigzag construction, we can construct an
extractor such that evaluating the extractor and computing a random preimage can
both be accomplished in O(n) time-the key advantage of the Margulis construction
over the LPS construction is that the edge function can be computed using only
addition, as opposed to addition and multiplication, which is why we can eliminate the
logarithmic factors associated with finite field multiplication that would be present if
we used the LPS construction instead. This extractor only achieves a constant gap to
the uniform distribution, i.e., instead of exponentially decaying mutual information,
we can only produce extractors so that for any constant 6 > 0, I(M; Z") < 6. Thus,
there remains room for significant improvement for the constant-capacity compound
wiretap channel. Also, the question of how to construct codes for the constant-
capacity compound wiretap channel possessing semantic security remains open.
6.4 Semantic Security for the Noiseless/BEC case
In this section, we construct codes with linear time encoding and decoding algorithms
that possess semantic security and achieve the capacity of a wiretap channel with a
noiseless channel to the intended receiver and a BEC with erasure rate ee to the
eavesdropper. The codes we construct also have the property that the complexity
is uniformly bounded with respect to the gap from capacity. The code construction
we use is based on the nonsystematic irregular repeat-accumulate (NSIRA) codes
described in Section 2.2.3. Specifically, by taking the dual codes of NSIRA codes, we
get a suitable precode for the wiretap channel. We will explain why the dual codes
are useful in a moment, but first we show that NSIRA codes can be combined with
expander graphs to produce efficiently decodable codes achieving the capacity of the
BEC with exponentially decaying probability of error. Note that since the channel
to the intended receiver is noiseless, we do not need to use a channel code after the
precode.
The key fact we use about NSIRA codes is that these codes can achieve very
good performance on the BEC. Specifically, it is shown in [97] that NSIRA codes
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can achieve capacity on the BEC for all erasure probabilities p E [0, .95], and it is
conjectured that these codes achieve capacity for all p E [0, 1). Furthermore, these
codes achieve capacity with uniformly bounded complexity regardless of the gap to
capacity.
For future reference, we note that it will be useful to modify the NSIRA codes by
adding a few extra parity checks. Specifically, we add En parity checks with appro-
priate edges connecting these parity checks to the Rn information bits so that the
resulting graph between the information bits and the en new parity checks has good
expansion properties. The reason for doing this is that the proof in [97] that NSIRA
codes can achieve capacity for the BEC uses the density evolution technique. As al-
luded to in Chapter 1, this technique proves that the bit error probability approaches
0 in the limit of long codes and a large enough number of message-passing iterations,
but density evolution does not directly provide bounds on the block error rate. By
adding new parity checks and connections that form a graph with good expansion
properties, we can construct a code that achieves rates arbitrarily close to the capac-
ity, but with the further property that the block error rate decays exponentially as a
function of n. Formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6.4.1. There exist codes that achieve rates arbitrarily close to capacity for
the BEC with exponentially decaying block error probability, and these codes can be
decoded in linear time with uniformly bounded complexity.
Before proving Lemma 6.4.1, we need the following simple result about the existence
of certain expander graphs.
Lemma 6.4.2. For every sufficiently large n and every e > 0, there exists a 6 > 0
and a left-regular bipartite graph G with n left vertices, en right vertices, and left
degree 10, so that G is also a (6n, .8)-expander.
(Note: in the lemma and proof, for simplicity we assume that en is an integer)
Proof. We use the probabilistic method. Consider a random graph formed by having
each of the n left vertices randomly select (with replacement) 10 neighbors on the
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right. We show that for a suitably small 6, every subset S of at most 6n vertices on
the left has at least 81SI neighbors on the right. First, consider a fixed set S. The
union bound implies that the probability that S has fewer than 81SI neighbors is at
most (En) (8,S,) 0S
Taking a union bound over all sets of size at most 6n, we see that the probability
that any subset of size < 3n has too few neighbors is at most
n (n en -8s 10sS: (2) (682) (Ern)
se 5 8s ls
s 8s en)
s=1
64es SSs=1
E 2n)
<1
for sufficiently large n, provided that 6 < E2
Proof of Lemma 6.4.1. The codes we consider are the NSIRA codes with degree dis-
tribution as specified in [97], along with the expander modification suggested above.
Specifically, we add en parity check nodes and connect them to the Rn information
bits so that the graph induced by the information bits and the en extra parity check
nodes is a (3n, .8)-expander such that every information bit has degree 10. We know
that such an expander exists by Lemma 6.4.2. Now, we use the natural decoder,
i.e., first we decode the NSIRA code pretending that the extra parity checks are
not present. Once the decoder finishes, we attempt to decode (using the standard
message-passing algorithm) any remaining erased information bits by using the en
extra parity checks. (In other words, the idea of "ignoring" the parity checks is purely
for conceptual reasons. The decoder we consider is equivalent to simply running the
message-passing decoder on the whole graph.) It is well-known that for a (k, ;> .5)-
expander, every subset of size at most k contains a vertex with a unique neighbor.
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In the language of coding theory, all stopping sets have size greater than k. Since we
chose the connections so that the resulting graph has expansion factor .8 > .5, we see
that the only way the decoder can fail is if more than 6n information bits are erased
after the first stage of decoding.
It is known [100] that the bit error rate of BP is tightly concentrated. That is,
although density evolution only provides a guarantee on the bit error rate, density
evolution does show that the probability that the bit error rate deviates from the
expected bit error rate by a constant is exponentially small. The density evolution
analysis from [97] shows that NSIRA codes achieve the capacity, which means that
after a suitably large number of BP iterations, the expected bit error rate is less
than .56, and therefore the probability that more than 6n bits are erased after some
suitable number of iterations is exponentially small. Since the BP decoder on the
BEC has the property than once information bits are recovered, they stay recovered,
we don't have to worry about information bits becoming erased in later iterations,
i.e., when the BP decoder finishes, fewer than 6n bits are erased with exponentially
high probability. The decoding complexity is proportional to the number of edges in
the graph. For the expander, this is at most 1ORn regardless of how small we make
e. As shown in [97], the number of edges in the NSIRA code also does not grow as a
function of the gap to capacity. Therefore, the proof is complete. l
Comment: Lemma 6.4.1 shows that we can construct codes with uniformly bounded
decoding complexity that also have exponentially decaying block error rate. Using
the expanders of Lemma 6.4.2 in the construction of Spielman codes [113], we can
construct codes that have uniformly bounded encoding and decoding complexity, and
exponentially decaying block error rate.
It turns out that the dual codes of the modified NSIRA codes constructed above
are very good precodes for the noiseless/BEC wiretap channel. For the reader familiar
with the binary erasure quantization (BEQ) problem (defined in Chapter 5), the
intuition for taking the dual code is that good codes for the BEQ problem provide
semantic security for the noiseless/BEC wiretap channel, and as mentioned in Chapter
5, good codes for the BEQ problem can be constructed by taking the duals of good
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codes for the BEC. To keep this chapter self-contained, we do not explicitly refer to
the BEQ problem in our analysis. Instead, we first work out the structure of the duals
of the modified NSIRA codes constructed above, and then explain how the dual codes
can be used as precodes. After explaining how the dual codes can used as precodes, we
analyze the properties that a precode must satisfy to possess semantic security-the
reader familiar with the BEQ problem will recognize that the properties guaranteeing
semantic security are equivalent to the properties that make a precode good for the
BEQ problem, but no knowledge of the BEQ problem is needed to understand our
analysis.
For simplicity, we start by describing the dual code of the standard NSIRA code,
i.e., without the extra expander graph. Recall from Chapter 2 that the dual of a code
can be computed by switching the variable nodes and the check nodes. Figure 6-3
shows the normal graph of the dual of an NSIRA code. Imagine that the bottom k
n Encoded Bits
k Message Bits
Figure 6-3: Dual NSIRA code.
check nodes do not need to be set to 0, but rather these bottom nodes will be used to
encode a message. Specifically, we encode a k-bit message m as follows. First, assign
values to the variable nodes so that these values are uniformly distributed over all
values satisfying the constraint that the bottom k parity checks are equal to m. At
this stage, it may not be entirely clear that this can be done efficiently, but we will
address this concern in a moment. Once the variable nodes have been assigned these
values, we compute the values of the top n parity checks. The values of these checks
comprise the length n encoding of m.
With this strategy, observe that the intended receiver can easily recover m. Specifi-
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cally, the intended receiver has a noiseless channel, so the intended receiver can recover
the variables node values by simply accumulating the n symbols of the encoding in
O(n) time. Then, because the bottom part of the graph has O(n) edges, the receiver
can compute the values of the bottom k parity checks in O(n) time, and the values
of these parity checks are equal to the sent message m. The eavesdropper, however,
will most likely learn absolutely nothing about the message, i.e., most of the time the
posterior distribution of m given the eavesdropper's channel output is uniform over
all possible messages. To see this, first observe that by construction, the prior on the
channel input is uniform over all strings of length n. Therefore, the eavesdropper's
channel output fixes some bits, but the erased bits are uniformly distributed. Now,
for a fixed message m', the eavesdropper determines the probability that m' is the
sent message by counting the number of assignments to the variable nodes that (a)
match the unerased bits received by the channel, and (b) result in m' being the value
of the k bottom parity checks. This number is normalized by the number of possible
assignments to the variable nodes that match the unerased channel bits to get the
posterior distribution. Now, basic linear algebra implies that if the matrix induced
by the variable nodes, the unerased channel bits, and the k bottom parity checks has
full rank, then for every m', the posterior is the same, i.e., the posterior distribution
is uniform. Since row rank equals column rank, we see that this matrix has full rank
if and only if the dual of the dual NSIRA code, i.e., the original NSIRA code, can
recover the message when a BEC erases the set of channel bits that are received
unerased by the dual NSIRA code. Formally, [80] proves the following lemma (note:
this lemma is identical to Lemma 5.2.1, but we restate it below for convenience).
Lemma 6.4.3. A linear code C with block length n can recover from a particular
erasure sequence (under ML decoding) if and only if the dual code Cl has full rank
when restricted to the dual erasure sequence, i.e, the sequence where all the erased
symbols have been turned into unerased symbols and vice versa. Also, if C can recover
from an erasure sequence using message-passing decoding, then we can perform the
encoding process described above for C' using a dualized form of message-passing.
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Comment: The dualized form of message-passing decoding allows us to perform
encoding in linear time. For the details of how to dualize message-passing decoding,
we refer the reader to [80].
Thus, we find that whenever the NSIRA code decodes a block correctly, our dual
precode secures the message perfectly, i.e., the eavesdropper learns nothing about the
message. Unfortunately, as we noted previously, the results on NSIRA codes rely on
the density evolution technique, and therefore the results in [97) only show that the
bit error probability, as opposed to the block error probability, is small. It is precisely
for this reason that we introduced the modified NSIRA codes above. Lemma 6.4.1
shows that the modified codes achieve exponentially small block error rate, so by
suitably modifying the strategy above, we are able to achieve semantic security.
Figure 6-4 shows the normal graph of the dual of a modified NSIRA code. It is still
n Encoded Bits
++ +
Extra Variables
k Message Bits
Figure 6-4: Dual modified NSIRA code.
possible to encode a message m efficiently by using a dualized form of message-passing
decoding. However, note that decoding is impossible, because the extra parity checks
in the modified NSIRA code become extra variables in the dual modified NSIRA
code, and the top n parity checks give us no information about these variable nodes.
Therefore, we need a way to communicate these extra variable nodes to the intended
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receiver while keeping them secret from the eavesdropper. But this is exactly the
problem we started with, so a natural strategy is to recursively apply the strategy
outlined above until the number of variable nodes that needs to be communicated is
small, say O(V4f), at which point we can use a brute-force algorithm and a random
linear code to communicate the variable nodes. We consider this approach later in
this section, but for now we present another way of communicating the extra variable
nodes.
The key idea is that the number of extra variable nodes is very small, i.e., there
are only En such nodes to communicate. Therefore, we can be very inefficient in terms
of the rate at which we communicate these nodes. Based on the previous analysis, we
see that we can guarantee that the key remains secret if we encode the extra variable
nodes with a code that is the dual of a code with exponentially small error probability
on the BEC, but now we no longer need to use a capacity-achieving code. Of course,
the code still needs to have a suitable structure so that encoding and decoding can
be done in a computationally efficient manner. As we now show, the dual codes of
the repeat-accumulate-accumulate (RAA) codes proposed in [7] have all the required
properties. Recall from Chapter 2 that RAA codes with suitable parameters are
asymptotically good, i.e., the distance of these codes grows as on for some constant
6 > 0.
As noted in Chapter 2, we define RAA codes so that the encoding includes the
information bits and the outputs of both accumulators-this is slightly different from
the definition of RAA codes in [7], as [7] only includes the output of the second
accumulator. However, clearly our encoding is asymptotically good if the encoding
from [7] is asymptotically good. We use the dual of an RAA code as our precode,
but with one extra modification. Specifically, we attach a parity check of degree d to
each code bit of the dual RAA code. We add this essentially so that we can amplify
the erasure rate seen by the eavesdropper. The following lemma summarizes the
important properties of dual RAA codes with the parity check modification.
Lemma 6.4.4. The dual RAA codes constructed above secure the message perfectly
with exponentially high probability. The encoding and decoding complexity is 0(n).
167
(Note: whether the encoding /decoding complexity is uniformly bounded or not is
irrelevant, because the encoding complexity and decoding complexity are both going
to be measured with respect to En anyway.)
Proof. To encode a message m, we start by assigning uniformly random values to the
variable nodes. This induces values for the check nodes. We take the exclusive-or of
the parity checks corresponding to the information bits of the RAA code with m to
get the actual values used in the encoding. Finally, for each encoded bit, we select a
uniformly random string of length d whose parity is equal to the parity check. Clearly
this whole process is linear time.
The intended receiver can easily decode the message. Specifically, first the receiver
computes the parities of the groups of d received symbols to recover the values used in
the encoding. Then, the receiver inverts the two accumulators, and uses the recovered
variable node values to compute the remaining parity checks. Taking the exclusive-or
of these parity checks with the received values produces m, and this process clearly
takes linear time.
Now, we analyze the probability that the eavesdropper's posterior distribution is
not uniform. First, note that for each group of d symbols, if even a single symbol
is erased, then the posterior distribution on the value of the associated bit of the
encoding is uniform. Thus, we have essentially amplified the erasure probability for
each bit of the encoding from ee to 1 - (1 - ee)d. As before, to prove security we need
to show that the matrix induced by the variable nodes and unerased bits received by
the eavesdropper has full rank, but since RAA codes have distance 6n, by definition
this matrix has full rank whenever the eavesdropper receives fewer than 6n unerased
bits. Thus, the probability that the encoding is not perfectly secure is at most the
probability that a channel that erases each bit with probability 1 - (1 - ee)d erases
fewer than (1-6)n bits. This is exponentially small provided that 1-(1-ee)d > 1-6,
i.e., d > "(6)log(1-ee)
Finally, we can state the main result of this section.
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Theorem 6.4.1. The combination of a dual RAA code with the parity check modifi-
cation and a modified NSIRA code achieves the secrecy capacity of the noiseless/BEC
wiretap channel (with erasure probability at least .05) and possesses semantic secu-
rity. Furthermore, encoding and decoding can be accomplished with uniformly bounded
complexity, i.e., encoding and decoding take O(n) where the constant hidden inside
the big-0 notation does not depend on the gap to capacity.
Proof. We have done most of the work already. The encoder encodes the modified
NSIRA code as described above, and then encodes the extra en variable nodes using
the dual RAA code with the parity check modification. The analysis of the intended
receiver is trivial. The intended receiver first decodes the en extra variable nodes
using the decoding procedure for dual RAA codes with the parity check modification.
Then, the intended receiver decodes the modified NSIRA code by first determining
the values of the n variable nodes via accumulation, and then determining the message
by computing the values of the remaining parity checks, which is possible because the
values of the en extra variable nodes are known.
To analyze the eavesdropper, first note that Lemma 6.4.4 says that the extra
variable nodes are perfectly secure with exponentially high probability. The modified
NSIRA code is analyzed in the same way that we analyzed NSIRA codes, except
that now the probability that the matrix induced by the eavesdropper's unerased
received bits, potential message bits, and the variable nodes does not have full rank
is exponentially small. Therefore, the probability that the overall coding scheme
does not perfectly secure the message is exponentially small. Finally, note that our
analysis of security does not depend on which message m was sent, i.e., the rank of
the associated matrix is only a function of which bits the channel erases, not which
message was sent, so we get semantic security for free.
6.4.1 Explicit Constructions
Theorem 6.4.1 shows that there exist codes with computationally efficient encoding
and decoding algorithms that possess semantic security for the special case of a noise-
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less channel to the intended receiver and a BEC to the eavesdropper. However, our
construction is based on the analysis of a random ensemble of codes, so we cannot
prove that a particular code has the desired properties. It would be nice to have an
explicit construction of codes achieving the secrecy capacity with uniformly bounded
complexity that also possess semantic security, or at least an efficient method to verify
whether a particular code from a random ensemble possesses the desired properties.
We note that this is closely related to the notion of deterministic extraction from a
bit-fixing source [22]. In more detail, the coding scheme constructed above achieves
secrecy essentially by constructing an extractor for the special class of sources known
as bit-fixing sources, i.e., sources where some bits are uniform and other bits are fixed
to prescribed values. In the computer science literature, the class of bit-fixing sources
has been considered in the context of extractors because unlike the case of arbitrary
(k, E)-sources, where it is obvious that random seed is necessary, for the case of bit-
fixing sources one can show via the probabilistic method that there exist deterministic
functions capable of extracting randomness from an arbitrary bit-fixing source. Ex-
plicit constructions capable of extracting a small amount of randomness are given
in [65]. In our case, we have made the problem easier because we only need to be
able to extract randomness from almost all bit-fixing sources-for an exponentially
small fraction of bit-fixing sources, it is okay if we fail to extract randomness. On the
other hand, we proved the existence of extractors that come equipped with extremely
efficient algorithms to perform extraction and compute a random preimage, and we
are able to extract almost all the randomness in the source. This is reminiscent of the
difference between the bounded errors model versus the BSC in channel coding-in
Shannon's BSC model, we do not need to be able to correct all error patterns, just
the overwhelming majority of them.
To really compare our results with the results in deterministic extraction from
bit-fixing sources, it is not fair to use random ensembles, since the whole point of
the deterministic extraction problem is to provide a deterministic function that is
guaranteed to work. In other words, although we have proved that codes chosen from
a random ensemble work with very high probability, it would be nice to be able to
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construct a particular code and prove that this fixed code has the desired security
properties. For the codes constructed above, verifying the properties of the NSIRA
code can be done easily for very large n by checking that the graph has large girth,
and then analyzing the appropriate subtrees of small depth with density evolution.
We can construct suitable expanders explicitly via the zigzag product [19]. In fact,
because we only require unique-neighbor expansion, we can use even more explicit
expanders [2]. However, explicitly constructing or verifying that an RAA code has
distance at least 6n is an open problem, although some progress was made in [53].
More generally, using our strategy, to have an easily verifiable construction of a good
precode, we need to explicitly construct (or efficiently verify) an asymptotically good
code such that the dual code can easily be encoded and such that the dual code
supports an efficient inversion procedure (so that the intended receiver can decode
efficiently). Although we have not solved this problem, we can make some progress by
applying the recursive strategy suggested earlier. Once the number of extra variable
nodes is reduced to n3, we no longer have to worry about the efficiency of encoding
or inversion, since these procedures can be carried out in O(n2) and O(n3) time,
respectively, for any linear code. Constructing asymptotically good codes explicitly
is simple, since we can use the same expander constructions as before. Thus, we
get an explicit code, but this code does not quite achieve semantic security since the
probability that the eavesdropper learns some information only decays as e' , which
vanishes, but not exponentially quickly.
6.5 Semantic Security for the BEC/BEC case
In this section, we construct codes with linear encoding and decoding complexity
that possess semantic security and achieve the capacity of a wiretap channel where the
channel between the transmitter and the receiver is BEC(ei) and the channel between
the transmitter and the eavesdropper is BEC(e2). Unlike the previous section, the
codes we construct do not have uniformly bounded complexity-the complexity of
the precode is now O("(log(})) 2). As in the setup of Theorem 6.3.1, we do not make
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any assumptions on the rate R channel code used for the BEC (other than the fact
that the code is linear), i.e., we construct an ensemble of precodes such that for any
linear channel code, with high probability a randomly chosen member of the ensemble
is a good precode for the given channel code.
Copying the approach from the previous section, we would like to construct an
extractor for the appropriate source. Assuming that a linear code is used for the chan-
nel code, it follows that the eavesdropper learns that the channel input is uniformly
distributed over some affine subspace of GF(2)Rn. Thus, instead of constructing an
extractor for bit-fixing. sources, we must construct an extractor for arbitrary affine
subspaces. It turns out that we can accomplish this by introducing some more ran-
domness into the construction. At a high level, the construction contains many of the
same basic ingredients as the previous case. We start by showing how to communicate
near the secrecy capacity assuming that the intended receiver already has en secret
bits, i.e., the analog of a modified NSIRA code. Then, we show a highly suboptimal
(in terms of rate) scheme for transmitting the en secret bits, i.e., the analog of the
dual RAA codes with the parity check modification.
To construct a capacity-approaching precode assuming a secret key, we proceed
as follows. Construct a matrix
M= -I HI.
Here I denotes the n(e 2 - ei - e)-dimensional identity matrix, and H is an n(e 2 -
1 + R - e) by n(R - e2 + e1 + e) matrix distributed so that each entry is i.i.d. with
probability ! of being 1, where c is a parameter that we set later. In addition to M,
form an n(e2 - ei - e) by ne' matrix N such that every set of en rows of N is linearly
independent. One way of accomplishing this by taking N to be the adjacency matrix
of an (en, > .5)-expander graph with n(e2 -ei -e) left vertices and ne' = O(ne log(-))
right vertices. Intuitively, N corresponds to the small key that needs be transmitted
secretly, but at a potentially suboptimal rate. Formally, the encoding process proceeds
as follows. Given an n(e 2 - 1 + R - e)-bit message m , first we pick a random secret
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key s of length nE', and a random string x of length n(R - e2 + ei - E). Then, we
compute
t = Hx + Ns + m.
The input to the channel code is the Rn-bit string [t, x]. Note that m = M[t, x] + Ns,
so if the intended receiver can learn the secret key s by some other means, then the
message m can be recovered easily. As we will see, for suitable choices of c, e, and e',
the probability that the eavesdropper's posterior distribution on the message is not
uniform is exponentially small.
Now, we explain how to transmit s. We start with the dual RAA codes, but
we use a generalization of the parity check modification. Specifically, we apply a
random permutation to a dual RAA code with relative distance at least .001 and
rate - such that K(hb(.001) - .0001) > 2. Then, we encode with a channel codeK
capable of recovering from a .001 fraction of erasures. Finally, we encode each bit of
the output using a constant size code to transform the given wiretap channel into a
channel where the transmitter and the receiver are connected by BEC(< .0005) and
the transmitter and the adversary are connected by BEC(> .99995).
Theorem 6.5.1. The code construction above can achieve rates arbitrarily close to the
secrecy capacity for the BEC/BEC wiretap channel, and possesses semantic security.
Encoding and decoding take O((log j)2) time, where E denotes the gap to capacity.
Proof. The complexity of encoding and decoding the main code, specified by M and
N, is O(cn + n log(!)), assuming that N is chosen as an optimal expander graph.
The complexity of encoding and decoding the dual RAA code used to transmit the
secret key is O(nE'log(})). Thus, the complexity of encoding and decoding is
O(n(c + log( ))).
To analyze the security of the scheme, we show that regardless of the (linear)
channel code used to correct errors on the BEC connecting the transmitter to the
intended receiver, the precode described above provides semantic security. As in the
case of a noiseless channel between the transmitter and the intended receiver, our
analysis essentially boils down to proving that certain matrices have full rank with
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high probability. Formally, assume that the channel connecting the transmitter and
the eavesdropper erases at least n(e2 - .5E) symbols. Note that the probability that
this does not happen decays exponentially with n. Because the code is linear, the
eavesdropper learns n(1 - e2 + .5E) linear combinations of the Rn-bit string [t, x].
We show that regardless of the choice of the n(1 - e2 + .5e) linear combinations, the
matrices M and N protect the message m perfectly with high probability. Formally,
let S denote a basis for any n(1 - e2 + .5E) dimensional subspace of GF(2)Rn. We
show that
S 0
T=
M N
has full rank, i.e., rank n(R - .5e) with high probability. To see this, compute the
expected number of strings y such that yT = 0. We represent y as y = [Yi, Y21, where
yi is a string of length n(1 - e2 + .5E) and Y2 is a string of length n(e 2 - 1 + R -
so that yT = yiS+ y2M. Note that S is a basis, so for each Y2, there is at most one
y1 such that y1S + y2M = 0. However, we show that when Y2 has w > En l's, the
probability that there exists any y1 such that YIS + y2M = 0 is small. To see this,
observe that for such a Y2, y2M is distributed as a string of Rn independent bits,
where each bit has probability
1 + (1 - 2c)"
2
of being 0. Thus, for c = log(-), the probability of any string is at most (1+j)Rn.
Thus, the expected number of strings Y2 with at least En l's for which there exists a
y1 such that y1S + y2M = 0 is at most
2 n(e 2 -1+R-e) 2 n(1-e2+.56) 
1 + . 2 Rn
2 5)
for s.5en+og(e)e2Rn
< -. 25En
for sufficiently small E, e.g., E < .251ln(2). Therefore, by Markov's inequality, the
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probability that there exists any string y such that yT = 0 and such that the associ-
ated Y2 has more than en l's is exponentially small. On the other hand, if Y2 has at
most en l's, then by the choice of N it is impossible to have yT = 0, so it follows that
T has full rank with high probability. Therefore, with all but exponentially small
probability, m is perfectly secured provided that s is perfectly secured.
To complete the proof, we must show that s is perfectly secured with all but
exponentially small probability. Let S be a subspace as above, but now of dimension
.0001KE'n. Let C denote the code formed by taking the set of encodings of the all 0-
string. Then, C' is an RAA code, except that we have applied a random permutation.
Proving that s is communicated secrectly boils down to showing that the matrix
S
T =
LC1
has full rank, where with a slight abuse of notation, C' in definition of T denotes
a basis for the code C'. To show that yT = 0 has no nonzero solutions, we must
show that no codeword in C' lies in S. The key point is that the RAA code is
asymptotically good. Thus, if c is a codeword in C', then c has at least .001Ke'n l's,
and at most .999Ke'n l's. 3 Therefore, after the random permutation, the probability
that c lies in S is at most poly(n)2.0001KE'n2-Kh(.001)E'n, so the probability that any
codeword lies inside S is at most poly(n)2n'(1-K(h(.00).0001)), completing the proof
of secrecy.
Finally, notice that the gap to capacity is O(E') = O(e log(.)), and the encod-
ing and decoding complexities are 0 ( n (log ())2), which completes the proof of the
theorem. EL
6.5.1 Explicit Constructions
Theorem 6.5.1 shows that there exist codes with computationally efficient encoding
and decoding algorithms that possess semantic security for the special case of erasure
3To obtain the upper bound on the number of 1's, we slightly modify an RAA code by appending
O's to every codeword.
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channels to the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. As in the case of Theorem
6.4.1, we can ask for an explicit construction of a code with the desired properties.
This is closely related to the notion of deterministic extraction from affine sources [41,
i.e., sources that are uniform over some affine subspace. In the computer science
literature, this has been considered for large alphabets, where a Reed-Solomon like
construction provides some nontrivial guarantees. Also, the weaker notion of an affine
disperser, which is a function that only produces one bit of output, with the property
that the function is not constant on any affine source, has been considered in [8].
As before, we have made the problem easier because we only need to be able to
extract from almost all affine sources-for an exponentially small fraction of affine
sources, it is okay if we fail to extract randomness. On the other hand, we have once
again proved the existence of extractors that come equipped with extremely efficient
algorithms to perform extraction and compute a random preimage, and we are able
to extract almost all the randomness in the source. Of course, the new construction
uses much more randomness than in the case of Theorem 6.4.1, so it is no longer so
simple to construct an explicit, or easily verifiable, code. We leave the construction
of explicit codes for the case of BECs to the intended receiver and the eavesdropper
as an open problem.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a new channel model called the constant-capacity com-
pound wiretap channel, and we proposed semantic security as a slight strengthening
of the notion of strong security from [83]. We also proposed several different code
constructions based on the principle that secrecy can be guaranteed using a precode,
so channel codes can be treated as a black box designed independently of the pre-
code. In particular, we showed a simple construction that achieves the capacity of
any degraded wiretap channel, for example the Gaussian wiretap channel, possesses
strong security, and has O(nlog(n)loglog(n)) encoding and decoding complexity.
For the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel, we provided a code construc-
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tion that achieves half of the secrecy capacity, possesses strong security, and has
O(n log(n) log log(n)) encoding and decoding complexity. We also constructed codes
possessing semantic security for two simple cases of the wiretap channel. First, for the
case of a noiseless channel to the intended receiver and a BEC to the eavesdropper,
we constructed codes that achieve the secrecy capacity, possess semantic security,
and can be encoded and decoded with uniformly bounded complexity. For the case
of BECs to both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper, we constructed codes
that achieve the secrecy capacity, possess semantic security, and can be encoded and
decoded with O(2(log(1)) 2 ) complexity, where e denotes the gap to capacity.
There are several open problems related to results in this chapter. As mentioned
in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.5.1, constructing explicit codes with the same performance
as our random ensembles could be interesting. In particular, constructing explicit
RAA codes that are asymptotically good is an.interesting challenge for future work.
Also, constructing secrecy-capacity achieving codes with linear time encoding and de-
coding algorithms that possess semantic security for more general channels remains
open. For example, even in the simple case of a noiseless channel to the intended
receiver and a BSC to the eavesdropper, it is not known how to construct such codes.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore other methods of generalizing the wiretap
channel. We have proposed the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel in this
chapter as an attempt to make the constraint that the eavesdropper is somehow fun-
damentally limited by physics in terms of how well he can receive the transmitter's
signal more plausible, but coming up with more general models is particularly impor-
tant assuming that one wants to pursue the wiretap channel as an actually practical
model, rather than just an interesting theoretical toy problem. As one example of
why such generalizations are important, we note that assuming certain conjectures
in computational complexity theory are true, e.g., the existence of trapdoor permu-
tations, computationally secure transmission is possible at the usual capacity of the
channel between the transmitter and the intended receiver, and this remains the case
even if the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is noiseless. Thus,
we pay a large penalty by using information-theoretic security (unless the channel be-
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tween the transmitter and the eavesdropper has very low capacity), so unless a strong
argument can be made for the underlying assumptions of the wiretap channel model,
it is unlikely that one can justify using the information-theoretic security guarantee
over a computational security guarantee.
178
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis has explored the application of sparse graph codes to four different prob-
lems, showing that sparse graph codes have potential as a low complexity alternative
to random codes in contexts beyond channel coding. We briefly summarize the main
results of Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. Then, we describe possible directions for future
work.
7.1 Summary of Results
First, in Chapter 3 we considered using sparse graphs codes to construct locally
encodable and decodable source codes. For a simple class of sources, namely vectors
of nonnegative integers subject to average and maximum constraints, we proposed
a solution based on sparse graph codes that possesses nontrivial local encoding and
local decoding properties, while still using space close to the information-theoretic
limit.
In Chapter 4, we applied sparse graph codes to the problem of compressed sensing.
In the first half of Chapter 4, we showed that linear measurements derived from sparse
graph codes, specifically expander graphs, can perform well for compressed sensing,
and further, that message-passing algorithms can be used as an efficient alternative
to LP for recovering the original signal x from the measurements y. In particular,
we showed that a simple message-passing algorithm can be used to recover sparse
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signals, and the same algorithm also provides an f1/41 guarantee. In the second half
of Chapter 4, we showed that linear measurements based on binary matrices or on
very sparse matrices do not behave well with respect to the RIP 2, suggesting that
either a new proof technique or a different class of linear measurements is needed to
develop fast (i.e., linear or near linear time) reconstruction algorithms providing £2 /li
recovery guarantees.
In Chapter 5, we considered using sparse graphs codes for lossy source coding.
While we could not develop efficient algorithms for lossy source coding using sparse
graph codes, we were able to prove nontrivial guarantees on the performance of sparse
graph codes when optimal (and computationally very expensive) algorithms are used.
Specifically, we show that if one ignores computational complexity, there is a strong
duality between the lossy source coding problem and the channel coding problem-
for many rate-distortion problems, a good channel code (i.e., a code achieving low
probability of error under ML decoding) for an appropriate dual channel automatically
achieves low distortion for the original rate-distortion problem. This duality result
was proved using isoperimetric inequalities, and interestingly this result applies to
any code, not just sparse graph codes. Roughly speaking, our result says that in high
dimensions, i.e., for long blocklengths, good sphere-packings are automatically good
covers.
In the second half of Chapter 5, we analyzed the interplay between graph structure
and sparsity for the BSS-HD problem. We proved lower bounds on the sparsity
of LDGM codes and LDPC codes that are tight to within constant factors. As
explained in Chapter 5, this is the analog in lossy source coding of a phenomenon
that has already been observed for channel coding, where a compound construction
based on LDGM codes and LDPC codes can fundamentally achieve lower complexity
(uniformly bounded complexity for the BEC) than either LDGM codes or LDPC
codes individually.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we applied sparse graph codes to the wiretap channel [120].
First, we defined the information-theoretic analog of semantic security [49], and clari-
fied the relationship between our analog of semantic security and the notion of strong
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security considered in the wiretap channel literature. Then, we proposed a general
architecture for constructing codes for wiretap channels, allowing the separate design
of a precode with good security properties and a good channel code. We used this ap-
proach to show that for any degraded wiretap channel, there exist precodes possessing
strong security whose encoding and decoding complexities are 0(n log n log log n). For
the special case of wiretap channels where the component channels are BECs, we de-
signed sparse graph codes possessing semantic security whose encoding and decoding
complexities are only 0(n).
7.2 Future Work
There are many interesting avenues for future research. We briefly review some of
the open problems suggested in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.
For Chapter 3, an interesting direction for future work is to consider methods from
the data structures literature. Specifically, techniques from that field may provide
lower bounds showing that local encoding and local decoding cannot be simultane-
ously achieved with low complexity. On the positive side, techniques from the data
structures literature may also suggest techniques for improving our code construc-
tions. More broadly, extending our results to the design of locally encodable and
decodable source codes for a larger class of sources would be very interesting.
We view the results in Chapter 4 as a step towards formally connecting the the-
ory of message-passing algorithms with that of compressed sensing. An interesting
research direction would be to extend the connection between message-passing and
compressed sensing further. For example, it would be interesting to design message-
passing algorithms that provide £2/eI reconstruction guarantees. We note that this
problem was also suggested in [52] in the context of explicitly constructing good mea-
surement matrices, but even proving results for randomly constructed matrices would
be interesting.
Finding an explicit construction of matrices satisfying the RIP 2 remains an inter-
esting open problem. We have shown that existing constructions have essentially been
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pushed as far as possible, in the sense that our bound on the number of rows required
by binary matrices is within a constant factor of the construction in [31]. From the
point of view of developing efficient algorithms, it would be interesting to explore
new class of codes, or develop a new analysis technique besides RIP 2 , to design more
efficient algorithms providing e2/fi guarantees.
The main open problem related to Chapter 5 is to design a provably efficient algo-
rithm for the BSS-HD problem. As noted in Chapter 5, even developing algorithms
for the BSS-HD problem with complexity per bit that provably scales subexponen-
tially as a function of , where E denotes the gap to the rate-distortion bound, is still
an open problem.
There are several open problems related to results in Chapter 6. As mentioned
in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.5.1, constructing explicit codes with the same performance as
our random ensembles could be interesting. In particular, constructing explicit RAA
codes that are asymptotically good is an interesting challenge. Also, constructing
secrecy-capacity achieving codes with linear time encoding and decoding algorithms
that possess semantic security for more general channels remains open. For example,
even in the simple case of a noiseless channel to the intended receiver and a BSC
to the eavesdropper, it is not known how to construct such codes. Finally, it would
be interesting to explore other methods of generalizing the wiretap channel. We
proposed the constant-capacity compound wiretap channel as an attempt to make
the constraint that the eavesdropper is somehow fundamentally limited by physics
in terms of how well he can receive the transmitter's signal slightly more palatable,
but coming up with more general models is particularly important assuming that one
wants to pursue the wiretap channel as an actually practical model, rather than just
an interesting theoretical toy problem.
In a broader context, there are many other problems in information theory where
random codes have been used, and it would be interesting to construct sparse graph
codes for these problems. The examples considered in this thesis showed mainly
positive results, i.e., for the problems we considered sparse graph codes could replace
random codes with essentially no loss in performance, but sparse graph codes could
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lower the complexity dramatically. It would be interesting to see if there are problems
where there is a fundamental performance loss incurred by using sparse graph codes.
For example, the results on RIP 2 in Chapter 4 are in this vein, but because RIP 2 is
not a necessary condition for f2/f1 reconstruction guarantees, these result does not
quite furnish an example where sparse graph codes are provably substantially worse
than random codes.
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Appendix A
Additional Proofs for Chapter 3
This appendix contains a proof of lemma 3.8.2, including a detailed example of the
density evolution technique, and a proof of Lemma 3.5.5, that the BAILOUT algo-
rithm can be modified to run in a small amount of space.
A.1 Analysis of modified BAILOUT algorithm
In this section, we describe the modified BAILOUT algorithm and prove Lemma
3.5.5.
The modified BAILOUT algorithm is very similar to the original BAILOUT al-
gorithm. The reason that the BAILOUT algorithm cannot be implemented in the
natural way is that if we store the numbers associated with each edge naively, then
the space will be to large. So, the modified BAILOUT algorithm stores the messages
in compressed form. Of course, storing the messages in compressed form requires
some modifications of the BAILOUT algorithm.
To give a more formal description of the modified BAILOUT algorithm, we first
describe the compression scheme that will be used. The compression scheme is just
a simple prefix-free code, similar to the naive prefix-free coding solution described
in Section 3.2. Given an integer x, the prefix-free encoding is computed as follows.
First, we compute 1, the length of the binary expansion of x. Then, we compute 1',
the length of the binary expansion of 1. Now, the prefix-free encoding of x starts with
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1: Initialization - Set 1, = m, 0 for all left vertices v.
2: Update mv by computing
max c -m( min cy - z
w E N(e) x N(W)-V y EN(x) z N(y)-x
3: Set 1, = m, for all left vertices v.
4: Termination - Repeat steps 1-2 until the values converge. By convergence, we
mean that l, = m, for all left vertices before step 2 is run, i.e., step 2 has no
effect.
5: return overflow(v) = l for all vertices.
Algorithm 5: Modified BAILOUT Subroutine
1' 1's, followed by a 0. Next, we append the binary expansion of 1. Finally, we append
the binary expansion of x. 1
Now, the modified BAILOUT algorithm stores a number for each left vertex, in-
stead of for each edge. Intuitively, this makes sense because the BAILOUT subroutine
has the property that all numbers associated with edges in the direction leaving a
left vertex v are the same, and clearly storing the same information multiple times is
redundant.
The modified BAILOUT algorithm stores the numbers associated with left ver-
tices in compressed form by concatenating the prefix-free encodings described above.
Algorithm 5 gives a pseudocode description of the modified BAILOUT subroutine.
For simplicity, we store two numbers l and m, for each left vertex, corresponding
to upper and lower bounds. In the pseudocode of Algorithm 5, we leave out the
subscripts f - 1 and f since these should be clear from Section 3.5.2.
The overall modified BAILOUT algorithm calls this subroutine recursively, in an
identical way to the BAILOUT algorithm, except for one difference. The cv values
used in all layers except the last layer are also stored in a compressed form using the
prefix-free encoding. Note that because the l, m, and cv values are always stored
in compressed form, reading or updating a single 1v or m, can be as computationally
expensive as reading through the entire compressed representation.
'This scheme is very similar to Elias delta coding [38], and Elias delta coding would also work
for our application, but our method is slightly easier to describe.
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Proof of Lemma 3.5.5. Correctness is clear because the modified BAILOUT subrou-
tine performs an equivalent computation to the original BAILOUT subroutine. To
analyze the running time, observe that the BAILOUT subroutine is called L times
(once for each layer 0 < f < L - 1), and the proof of Lemma 3.5.4 shows that we
require at most N iterations for a single subroutine call to converge. In each iteration,
we update O(N) values. To update a single value, we need to read 0(1) values stored
in compressed form. Let U be an upper bound on the length of any of the compressed
strings representing l1, mi, and c,. Then, reading or updating a single value takes
O(U) time. Therefore, the total running time is at most O(N 2 LU) time.
The workspace needed is the space to store l, mv, and c, in each layer. 2 Note
that the space can be recycled. Specifically, as we work our way back towards the first
layer, the initialization destroys the l, mv, and cv values from the previous subroutine
call. Therefore, we just need to analyze the maximum space needed for one subroutine
call. The space is O(U), so this means we just need to produce an upper bound on
U.
We complete the proof by showing that U = 4N + O(E log(1/)N). First, note
that for positive x, our prefix-free encoding uses at most 4 + log x + 2 log log(2x) bits
to represent the integer x, and our prefix-free encoding uses 4 bits to encode x = 0.
Now, consider layer 0. We know that l and mv are always at most overflow(v),
so the compressed representation of these numbers has length at most E 4 +
log(overflow(xi)) +2 log log(2overflow(xi)), where it is understood that for those terms
where the overflow is 0, we take the value of the logarithm to be 0 rather than -oc.
The functions log x and log log(2x) are both concave, Eoverflow(xi) < N/K 2 , and
overflow(xi) > 0 for at most N/K 2 inputs. Therefore, the maximum of El 4 +
log(overflow(xi)) + 2 log log(2overflow(xi)) is achieved when all the nonzero overflows
are equal, giving us an upper bound of 4N + O(N/K 2 ). The same technique can be
used to bound the length of the compressed representation of the cv values in the
first layer. The analysis can also be repeated for the higher layers, using Lemma
2There is also workspace associated with performing arithmetic, e.g., subtraction, but this is
O(log(AN)), and hence negligible for our purposes.
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3.8.9. However, because the size of the layers shrinks geometrically, not surprisingly
the largest upper bound comes from the first layer. Thus, U = 4N + O(E log(1/s)N),
completing the proof.
A.2 Completing the Analysis of WHP
In this section, we complete the analysis of WHP by proving Lemma 3.8.2. The proof
involves several steps. First, we show that no counters in VL can ever overflow. Thus,
even though bL is finite, the counters in bL already contain the values that they would
have stored if bL = oO. Next, we focus on a single computation tree, and analyze how
the failure probability decays as a function of the depth of the tree. We show that
the failure probability decays doubly exponentially as a function of the depth. This
proof is done in two steps. First, we introduce a new probability distribution on the
counter values. This distribution is different than the probability distribution induced
by our data structure. For the new distribution, we are able to modify an argument
from [70] to prove doubly exponential decay. In the second step, we show that the new
distribution is in some sense close to the distribution induced by our data structure,
and in particular doubly exponential decay under the first distribution implies doubly
exponential decay under the second distribution. Finally, we use a union bound over
computation trees to bound the probability of failure for each layer f.
A.2.1 Bounds on the Number of Overflowing Counters
In this section we prove two lemmas bounding how many counters can overflow.
These lemmas are the analog of Lemmas 3.8.8 and 3.8.9 for the Ve's, and the proofs
are identical.
Lemma A.2.1. No counter in VL can overflow.
Proof. We prove that the largest possible value that needs to be stored in a counter
in VL is at most 2KMA2. Because 2 bL> M none of these counters overflow.
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To verify the upper bound, consider the first layer. By assumption, the inputs
have maximum value M. Therefore, the overflow is at most [ J. Each counter
in V computes the sum of the overflows associated with its K neighbors in V. Let
s denote this sum. Then, the overflow is given by [12A . Thus, the overflow is
bounded by 2K = 12.
Now, each counter in V2 takes the sum of the overflows of its 6 neighbors in V1,
and each of these overflows is at most 2. Thus, the overflow for counters in V2
is bounded by
S12A2 M
8 12K 2A 2
Continuing down to the last layer, we see that in the last layer the counters in VL
have an overflow of at most M2i2. Since each counter in VL+1 is connected to 6
counters in VL, the largest possible value that a counter in VL needs to store is at
most 2KMA 2 -
Now, we show that even for V, .. . , VL-1, the fraction of counters that overflow
must be small.
Lemma A.2.2. The fraction of counters in V that overflow is at most 1/ K 2. Also,
for all f > 0, the fraction of counters in V that overflow is at most 1/12.
Proof. Recall that the input must satisfy L xi < AN. Thus, at most a 1/K 2 fraction
of the inputs can have values that are greater than or equal to K 2A, which proves the
first part of the lemma. Because G1 is (3, K)-regular, the average value associated
with counters on the right is at most KA, and therefore at most 1/12 of the counters
in V1 are greater than or equal to 12KA. Repeating this analysis for the future layers,
we see that at every layer at most 1/12 of the counters overflow. O
A.2.2 Failure Probability for a Single Computation Tree,
Part 1
In this section we introduce a probability distribution over the counter values, and
prove that for this distribution the failure probability decays doubly exponentially.
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This will be useful later when we prove Lemma 3.8.2.
First, we describe the probability distribution considered in this section. Pick an
arbitrary f. We want to analyze a computation tree in Ge, so we define a probability
distribution over the counters in V-1. For each counter in Ve_1, we independently
assign it an overflow as follows. With probability q, the overflow is 0, i.e., there is
no overflow. With probability 1 - q, the overflow is nonzero. We do not specify how
to assign a specific nonzero value to the overflow because, as we shall see, for the
purposes of analysis it is sufficient to know whether the overflow is 0 or nonzero. In
other words, for nonzero overflow, the precise value of the overflow does not affect
whether the WHP subroutine is successful or not. Regardless of how the nonzero
overflows are assigned, we assume that the input to the WHP subroutine has the
correct c, values for the counters in V, i.e., once the overflows in V-1 have been
assigned, we pretend that be = 00, so that each counter in V stores the sum of the
overflows of its neighbors in V-1.
Now that the probability distribution is set, we can analyze the probability of fail-
ure for the WHP subroutine under this probability distribution. Specifically, consider
a counter (V, f - 1) in V-1, and imagine running the WHP subroutine (omitting step
7, the termination step) on computation trees rooted at (V, - 1) of increasing depths.
Let pt be the probability that after running the subroutine on the computation tree
rooted at (V, f - 1) of depth t, the message outgoing from (v, f - 1) (either a lower or
upper bound depending on the depth of the tree mod 4) is not equal to (v, - 1)'s
overflow. Also, let A(x) = x, and let p(x) = x5 if f > 1. If f = 1, let p(x) = xK-1.
Lemma A.2.3. There exists a constant T > 0 so that P4t+2 = A(l - p(1 - Pt)) and
P4t+4 = qA(1 - pl - P4t+2)) for t < T log N.
Remarks: As promised in Chapter 1, Lemma A.2.3 is an application of density
evolution to our construction. Also, Lemma A.2.3 is implicit in Theorem 2 of [73].
Proof. To prove the formulas above, we consider steps 1 through 5 of the WHP
subroutine separately. For ease of exposition, we start by considering a computation
tree of depth 4.
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First, consider the value on an edge outgoing from a leaf of the computation tree,
i.e., the outgoing value from a counter at depth 4. Recall that these messages are all
0, and thus, po = q, because by assumption each counter overflows with probability
q.
Next, consider the value on an edge from a counter (u, f) at depth 3 to its parent
P(u, f). We want to compute the probability that this value is correct, i.e., the value
is equal to the overflow of P(u, f). Recall that this value is computed by subtracting
from cu the sum of incoming values to (U, f) from C(u, f). Thus, the outgoing value
from (u, f) is correct if and only if the incoming values are all correct. For our
probability model, recall that every counter in V_ 1 sets its overflow independently,
and therefore the messages coming into (U, f) are independent. Each value is correct
with probability 1 - po, which means that for the definition of p(x) given above, the
probability that the value leaving u is correct is p(l - PO).
Now, consider the probability that the value on an edge leaving a counter (u, f- 1)
at depth 2 is correct, i.e., the value is equal to (u, f - 1)'s overflow. Recall that we
take the minimum of the values on the incoming edges. From Lemma 3.5.1, it follows
that this procedure produces the correct value if and only if at least one edge coming
into (u, - 1) has the correct value. Because every counter in V sets its overflow
independently, the incoming values to (U, f - 1) are independent. For each incoming
value, the probability of being wrong is 1 - p(1 - po). Thus, for the definition of A
given above, the probability that all incoming values are wrong is A(1 - p(1 - po)),
i.e., P2 = A(1 - p(l - po)).
Next, we must consider the value on an edge leaving a counter (U, f) at depth 1.
Because the value is computed in the same way as the outgoing value from a counter
at depth 3, the analysis is identical. Therefore, the probability that the outgoing
value is wrong is simply p(1 - P2).
Finally, consider the outgoing value from the root. This value is computed by
taking the maximum of the values on all incoming edges to the root, and 0. For this
value to be wrong, observe that two things must happen. First, from Lemma 3.5.1,
we see that for the outgoing value to be wrong every value coming into the root must
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be wrong. However, from Lemma 3.5.1 we know that even if every incoming edge
has the wrong value, if the root has zero overflow, then the outgoing message is still
correct. This is because we take the maximum of not just the incoming values, but
also 0. The values coming into the root are independent of the root, and each of these
values is wrong with probability 1- p(l -P2). Thus, the probability that all incoming
values are wrong is A(1 - p(1 - P2)). Because the incoming values are independent
of the root, the overall probability that the outgoing value from the root is wrong is
P4 = qA(1 - p(1 - P2)).
The preceding analysis proves the lemma for t = 0. However, it is clear that
nothing in the analysis is specific to the t = 0 case, i.e., these recursions remain valid
for going from p4 to P6 and P6 to ps, and so on. Thus, we have proved the lemma,
except for one minor technical detail which we now describe.
The above derivation crucially relies on the fact that the computation tree is a
tree in the graph-theoretic sense-if the computation tree contains a cycle, then the
values on edges coming into a counter may not be independent. In order to guarantee
that the computation tree is a tree, 2(4t +4) must be less than the girth of the graph
Gj. By Lemma 3.3.1 we know that the girth of Ge is Q(log N), and hence a suitable
T> 0 exists. l
As an aside, in the following analysis we implicitly assume that t < log N. Look-
ing at the values t(j) defined in Section 3.5.1, it is clear that all of the & 's are
o(log N), so for our purposes the assumption t < log N is not a major restriction.
Lemma A.2.3 gives us a method for bounding the probability of failure. Specifi-
cally, recall that the WHP subroutine (with step 7 included) fails if the computation
trees of depth t and depth t + 2 give different outgoing values for the root. For this
to happen, at least one of these two computation trees must give the wrong outgoing
value. Applying the union bound, we see that the probability that at least one of the
outgoing messages is wrong is at most Pt + Pt+2. Thus, our goal is to show that pt
decays doubly exponentially as a function of t.
We split the proof that pt decays doubly exponentially into two steps. First, we
show that pt -+ 0 as t -- oo. Then, we modify an argument from [70] to prove that
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if pt -+ 0 as t -+ o, then pt decays doubly exponentially.
Lemma A.2.4. For e > 1, if q = 1/12, then pt - 0 as t -- oo. For f = 1, if
q = 1/K 2 , then Pt -+ 0 as t -+ oo.
Proof. Let f(x) = A(1 - p(1 - A(1 - p(l - x)))). From Lemma A.2.3, we know that
P4t+4 qf (p4t). Also, note that po = q.
Observe that f is a continuous function, f is nonnegative on the interval [0, q],
and f(0) = 0. Assume that qf(x) < x for all x E (0, q]. Then, clearly the recursion
above satisfies the property pt -+ 0 as t -+ oo. Thus, to complete the proof we just
have to show that qf(x) < x for all x E (0, q]. Specifically, we must show that
(1 -(I( (1 
-X)5)2)5)2 < z12
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for 0 < x n, and that
- (1 - (1 - (1 - x)K-1)2)K-1)2 <3;
for 0 < x < 1.
The second inequality can easily be proved using Taylor series. Specifically, for
any 0 < x < 1, Taylor's theorem implies that (1 - z)K-1 > 1 - (K - 1)x. 3
Thus, 1 - (1 - X)K-1 < (K - 1)x, so (1 - (1 - z)K-1)2 < (K - 1)2x2. Therefore,
(1 - (1 - (1 - (1 - X)K-1)2)K-1)2 < (K - 1) 2 ((K - 1)2X2)2 < K6X4 . Thus, it suffices
to show that K 4x4 < x for 0 < x < 1/K 2. But K 4x 4 < x for all 0 < x < 1/K 4/ 3 , so
we are done.
Applying the analysis above with K 6 gives the bound
1 1 - (1 - (1- (1 - X)5)2)5)2 <3;
5N/
for 0 < x < V/25, and 1/12 < v'-/25, completing the proof.
Now that we know that pt - 0, we prove that the decay is doubly exponential.
3Recall that we assume that K > 2.
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First, we summarize the results of Section V-A of [70] in the following lemma.
Lemma A.2.5. Let dl, d, be two positive integers, and assume that d, > 3. Let
A(x) - xdi-, and let p(x) xdr-1. Consider the recursion ys+1 = qA(l - p(lI - ys)),
where yo = q. If q is chosen so that y, -> 0 as s -+ oc, then there exist constants
a > 0,d > 1, s* such that Y, < ea-dss
We use Lemma A.2.5 to prove that pt decays doubly exponentially.
Lemma A.2.6. If q is chosen so that pt -+ 0 as t -+ oc, then there exist constants
a> O,d> 1,t* such thatpt < e-ad-t*
Proof. The only difference between the recursion taking pt to Pt+4 and the recursion
considered in Lemma A.2.5 is that we apply the map x -+ A(1 - p(1 - x)) twice
instead of just once. By expanding A(1 - p(l - x)) in a Taylor series around x = 0,
i.e., expanding out the polynomial, it is clear that A(1 - p(l - x)) = O(x 2) for x near
0, and thus A(1 - p(1 - x)) < x for all x in some neighborhood of 0, say [0, a]. Also,
note that A(1 - p(1 - x)) is monotonically increasing over the interval [0, 1].
Now, by assumption there exists some t* such that p* < a. For all future iterations,
we have
Pt+i < pA (I - p(l - pt)),
i.e., we can eliminate one instance of the map x -> A(1 - p(l - x)) because we know
that the map only makes things smaller for x < a. But once we eliminate one instance
of the map x -+ A(1 - p(1 - x)), we are left with exactly the same recurrence as in
Lemma A.2.5.
To apply Lemma A.2.5, we need to verify that the value of q is such that the
recursion ys+1 = qA(1 - p(1 - y,)), yo = q has the property that y, -+ 0 as s -> o.
By assumption, pt -+ 0 as t -+ 00. Looking at the recursions given in Lemma A.2.3,
we see that because A(1 - p(1 - x)) is monotonically increasing for x > 0, ys < P2s,
and thus y, -+ 0. Thus, Lemma A.2.5 does apply, and we can conclude that pt decays
doubly exponentially once pt < a.
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Remark: As we observed above, A(1 - p(1 - x)) is monotonically increasing on the
interval [0, 1]. Therefore, if we view pt as a function of q, then pt is monotonically
increasing, i.e., for all t, pt is larger for larger q. Thus, although we only explicitly
proved doubly exponential decay for the values q = 1/12 and q = 1/K 2 , it follows
that we have also proved doubly exponential decay for all values smaller than 1/12
and smaller than 1/K 2
A.2.3 Failure Probability for a Single Computation Tree,
Part 2
Now, we prove that for the probability distribution induced by our data structure,
the failure probability is doubly exponential. This represents the next step after the
analysis presented in Section A.2.2 towards proving Lemma 3.8.2.
To prove doubly exponential decay, we prove that in some sense, our choice of
random graphs induces a distribution that is "close" to the i.i.d. distribution con-
sidered in the previous section. We do this in two steps. First, we show that the
failure probability when a fraction q of the counters are chosen uniformly at random
to overflow is not much larger than the failure probability when the counters overflow
i.i.d. with probability q. Then, we show that the probability of failure under the
distribution induced by our data structure is not much larger than the probability of
failure in the uniform model. Together with Lemma A.2.6, this implies that we get
doubly exponential decay.
Lemma A.2.7. Under the same assumptions as in Lemma A.2.6, for any 0 < q <
1, the probability of failure when we select a fraction q of the counters in Ve_1 to
overflow uniformly at random is at most Vi times the probability of failure when the
set of counters that overflow is generated by selecting each counter independently with
probability q.
Proof. To show that the failure probability behaves essentially the same under the
two different models, we will show that the input to the subroutine has approximately
the same distribution under either model. Specifically, given a computation tree, let
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a configuration be an assignment of either "overflow" or "don't overflow" to each
counter at even depth in the computation tree. Then, the failure probability is the
sum of the probabilities of configurations that cause the WHP subroutine to fail.
We show that for each configuration, the probability of observing this configuration
under the model where we select a fraction q of the counters to overflow uniformly is at
most V/e times as much as the probability when the counters overflow independently
with probability q. Note that our proof assumes that the local neighborhood is small-
in particular, our proof only works under the assumption that the computation tree
has at most lVI_1| vertices, i.e., the number of iterations in every layer must be
substantially smaller than log N. As noted previously, this is always the case for our
choice of parameters, so this assumption is valid.
Given the assumption that the computation tree is small, the proof is straightfor-
ward. Define N1 to be the number of counters that overflow in a particular configu-
ration, and define N 2 to be the number of counters that do not overflow. Then, for
the independent overflow model, the probability of this configuration is qNi (1 - q)N2.
For the uniform model, the probability is
q|V-1| (q|V11| - 1) (q|Vi_1| - 2) .. . (q|Vi_1| - N1 + 1)
(1 - q)|JV_1| ((1 - q)|IV_1| - 1) ... ((1 - q)|JV-1I - N2 + 1) 4
- 1)...( 1 - N1 - N2 + 1)
Now, we want to show that this second expression is not much bigger than qNi(1 _
q)N2. This is simple. The first N1 terms are all ; q, so we can upper bound the first
N1 terms by qNi. For the remaining N2 terms, we rewrite each fraction as
( i±+N1 ___ N i+N_-(1-q) 1+ 1-q < (1 - q) e|VgIiNi|Vf_1| - i - N1
where i ranges from 0 to N2 - 1. To complete the proof, we just need to upper bound
N 2 _ Ii+N-e IVeiI-i-Ni
4This formula can of course be written more compactly using binomial coefficients, but expanding
it out this way makes the rest of the proof obvious.
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This is where we use the assumption that the computation tree is small, i.e., that
N1 + N2 < |Ve-1f. Because of this assumption, we know that the denominator of
every fraction is at least .5|V_1|, provided that |Ve_i > 4. Now, if q = 0 or q = 1,
both models are identical. Thus, we may assume that 0 < q < 1. This means that
i - q < 0 for nonnegative i. Thus, we may bound the sum in the exponent by
E2N/|V-1| = 2NiN 2/|Ve-i. But N1 N2 < .25|V_1|I because N 1 + N2 < VX-i l, so
the exponent is at most .5. This proves that for all configurations, the ratio between
the probabilities under the two models is at most fe/. Thus, the failure probability
when the overflowing counters are selected uniformly is at most V/2 times as much as
the failure probability when the counters overflow independently. El
Lemma A.2.8. The failure probability for the distribution induced by our data struc-
ture is at most twice the failure probability for the uniform case.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma A.2.7. Specifically, we prove that
the input distribution induced by our data structure is close to the distribution for
the uniform case. To do this, note that in terms of the grid interpretation of Q
given in Section 3.3.2, the uniform case corresponds to applying a uniformly random
permutation to the left vertices of G, instead of a permutation to the rows and
columns separately. Fix a computation tree, and consider the distribution of where
the computation tree gets mapped under a uniformly random permutation versus the
row-column permutation. The key observation is that because of our choice of the grid
layout in Section 3.3.2, i.e., our choice of F, the left vertices of every computation
tree all lie in different rows and columns. Therefore, the row-column permutation
distribution is identical to the uniformly random distribution, conditioned on the
event that the uniformly random permutation maps all left vertices in the computation
tree to different rows and columns.
To finish the proof, note that the probability that a uniformly random permu-
tation does not map a set of size S to all different rows and columns is at most
(S)3/2N, which is less than .5 for S < .5N.25. For our choice of tj', the compu-
tation tree is always smaller that .5N 25 , so the probability that a uniformly random
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permutation maps the computation tree to all different rows and columns is at least
.5, and therefore the failure probability conditioned on this event is at most twice the
unconditional failure probability. E
Lemma A.2.9. The failure probability for the distribution induced by our data struc-
ture is at most e-adt-t*
Proof. We prove the lemma by combining Lemmas A.2.7 and A.2.8. To start our
analysis, consider the event that exactly k counters in V_1 overflow. Conditioned
on this event, Lemma A.2.7 says that the failure probability is at most V times
the failure probability when the counters overflow independently with probability
k/IiV_1|. Lemma A.2.2 says that k/IV_1i < 1/12 for f > 0, and k/|Vol < 1/K 2 . Also,
we noted above that for the independent overflow model, the failure probability is
monotonically increasing as a function of the overflow probability, i.e., monotonically
increasing as a function of k/IV_i. So, we see that for all k, the failure probability
conditioned on k counters overflowing is at most V/e times the failure probability
when the counters overflow independently with probability 1/12 (if f > 0) or 1/K 2
(if f = 0).
Combining the above discussion with Lemma A.2.8, we see that the failure prob-
ability is bounded by 4 fe-adt-t* for all k. ' To complete the proof, observe that the
probability of failure can be expressed as
Pr[failure] =E Pr[exactly k counters overflow]
k
Pr[failureIexactly k counters overflow]
< S 4 /--ad t Pr[exactly k counters overflow]
k
S4A/e -adtt*
Note that the 4v/e factor can be absorbed into a, d, and t.
5One factor of 2 comes from Lemma A.2.8. The other factor of 2 comes from the fact we use a
union bound, i.e., as mentioned previously, we must add pt + Pt+2.
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A.2.4 Completing the Proof of Lemma 3.8.2
Finally, we prove Lemma 3.8.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.8.2. From Lemma A.2.9, we know that for a single computation
tree, the failure probability is at most e-adt* . From the proof of Lemma 3.8.4, we
know that the number of computation trees in GE during the pth repetition is at most
n "). The union bound implies that the probability that any subroutine call fails in
Gf is at most n, 4e-"d'~'. Substituting in the definitions given Section 3.5.1, we see
that n p)-eadtt* 6(P)L. l
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